Results for 'Sleeping Beauty'

997 found
Order:
See also
  1. Sleeping Beauty: Awakenings, Chance, Secrets, and Video.Nathan Salmón - 2024 - In Alessandro Capone, Pietro Perconti & Roberto Graci (eds.), Philosophy, Cognition and Pragmatics. Springer Nature Switzerland. pp. 53-65.
    A new philosophical analysis is provided of the notorious Sleeping Beauty Problem. It is argued that the correct solution is one-third, but not in the way previous philosophers have typically meant this. A modified version of the Problem demonstrates that neither self-locating information nor amnesia is relevant to the core Problem, which is simply to evaluate the conditional chance of heads given an undated Monday-or-Tuesday awakening. Previous commentators have failed to appreciate the significance of the information that (...) gains upon waking, and which is relevant to the conditional chance of heads: de re acquaintance with the awakening itself and the non-locating knowledge that it is an experimental awakening. David Lewis and company are committed to several unjustifiable and unacceptable probability assessments. Previous commentators have in effect confused the information that Beauty undergoes this particular experimental awakening for the information that she undergoes some experimental awakening or other. Lewis in particular thereby illegitimately tips the scales both in favor of heads and in favor of Monday. The Sleeping Beauty Problem is equivalent to a ball-in-urn word problem in elementary probability theory. (shrink)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Sleeping beauty and the dynamics of de se beliefs.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (2):245-269.
    This paper examines three accounts of the sleeping beauty case: an account proposed by Adam Elga, an account proposed by David Lewis, and a third account defended in this paper. It provides two reasons for preferring the third account. First, this account does a good job of capturing the temporal continuity of our beliefs, while the accounts favored by Elga and Lewis do not. Second, Elga’s and Lewis’ treatments of the sleeping beauty case lead to highly (...)
    Direct download (13 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   87 citations  
  3. Sleeping beauty and the forgetful bayesian.Bradley Monton - 2002 - Analysis 62 (1):47–53.
    Adam Elga takes the Sleeping Beauty example to provide a counter-example to Reflection, since on Sunday Beauty assigns probability 1/2 to H, and she is certain that on Monday she will assign probability 1/3. I will show that there is a natural way for Bas van Fraassen to defend Reflection in the case of Sleeping Beauty, building on van Fraassen’s treatment of forgetting. This will allow me to identify a lacuna in Elga’s argument for 1/3. (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  4. Sleeping Beauty, evidential support and indexical knowledge: reply to Horgan.Joel Pust - 2013 - Synthese 190 (9):1489-1501.
    Terence Horgan defends the thirder position on the Sleeping Beauty problem, claiming that Beauty can, upon awakening during the experiment, engage in “synchronic Bayesian updating” on her knowledge that she is awake now in order to justify a 1/3 credence in heads. In a previous paper, I objected that epistemic probabilities are equivalent to rational degrees of belief given a possible epistemic situation and so the probability of Beauty’s indexical knowledge that she is awake now is (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  5. Sleeping beauty: A note on Dorr's argument for 1/3.Darren Bradley - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):266–268.
    Cian Dorr (2002) gives an argument for the 1/3 position in Sleeping Beauty. I argue this is based on a mistake about Sleeping Beauty's epistemic position.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  6. Sleeping Beauty: Exploring a Neglected Solution.Laureano Luna - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (3):1069-1092.
    The strong law of large numbers and considerations concerning additional information strongly suggest that Beauty upon awakening has probability 1/3 to be in a heads-awakening but should still believe the probability that the coin landed heads in the Sunday toss to be 1/2. The problem is that she is in a heads-awakening if and only if the coin landed heads. So, how can she rationally assign different probabilities or credences to propositions she knows imply each other? This is the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  7. Sleeping Beauty and Self-location: A Hybrid Model.Nick Bostrom - 2007 - Synthese 157 (1):59-78.
    The Sleeping Beauty problem is test stone for theories about self-locating belief, i.e. theories about how we should reasons when data or theories contain indexical information. Opinion on this problem is split between two camps, those who defend the "1/2 view" and those who advocate the "1/3 view". I argue that both these positions are mistaken. Instead, I propose a new "hybrid" model, which avoids the faults of the standard views while retaining their attractive properties. This model _appears_ (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   45 citations  
  8. Sleeping beauty: A simple solution.Ruth Weintraub - 2004 - Analysis 64 (1):8–10.
    I defend the suggestion that the rational probability in the Sleeping Beauty paradox is one third. The reasoning in its favour is familiar: for every heads-waking, there are two tails-wakings. To complete the defense, I rebut the reasoning which purports to justify the competing suggestion – that the correct probability is half – by undermining its premise, that no new information has been received.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   44 citations  
  9. Sleeping Beauty's evidence.Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2019 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. Routledge.
    What degrees of belief does Sleeping Beauty's evidence support? That depends.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. Sleeping Beauty and the Absent-Minded Driver.Jean Baratgin & Bernard Walliser - 2010 - Theory and Decision 69 (3):489-496.
    The Sleeping Beauty problem is presented in a formalized framework which summarizes the underlying probability structure. The two rival solutions proposed by Elga and Lewis differ by a single parameter concerning her prior probability. They can be supported by considering, respectively, that Sleeping Beauty is “fuzzy-minded” and “blank-minded”, the first interpretation being more natural than the second. The traditional absent -minded driver problem is reinterpreted in this framework and sustains Elga’s solution.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  11. Sleeping beauty: In defence of Elga.Cian Dorr - 2002 - Analysis 62 (4):292–296.
    Argues for the "thirder" solution to the Sleeping Beauty puzzle. The argument turns on an analogy with a variant case, in which a coin-toss on Monday night determines whether one's memories of Monday are permanently erased, or merely suspended in such a way that they will return some time after one wakes up on Tuesday.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   77 citations  
  12. Quantum Sleeping Beauty.Peter J. Lewis - 2007 - Analysis 67 (1):59-65.
    The Sleeping Beauty paradox in epistemology and the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics both raise problems concerning subjective probability assignments. Furthermore, there are striking parallels between the two cases; in both cases personal experience has a branching structure, and in both cases the agent loses herself among the branches. However, the treatment of probability is very different in the two cases, for no good reason that I can see. Suppose, then, that we adopt the same treatment of probability (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  13. Sleeping Beauty, Countable Additivity, and Rational Dilemmas.Jacob Ross - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (4):411-447.
    Currently, the most popular views about how to update de se or self-locating beliefs entail the one-third solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem.2 Another widely held view is that an agent‘s credences should be countably additive.3 In what follows, I will argue that there is a deep tension between these two positions. For the assumptions that underlie the one-third solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem entail a more general principle, which I call the Generalized Thirder Principle, (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  14. Sleeping beauty should be imprecise.Daniel Jeremy Singer - 2014 - Synthese 191 (14):3159-3172.
    The traditional solutions to the Sleeping Beauty problem say that Beauty should have either a sharp 1/3 or sharp 1/2 credence that the coin flip was heads when she wakes. But Beauty’s evidence is incomplete so that it doesn’t warrant a precise credence, I claim. Instead, Beauty ought to have a properly imprecise credence when she wakes. In particular, her representor ought to assign \(R(H\!eads)=[0,1/2]\) . I show, perhaps surprisingly, that this solution can account for (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  15.  45
    Sleeping Beauty: why violations of probability laws are `Deal' breakers.Randall G. McCutcheon - manuscript
    Technical criticism of Jacob Ross's "Sleeping Beauty, Countable Additivity and Rational Dilemmas" and Double Halfing.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Sleeping Beauty: a Critical Survey.Randall G. McCutcheon - manuscript
    Rambling, largely unreadable survey of the Sleeping Beauty literature.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17.  56
    Sleeping Beauty’s Credences.Jessi Cisewski, Joseph B. Kadane, Mark J. Schervish, Teddy Seidenfeld & Rafael Stern - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (3):324-347.
    The Sleeping Beauty problem has spawned a debate between “thirders” and “halfers” who draw conflicting conclusions about Sleeping Beauty's credence that a coin lands heads. Our analysis is based on a probability model for what Sleeping Beauty knows at each time during the experiment. We show that conflicting conclusions result from different modeling assumptions that each group makes. Our analysis uses a standard “Bayesian” account of rational belief with conditioning. No special handling is used (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  18. Sleeping beauty: Reply to Elga.David Lewis - 2001 - Analysis 61 (3):171–76.
  19.  37
    “The Sleeping Beauty of the Brain”: Memory, MIT, Montreal, and the Origins of Neuroscience.Yvan Prkachin - 2021 - Isis 112 (1):22-44.
  20.  68
    Sleeping Beauty: a simple solution.R. Weintraub - 2004 - Analysis 64 (1):8-10.
    I defend the suggestion that the rational probability in the Sleeping Beauty paradox is one third. The reasoning in its favour is familiar: for every heads-waking, there are two tails-wakings. To complete the defense, I rebut the reasoning which purports to justify the competing suggestion – that the correct probability is half – by undermining its premise, that no new information has been received.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   43 citations  
  21. Sleeping Beauty meets Monday.Karl Karlander & Levi Spectre - 2010 - Synthese 174 (3):397-412.
    The Sleeping Beauty problem—first presented by A. Elga in a philosophical context—has captured much attention. The problem, we contend, is more aptly regarded as a paradox: apparently, there are cases where one ought to change one’s credence in an event’s taking place even though one gains no new information or evidence, or alternatively, one ought to have a credence other than 1/2 in the outcome of a future coin toss even though one knows that the coin is fair. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  22. Sleeping Beauty and shifted Jeffrey conditionalization.Namjoong Kim - 2009 - Synthese 168 (2):295-312.
    In this paper, I argue for a view largely favorable to the Thirder view: when Sleeping Beauty wakes up on Monday, her credence in the coin’s landing heads is less than 1/2. Let’s call this “the Lesser view.” For my argument, I (i) criticize Strict Conditionalization as the rule for changing de se credences; (ii) develop a new rule; and (iii) defend it by Gaifman’s Expert Principle. Finally, I defend the Lesser view by making use of this new (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  23.  69
    Sleeping Beauty in a grain of rice.David Haig - 2016 - Biology and Philosophy 31 (1):23-37.
    In the Sleeping Beauty problem, Beauty is woken once if a coin lands heads or twice if the coin lands tails but promptly forgets each waking on returning to sleep. Philosophers have divided over whether her waking credence in heads should be a half or a third. Beauty has centered beliefs about her world and about her location in that world. When given new information about her location she should update her worldly beliefs before updating her (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. Sleeping Beauty and direct inference.Joel Pust - 2011 - Analysis 71 (2):290-293.
    One argument for the thirder position on the Sleeping Beauty problem rests on direct inference from objective probabilities. In this paper, I consider a particularly clear version of this argument by John Pollock and his colleagues (The Oscar Seminar 2008). I argue that such a direct inference is defeated by the fact that Beauty has an equally good reason to conclude on the basis of direct inference that the probability of heads is 1/2. Hence, neither thirders nor (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  25. Sleeping Beauty Goes to the Lab: The Psychology of Self-Locating Evidence.Matteo Colombo, Jun Lai & Vincenzo Crupi - unknown - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (1):173-185.
    Analyses of the Sleeping Beauty Problem are polarised between those advocating the “1/2 view” (“halfers”) and those endorsing the “1/3 view” (“thirders”). The disagreement concerns the evidential relevance of self-locating information. Unlike halfers, thirders regard self-locating information as evidentially relevant in the Sleeping Beauty Problem. In the present study, we systematically manipulate the kind of information available in different formulations of the Sleeping Beauty Problem. Our findings indicate that patterns of judgment on different formulations (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26.  26
    The Sleeping Beauty Problem: What about Monday?Nathan Moore - manuscript
    In this paper I defend the thirder solution to the sleeping beauty problem by considering the credence Beauty ought to have, upon first awakening, that it is Monday. This leads to problems for the double-halfer and halfer but not for the thirder. In the three cases the credences Beauty ought to have, upon first awakening, that it is Monday are 1, 3/4, and 2/3, respectively. The first value is implausible given that Tuesday awakenings are possible. The (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27.  55
    Sleeping Beauty’s Credences.Jessica Cisewski, Joseph B. Kadane, Mark J. Schervish, Teddy Seidenfeld & Rafael Stern - unknown
    The Sleeping Beauty problem has spawned a debate between “Thirders” and “Halfers” who draw conflicting conclusions about Sleeping Beauty’s credence that a coin lands Heads. Our analysis is based on a probability model for what Sleeping Beauty knows at each time during the Experiment. We show that conflicting conclusions result from different modeling assumptions that each group makes. Our analysis uses a standard “Bayesian” account of rational belief with conditioning. No special handling is used (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  28.  50
    Sleeping Beauty and the Evidential Centered Principle.Namjoong Kim - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-23.
    Since Elga published his “Self-locating belief and the Sleeping Beauty problem,” there has been an intense debate about which credence between 1/2 and 1/3 Beauty should assign to (H) the coin’s landing heads, when she is awakened on Monday. The Halfers claim that she ought to assign 1/2 to H at that moment. The Thirders argue that she ought to assign 1/3 to H then. Meanwhile, Pettigrew defended a new chance-credence coordination principle, called the “Evidential Temporal Principle” (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  29. Horgan on sleeping beauty.Joel Pust - 2008 - Synthese 160 (1):97 - 101.
    With the notable exception of David Lewis, most of those writing on the Sleeping Beauty problem have argued that 1/3 is the correct answer. Terence Horgan has provided the clearest account of why, contrary to Lewis, Beauty has evidence against the proposition that the coin comes up heads when she awakens on Monday. In this paper, I argue that Horgan’s proposal fails because it neglects important facts about epistemic probability.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  30.  51
    Sleeping Beauty and De Nunc Updating.Namjoong Kim - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts
    About a decade ago, Adam Elga introduced philosophers to an intriguing puzzle. In it, Sleeping Beauty, a perfectly rational agent, undergoes an experiment in which she becomes ignorant of what time it is. This situation is puzzling for two reasons: First, because there are two equally plausible views about how she will change her degree of belief given her situation and, second, because the traditional rules for updating degrees of belief don't seem to apply to this case. In (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. Sleeping Beauty Reconsidered: Conditioning and Reflection in Asynchronous Systems.Joseph Halpern - 2004 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Proceedings of the Twentieth Conference on Uncertainty in Ai. Oxford University Press. pp. 111-142.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  32. Sleeping Beauty Reconsidered: Conditioning and Reflection in Asynchronous Systems.Joseph Halpern - 2006 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  33.  42
    Sleeping Beauty awakened: new odds at the dawn of the new day.T. Horgan - 2004 - Analysis 64 (1):10-21.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   49 citations  
  34. Sleeping beauty awakened: New odds at the dawn of the new day.Terry Horgan - 2004 - Analysis 64 (1):10–21.
  35.  64
    Sleeping Beauty on Monty Hall.Michel Janssen & Sergio Pernice - unknown - Philosophies 5 (3):15.
    Inspired by the Monty Hall Problem and a popular simple solution to it, we present a number of game-show puzzles that are analogous to the notorious Sleeping Beauty Problem (and variations on it), but much easier to solve. We replace the awakenings of Sleeping Beauty by contestants on a game show, like Monty Hall’s, and increase the number of awakenings/contestants in the same way that the number of doors in the Monty Hall Problem is increased to (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Laying Sleeping Beauty to Rest.Masahiro Yamada - manuscript
    There are three main points of the paper. 1. There are straightforward ways of manipulating expected gains and losses that result in a divergence between fair betting odds and credence. Such manipulations are familiar from tools of finance. One can easily see that the Sleeping Beauty case is structured in such a way as to result in a divergence between fair betting odds and credence. 2. The inspection of credences and betting odds in certain betting situations shows that (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. Diachronic dutch books and sleeping beauty.Kai Draper & Joel Pust - 2008 - Synthese 164 (2):281 - 287.
    Hitchcock advances a diachronic Dutch Book argument (DDB) for a 1/3 answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem. Bradley and Leitgeb argue that Hitchcock’s DDB argument fails. We demonstrate the following: (a) Bradley and Leitgeb’s criticism of Hitchcock is unconvincing; (b) nonetheless, there are serious reasons to worry about the success of Hitchcock’s argument; (c) however, it is possible to construct a new DDB for 1/3 about which such worries cannot be raised.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  38. Sleeping Beauty Reconsidered: Conditioning and Reflection in Asynchronous Systems.Joseph Halpern - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press UK.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  39.  84
    On sleeping beauty controversy.Lev Vaidman & Simon Saunders - manuscript
    It is argued that Lewis's approach to Elga's Sleeping Beaty problem is untenable and, therefore, the universality of the betting approach to probability has not been breached.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  40. Sleeping beauty and the problem of world reduction.Paul Franceschi - 2005
    I describe in this paper a solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem. I begin with the consensual emerald case and discuss then Bostrom's Incubator gedanken. I address then the Sleeping Beauty problem. I argue that the root cause of the flaw in the argument for 1/3 is an erroneous assimilation with a repeated experiment. I show that the same type of analysis also applies to Elga's version of the argument for 1/3. Lastly, I show that the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  41.  80
    Sleeping beauty in flatland.Paul Franceschi - unknown
    I present a solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem. I begin with the consensual emerald case and describe then a set of relevant urn analogies and situations. These latter experiments make it easier to diagnose the flaw in the thirder's line of reasoning. I discuss in detail the root cause of the flaw in the argument for 1/3 which is an erroneous assimilation with a repeated experiment. Lastly, I discuss an informative variant of the original Sleeping (...) experiment that casts light on the diagnosis of the fallacy in the argument for 1/3. (shrink)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42.  32
    Sleeping beauty and the current chance evidential immodest dominance axiom.Namjoong Kim - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-27.
    Concerning the notorious Sleeping Beauty problem, philosophers have debated whether 1/2 or 1/3 is rational as Beauty’s credence in the coin’s landing heads. According to Kierland and Monton, the answer depends on whether her goal is to minimize average or total inaccuracy because, while the expected average inaccuracy of Halfing is smaller than that of Thirding, the expected total inaccuracy of Thirding is lower than that of Halfing. In this paper, I argue that Halfing is average accuracy (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43.  72
    Sleeping Beauty's Evidence.Kai Draper - 2007 - American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1):61 - 70.
    The probability puzzle known as "Sleeping Beauty" raises interesting and difficult ques tions about the nature of evidence. It appears that the puzzle itself has already been solved, for there is a near consensus in the relevant philosophical literature that 1/3 is the correct answer.' Be that as it may, no new argument for that result is offered here. Instead, an at tempt is made to clarify the nature of certain problems that an answer of 1/3 raises for (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  44.  80
    Sleeping Beauty and the Dreaming Butterfly: What Did Zhuangzi Doubt About?Thomas Ming - 2012 - Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 11 (4):497-512.
    The moral commonly drawn from Zhuangzi’s butterfly dream is that there is no distinction between the subjectivity of the dreamer and the awake. It is, however, tenuous to incorporate this insight into an overall view of Zhuangzi, whether as a perspectival relativist, a mystic, or an anti-rationalist, just to name the more popular positions. The parable, despite its brevity and clarity, is difficult because the assertion about metaphysical distinction in the last two lines does not cohere with the preceding text (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  45. Sleeping beauty: Theme and variations.J. Finkelstein - unknown
    Six variations on the Sleeping beauty theme are presented.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  46. Sleeping beauty and eternal recurrence.Hannes Leitgeb - 2010 - Analysis 70 (2):203-205.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  47.  64
    Sleeping Beauty: A New Problem for Halfers.Michael Nielsen - manuscript
    I argue against the halfer response to the Sleeping Beauty case by presenting a new problem for halfers. When the original Sleeping Beauty case is generalized, it follows from the halfer’s key premise that Beauty must update her credence in a fair coin’s landing heads in such a way that it becomes arbitrarily close to certainty. This result is clearly absurd. I go on to argue that the halfer’s key premise must be rejected on pain (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. Sleeping Beauty: A Wake-Up Call.C. S. Jenkins - 2005 - Philosophia Mathematica 13 (2):194-201.
    This note concerns a puzzle about probability which has recently caught the attention of a number of philosophers. According to the current philosophical consensus, the solution to the puzzle reveals that one can acquire new information, sufficient to change one's credences in certain events, just by having a certain experience, even though one knew all along that one would have an experience which felt exactly like this. I argue that the philosophical consensus is mistaken.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  49.  33
    Sleeping Beauty in Quantumland.Lev Vaidman - unknown
    It is argued that thirder resolution of the Lewis - Elga controversy about Sleeping Beauty is more clear when the coin toss is replaced by a quantum measurement and the analysis is performed in the framework of the Many-Worlds Interpretation.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50.  15
    How to Convince Sleeping Beauty She's Not Dreaming.C. A. McIntosh - 2019-10-03 - In Richard B. Davis (ed.), Disney and Philosophy. Wiley. pp. 93–105.
    Nearly all Disney movies represent to people mere possibilities. One can conceive of scenarios with genies, wooden puppets coming to life, flying elephants, and mermaids. And there certainly seems to be no special problem in conceiving of a scenario where all the author's experiences are a mere dream induced by a Maleficent‐like evil genius. The problem in the present context is that the possibility of a dream‐inducing Maleficent‐like evil genius guarantees that how things appear would be no different, whether she (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 997