Knowing and Not‐knowing For Your Own Good: The Limits of Epistemic Paternalism

Journal of Applied Philosophy:433-447 (2016)
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Abstract

Epistemic paternalism is the thesis that a paternalistic interference with an individual's inquiry is justified when it is likely to bring about an epistemic improvement in her. In this article I claim that in order to motivate epistemic paternalism we must first account for the value of epistemic improvements. I propose that the epistemic paternalist has two options: either epistemic improvements are valuable because they contribute to wellbeing, or they are epistemically valuable. I will argue that these options constitute the foundations of a dilemma: either epistemic paternalism collapses into general paternalism, or a distinctive project of justified epistemic paternalism is implausible

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Citations of this work

The Possibility of Epistemic Nudging.Thomas Grundmann - forthcoming - Social Epistemology:1-11.
What’s Epistemic About Epistemic Paternalism?Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - In Jonathan Matheson & Kirk Lougheed (eds.), Epistemic Autonomy. New York: Routledge. pp. 132–150.

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References found in this work

Paternalism.Gerald Dworkin - 1972 - The Monist 56 (1):64-84.
The Evolution of Misbelief.Ryan McKay & Daniel Dennett - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):493.
Epistemic Value and the Primacy of What We Care About.Linda Zagzebski - 2004 - Philosophical Papers 33 (3):353-377.

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