In Christopher Daly (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 527-552 (2015)

Authors
Yuri Cath
La Trobe University
Abstract
What is the relationship between the linguistic properties of knowledge-how ascriptions and the nature of knowledge-how itself? In this chapter I address this question by examining the linguistic methodology of Stanley and Williamson (2011) and Stanley (2011a, 2011b) who defend the intellectualist view that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. My evaluation of this methodology is mixed. On the one hand, I defend Stanley and Williamson (2011) against critics who argue that the linguistic premises they appeal to—about the syntax and semantics of knowledge-how and knowledge-wh ascriptions—do not establish their desired conclusions about the nature of knowledge-how itself. But, on the other hand, I also criticize the role that linguistic considerations play in Stanley’s (2011a) response to apparent Gettier-style counterexamples to intellectualism.
Keywords Epistemology  Knowledge How  Metaphilosophy  Philosophical Methods  Intellectualism  Knowledge That  Knowledge-Wh
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Knowing How.Yuri Cath - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):487-503.

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