G. E. Moore and Bad Faith

European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):347-365 (2012)
Abstract
Abstract: G. E. Moore claimed to know a variety of commonsense propositions. He is often accused of being dogmatic or of begging the question against philosophers who deny that he knows such things. In this paper, I argue that this accusation is mistaken. I argue that Moore is instead guilty of answering questions of the form ‘Do I know p?’ in bad faith
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2010.00413.x
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Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter K. Unger - 1975 - Oxford University Press.
Philosophical Papers.J. L. Austin - 1961 - Oxford University Press.

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