Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):31 - 40 (2013)

Jason D'Cruz
State University of New York, Albany
I argue for the existence of a category of practical reasons which I call "Deliberation-Volatile Reasons" or "DVRs". DVRs have the distinguishing feature that their status as reasons for action is diminished when they are weighed in deliberation by the agent. I argue that DVRs are evidence of "deliberative blind spots". I submit that an agent manifests a peculiar kind of practical irrationality in so far as she endeavours to find a deliberative path to what she has reason to do, when the discovery of such a path renders the destination inaccessible
Keywords deliberation  practical reason  reasons  practical deliberation  spontaneity
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DOI 10.1080/00048402.2011.641572
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The Sources of Normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
The Possibility of Altruism.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Oxford Clarendon Press.

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