The Pragmatics of Belief

Journal of Pragmatics 42 (1):35-47 (2010)

Authors
Igor Douven
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Abstract
This paper argues that pragmatic considerations similar to the ones that Grice has shown pertain to assertability pertain to acceptability. It further shows how this should affect some widely held epistemic principles. The idea of a pragmatics of belief is defended against some seemingly obvious objections.
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The Psychological Dimension of the Lottery Paradox.Jennifer Nagel - forthcoming - In Igor Douven (ed.), The Lottery Paradox. Cambridge University Press.
The Reformulation Argument: Reining in Gricean Pragmatics.Zachary Miller - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):525-546.
Junk Beliefs and Interest‐Driven Epistemology.Jane Friedman - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):568-583.
Relativism and Conservatism.Alexander Dinges - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-16.

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