Philosophy of Science 51 (March):23-43 (1984)

Abstract
Several arguments are considered which purport to demonstrate the impossibility of theory-neutral observation. The most important of these infers the continuity of observation with theory from the presumed continuity of perception with cognition, a doctrine widely espoused in recent cognitive psychology. An alternative psychological account of the relation between cognition and perception is proposed and its epistemological consequences for the observation/theory distinction are then explored
Keywords Epistemology  Inference  Observation  Perception
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1086/289162
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 50,147
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Thinking is Believing.Eric Mandelbaum - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):55-96.
Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.Dustin Stokes - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):646-663.
A Better Best System Account of Lawhood.Jonathan Cohen & Craig Callender - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (1):1 - 34.

View all 213 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

A Defense of a Non-Computational, Interactive Model of Visual Observation.Bonnie Tamarkin Paller - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:135 - 142.
Observation And Objectivity.Harold I. Brown - 1987 - Oxford University Press.
Observation and Induction.Theodore J. Everett - 2010 - Logos and Episteme 1 (2):303-324.
Observation and Growth in Scientific Knowledge.Robert Nola - 1986 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:245 - 257.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
387 ( #16,431 of 2,324,607 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #52,438 of 2,324,607 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes