Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (3-4):321-339 (2006)
According to a currently popular approach to the analysis of phenomenal character, the phenomenal character of an experience is entirely determined by, and is in fact identical with, the experience's representational content. Two underlying assumptions motivate this approach to phenomenal character: (1) that conscious experiences are diaphanous or transparent, in the sense that it is impossible to discern, via introspection, any intrinsic features of an experience of x that are not experienced as features of x, and (2) that the immediate objects of consciousness are not objects per se, but rather properties. This paper explores these assumptions, advancing the thesis that each is rejectable on phenomenological grounds.
|Keywords||representational content phenomenal consciousness transparency Brentano Tye|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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Citations of this work BETA
Self-Representationalism and Phenomenology.Uriah Kriegel - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):357-381.
Theories of Consciousness as Reflexivity.Frederic Peters - 2013 - Philosophical Forum 44 (4):341-372.
Accounting for Consciousness: Epistemic and Operational Issues.Frederic Peters - 2014 - Axiomathes 24 (4):441-461.
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