Imprecision and indeterminacy in probability judgment

Philosophy of Science 52 (3):390-409 (1985)
Isaac Levi
Columbia University
Bayesians often confuse insistence that probability judgment ought to be indeterminate (which is incompatible with Bayesian ideals) with recognition of the presence of imprecision in the determination or measurement of personal probabilities (which is compatible with these ideals). The confusion is discussed and illustrated by remarks in a recent essay by R. C. Jeffrey
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DOI 10.1086/289257
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