Persistent Disagreement and Polarization in a Bayesian Setting

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (1):51-78 (2021)
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Abstract

For two ideally rational agents, does learning a finite amount of shared evidence necessitate agreement? No. But does it at least guard against belief polarization, the case in which their opinions get further apart? No. OK, but are rational agents guaranteed to avoid polarization if they have access to an infinite, increasing stream of shared evidence? No.

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Author Profiles

Michael Nielsen
University of Sydney
Rush T. Stewart
University of Rochester

Citations of this work

Rational Polarization.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (3):355-458.
Against Irrationalism in the Theory of Propaganda.Megan Hyska - 2023 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9 (2):303-317.
Bayesian Epistemology.Jürgen Landes - 2022 - Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):1-7.

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