Authors
Michael Nielsen
University of Sydney
Rush T. Stewart
King's College London
Abstract
For two ideally rational agents, does learning a finite amount of shared evidence necessitate agreement? No. But does it at least guard against belief polarization, the case in which their opinions get further apart? No. OK, but are rational agents guaranteed to avoid polarization if they have access to an infinite, increasing stream of shared evidence? No.
Keywords Polarization  Dilation  Probability  Disagreement  Social Epistemology
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/axy056
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References found in this work BETA

Theory and Evidence.Clark N. Glymour - 1980 - Princeton University Press.
A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance.David K. Lewis - 1980 - In Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Volume II. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 263-293.

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Citations of this work BETA

Peirce, Pedigree, Probability.Rush T. Stewart & Tom F. Sterkenburg - forthcoming - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society.

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