Bounded rationality, epistemic externalism and the Enlightenment picture of cognitive virtue

In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 134--144 (2006)
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David Matheson
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Cultivating Doxastic Responsibility.Guy Axtell - 2021 - Humana Mente 14 (39):87-125.

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