Activity, Passivity, and Normative Avowal

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):2-24 (2017)
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Abstract

The idea that agents can be active with respect to some of their actions, and passive with respect to others, is a widely held assumption within moral philosophy. But exactly how to characterize these notions is controversial. I argue that an agent is active just in case her action is one whose motive she can truly avow as reason-giving, or her action is one whose motive she can disavow, provided her disavowal effects appropriate modifications in her future motives. This view maintains a link between activity, reason-responsiveness, and answerability, while avoiding commitments to an implausible theory of motivation.

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2015

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10.1111/papq.12090

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Andrew James McAninch
Milwaukee School of Engineering

Citations of this work

Acting for a Reason and Following a Principle.Andrew James McAninch - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (3):649-661.
Autonomy and Responsibility.Lubomira V. Radoilska - 2022 - In Ben Colburn (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Autonomy. New York, NY: Routledge.

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References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
The sources of normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Onora O'Neill.
Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.

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