Philosophical Studies 157 (2):211-225 (2012)
This paper presents an account of the manner in which a proposition’s immediate structural features are related to its core truth-conditional features. The leading idea is that for a proposition to have a certain immediate structure is just for certain entities to play certain roles in the correct theory of the brute facts regarding that proposition’s truth conditions. The paper explains how this account addresses certain worries and questions recently raised by Jeffery King and Scott Soames
|Keywords||Propositional Structure Truth Conditions|
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References found in this work BETA
Russell's Theory of Identity of Propositions.Alonzo Church - 1984 - Philosophia Naturalis 21 (2/4):513-522.
Tense and Singular Propositions.Nathan Salmon - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 331--392.
Citations of this work BETA
Not the Optimistic Type.Ben Caplan, Chris Tillman, Brian McLean & Adam Murray - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (5-6):575-589.
Soames’s New Conception of Propositions.Ben Caplan - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2533-2549.
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