Propositional structure and truth conditions

Philosophical Studies 157 (2):211-225 (2012)
This paper presents an account of the manner in which a proposition’s immediate structural features are related to its core truth-conditional features. The leading idea is that for a proposition to have a certain immediate structure is just for certain entities to play certain roles in the correct theory of the brute facts regarding that proposition’s truth conditions. The paper explains how this account addresses certain worries and questions recently raised by Jeffery King and Scott Soames
Keywords Propositional Structure  Truth Conditions
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9633-x
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 25,651
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
The Nature and Structure of Content.Jeffrey C. King - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
The Principles of Mathematics.Bertrand Russell - 1938 - Journal of Philosophy 35 (7):191-192.
Russell's Theory of Identity of Propositions.Alonzo Church - 1984 - Philosophia Naturalis 21 (2/4):513-522.
Tense and Singular Propositions.Nathan Salmon - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 331--392.
Compound Thoughts.Gottlob Frege - 1963 - Mind 72 (285):1-17.

View all 6 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Not the Optimistic Type.Ben Caplan, Chris Tillman, Brian McLean & Adam Murray - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (5-6):575-589.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Heidegger and Truth as Correspondence.Mark A. Wrathall - 1999 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 7 (1):69 – 88.
Frege's Gedanken Are Not Truth Conditions.Ari Maunu - 2002 - Facta Philosophica 4 (2):231-238.
Game Theoretical Semantics and Entailment.D. E. Over - 1981 - Studia Logica 40 (1):67 - 74.
Knowability and Epistemic Truth.M. Hand - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):216 – 228.
Must Beliefs Be Sentences?Brian Loar - 1982 - Philosophy of Science Association 1982:627 - 643.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

164 ( #26,424 of 2,143,564 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #280,273 of 2,143,564 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums