Should reason be fragmented?

Abstract Cognitive relativists?pragmatists (Stich, Churchland) claim that human cognitive strategies, lacking a common goal, are in addition divergent to the point of incommensurability. They appeal to the study of reasoning heuristics for evidence on cognitive diversity and incorrigibility. It is here argued that no such evidence is offered by the research, which, on the contrary (1) presents heuristics as uniform across great variations; (2) offers advice for correcting and improving human reasoning; and (3) very often postulates a uniformity of core logical strategies, built into reasoning competence. Cognitive research thus supports a moderate rationalism rather than relativism?pragmatism
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DOI 10.1080/02698599608573527
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Shaun Nichols, Stephen P. Stich, Alan M. Leslie & David B. Klein (1996). Varieties of Off-Line Simulation. In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), [Book Chapter]. Cambridge University Press. pp. 39-74.
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