Correction to: Qualitative Attribution, Phenomenal Experience and Being

Biosemiotics 12 (1):193-194 (2019)
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Abstract

In the article Qualitative Attribution, Phenomenal Experience and Being, by Mark Pharoah, the following corrections have been made.

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10.1007/s12304-019-09355-x

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