Blame It on the Norm: The Challenge from “Adaptive Rationality”

Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44 (2):131-150 (2014)
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Abstract

In this paper, I provide a qualified defense of the claim that cognitive biases are not necessarily signs of irrationality, but rather the result of using normative standards that are too narrow. I show that under certain circumstances, behavior that violates traditional norms of rationality can be adaptive. Yet, I express some reservations about the claim that we should replace our traditional normative standards. Furthermore, I throw doubt on the claim that the replacement of normative standards would license optimistic verdicts about human rationality

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Andrea Polonioli
University of Edinburgh (PhD)

References found in this work

Bayesian Epistemology.Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann - 2003 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by Stephan Hartmann.
Adaptive Thinking: Rationality in the Real World.Gerd Gigerenzer - 2000 - Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

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