Intersubjectivity of cognition and language: Principled reasons why the subject may be Trusted
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (2):195-214 (2004)
Abstract
The paper aims to show that scepticism concerning the status of first-person reports of mental states and their use as evidence in scientific cognitive research is unfounded. Rather, principled arguments suggest that the conditions for the intersubjectivity of cognition and description of publicly observable things apply equally for our cognition and description of our mental or internal states. It is argued that on these conditions relies the possibility of developing well-defined scientific criteria for distinguishing between first-person and third-person cognition and description. The paper concludes by outlining the consequences for cognitive research and for functional theories of mindDOI
10.1023/b:phen.0000040835.05225.9e
My notes
Similar books and articles
Enactive intersubjectivity: Participatory sense-making and mutual incorporation.Thomas Fuchs & Hanne De Jaegher - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):465-486.
The practice of mind: Theory, simulation or primary interaction?Shaun Gallagher - 2001 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):83-108.
Cognition, Language, and Consciousness: Integrative Levels.Gary Greenberg & Ethel Tobach (eds.) - 1987 - Lawrence Erlbaum.
Intersubjectivity in perception.Shaun Gallagher - 2008 - Continental Philosophy Review 41 (2):163-178.
Extended cognition and the metaphysics of mind.Zoe Drayson - 2010 - Cognitive Systems Research 11 (4):367-377.
Can social interaction constitute social cognition?Hanne De Jaegher, Ezequiel Di Paolo & Shaun Gallagher - 2010 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (10):441-447.
An act of cognitive intersubjectivity.Helga Nowotny - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (5):64-70.
Analytics
Added to PP
2009-01-28
Downloads
105 (#120,191)
6 months
3 (#228,007)
2009-01-28
Downloads
105 (#120,191)
6 months
3 (#228,007)
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
The phenomenological underpinning of the notion of a minimal core self: A psychological perspective.Nini Praetorius - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):325-338.
References found in this work
The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory.David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1950 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1 (4):328-332.
Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard problem.F. J. Varela - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (4):330-49.