This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories

51 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 51
  1. added 2019-02-28
    The Overlooked Ubiquity of First-Person Experience in the Cognitive Sciences.Joana Rigato, Scott M. Rennie & Zachary F. Mainen - forthcoming - Synthese:1-37.
    Science aims to transform the subjectivity of individual observations and ideas into more objective and universal knowledge. Yet if there is any area in which first-person experience holds a particularly special and delicate role, it is the sciences of the mind. According to a widespread view, first-person methods were largely discarded from psychology after the fall of introspectionism a century ago and replaced by more objective behavioral measures, a step that some authors have begun to criticize. To examine whether these (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. added 2017-10-26
    Four Meta-Methods for the Study of Qualia.Lok-Chi Chan & Andrew James Latham - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (1):145-167.
    In this paper, we describe four broad ‘meta-methods’ employed in scientific and philosophical research of qualia. These are the theory-centred metamethod, the property-centred meta-method, the argument-centred meta-method, and the event-centred meta-method. Broadly speaking, the theory-centred meta-method is interested in the role of qualia as some theoretical entities picked out by our folk psychological theories; the property-centred meta-method is interested in some metaphysical properties of qualia that we immediately observe through introspection ; the argument-centred meta-method is interested in the role of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  3. added 2017-10-05
    Heterophenomenology Versus Critical Phenomenology.Max Velmans - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1):221-230.
    Following an on-line dialogue with Dennett (Velmans, 2001) this paper examines the similarities and differences between heterophenomenology (HP) and critical phenomenology (CP), two competing accounts of the way that conscious phenomenology should be, and normally is incorporated into psychology and related sciences. Dennett’s heterophenomenology includes subjective reports of conscious experiences, but according to Dennett, first person conscious phenomena in the form of “qualia” such as hardness, redness, itchiness etc. have no real existence. Consequently, subjective reports about such qualia should be (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  4. added 2017-02-02
    The Fantasy of Third-Person Science: Phenomenology, Ontology and Evidence.Shannon Vallor - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):1-15.
    Dennett’s recent defense in this journal of the heterophenomenological method and its supposed advantages over Husserlian phenomenology is premised on his problematic account of the epistemological and ontological status of phenomenological states. By employing Husserl’s philosophy of science to clarify the relationship between phenomenology and evidence and the implications of this relationship for the empirical identification of ‘real’ conscious states, I argue that the naturalistic account of consciousness Dennett hopes for could be authoritative as a science only by virtue of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. added 2017-01-16
    Verbal Reports as Data.K. Anders Ericsson & Herbert A. Simon - 1980 - Psychological Review 87 (3):215-251.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   212 citations  
  6. added 2016-04-25
    Failing to Self-Ascribe Thought and Motion: Towards a Three-Factor Account of Passivity Symptoms in Schizophrenia.David Miguel Gray - 2014 - Schizophrenia Research 152 (1):28-32.
    There has recently been emphasis put on providing two-factor accounts of monothematic delusions. Such accounts would explain (1) whether a delusional hypothesis (e.g. someone else is inserting thoughts into my mind) can be understood as a prima facie reasonable response to an experience and (2) why such a delusional hypothesis is believed and maintained given its implausibility and evidence against it. I argue that if we are to avoid obfuscating the cognitive mechanisms involved in monothematic delusion formation we should split (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. added 2015-03-23
    How to Elicit Verbal Reports That Provide Valid Unobtrusive Externalization of Concurrent Thinking.K. A. Ericsson - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):1-18.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  8. added 2014-10-25
    Phenomenology of Social Cognition.Spaulding Shannon - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (5):1069-1089.
    Can phenomenological evidence play a decisive role in accepting or rejecting social cognition theories? Is it the case that a theory of social cognition ought to explain and be empirically supported by our phenomenological experience? There is serious disagreement about the answers to these questions. This paper aims to determine the methodological role of phenomenology in social cognition debates. The following three features are characteristic of evidence capable of playing a substantial methodological role: novelty, reliability, and relevance. I argue that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  9. added 2014-03-28
    Heterophenomenology: Learning About the Birds and the Bees.Daisie M. Radner - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (8):389-403.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. added 2014-03-22
    Intersubjectivity of Cognition and Language: Principled Reasons Why the Subject May Be Trusted.Nini Praetorius - 2004 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (2):195-214.
    The paper aims to show that scepticism concerning the status of first-person reports of mental states and their use as evidence in scientific cognitive research is unfounded. Rather, principled arguments suggest that the conditions for the intersubjectivity of cognition and description of publicly observable things apply equally for our cognition and description of our mental or internal states. It is argued that on these conditions relies the possibility of developing well-defined scientific criteria for distinguishing between first-person and third-person cognition and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  11. added 2014-03-19
    Describing One’s Subjective Experience in the Second Person: An Interview Method for the Science of Consciousness. [REVIEW]Claire Petitmengin - 2006 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (3-4):229-269.
    This article presents an interview method which enables us to bring a person, who may not even have been trained, to become aware of his or her subjective experience, and describe it with great precision. It is focused on the difficulties of becoming aware of one’s subjective experience and describing it, and on the processes used by this interview technique to overcome each of these difficulties. The article ends with a discussion of the criteria governing the validity of the descriptions (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   41 citations  
  12. added 2014-03-15
    No Heterophenomenology Without Autophenomenology: Variations on a Theme of Mine. [REVIEW]Eduard Marbach - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):75-87.
    The paper assumes that the very source for an appropriate concept formation and categorization of the phenomena of consciousness is provided by pre-reflectively living through one’s own experiences (of perceiving, remembering, imagining, picturing, judging, etc.) and reflecting upon them. It tries to argue that without reflective auto-phenomenological theorizing about such phenomena, there is no prospect for a scientific study of consciousness doing fully justice to the phenomena themselves. To substantiate the point, a detailed reflective and descriptive analysis of re-presentational experiences (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  13. added 2014-03-15
    Heterophenomenology and Phenomenological Skepticism.Jean-Michel Roy - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):1-20.
    This paper is an attempt to clarify and assess Dennett’s opinion about the relevance of the phenomenological tradition to contemporary cognitive science, focussing on the very idea of a phenomenological investigation. Dennett can be credited with four major claims on this topic: (1) Two kinds of phenomenological investigations must be carefully distinguished: autophenomenology and heterophenomenology; (2) autophenomenology is wrong, because it fails to overcome what might be called the problem of phenomenological scepticism; (3) the phenomenological tradition mainly derived from Husserl (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  14. added 2014-03-15
    Too Much Ado About Belief.Jérôme Dokic & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):185-200.
    Three commitments guide Dennett’s approach to the study of consciousness. First, an ontological commitment to materialist monism. Second, a methodological commitment to what he calls ‘heterophenomenology.’ Third, a ‘doxological’ commitment that can be expressed as the view that there is no room for a distinction between a subject’s beliefs about how things seem to her and what things actually seem to her, or, to put it otherwise, as the view that there is no room for a reality/appearance distinction for consciousness. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (13 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  15. added 2014-03-15
    Subjectivity in Heterophenomenology.Gianfranco Soldati - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):89-98.
    I distinguish between naïve phenomenology and really existing phenomenology, a distinction that is too often ignored. As a consequence, the weaknesses inherent in naïve phenomenology are mistakenly attributed to phenomenology. I argue that the critics of naïve phenomenology have unwittingly adopted a number of precisely those weaknesses they wish to point out. More precisely, I shall argue that Dennett’s criticism of the naïve or auto-phenomenological conception of subjectivity fails to provide a better understanding of the intended phenomenon.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. added 2014-03-15
    Heterophenomenology Vs. Critical Phenomenology.Max Velmans - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):221-230.
    Following an on-line dialogue with Dennett (Velmans, 2001) this paper examines the similarities and differences between heterophenomenology (HP) and critical phenomenology (CP), two competing accounts of the way that conscious phenomenology should be, and normally is incorporated into psychology and related sciences. Dennett’s heterophenomenology includes subjective reports of conscious experiences, but according to Dennett, first person conscious phenomenena in the form of “qualia” such as hardness, redness, itchiness etc. have no real existence. Consequently, subjective reports about such qualia should be (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  17. added 2014-03-15
    Heterophenomenology Reconsidered.Daniel C. Dennett - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):247-270.
    Descartes’ Method of Radical Doubt was not radical enough. –A. Marcel (2003, 181) In short, heterophenomenology is nothing new; it is nothing other than the method that has been used by psychophysicists, cognitive psychologists, clinical neuropsychologists, and just about everybody who has ever purported to study human consciousness in a serious, scientific way. –D. Dennett (2003, 22).
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  18. added 2014-03-15
    Heterophenomenology: Heavy-Handed Sleight-of-Hand. [REVIEW]Hubert Dreyfus & Sean D. Kelly - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):45-55.
    We argue that heterophenomenology both over- and under-populates the intentional realm. For example, when one is involved in coping, one’s mind does not contain beliefs. Since the heterophenomenologist interprets all intentional commitment as belief, he necessarily overgenerates the belief contents of the mind. Since beliefs cannot capture the normative aspect of coping and perceiving, any method, such as heterophenomenology, that allows for only beliefs is guaranteed not only to overgenerate beliefs but also to undergenerate other kinds of intentional phenomena.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  19. added 2012-01-01
    Does Self-Consciousness Mediate the Relation Between Self-Talk and Self-Knowledge?Johann F. Schneider, Markus Pospeschill & Jochen Ranger - 2005 - Psychological Reports 96 (2):387-396.
  20. added 2010-10-24
    Relations Among Self-Talk, Self-Consciousness and Self-Knowledge.Johann F. Schneider - 2002 - Psychological Reports 91 (3):807-812.
  21. added 2010-10-24
    Inner Speech as a Mediator of Self-Awareness, Self-Consciousness, and Self-Knowledge: An Hypothesis.Alain Morin & James Everett - 1990 - New Ideas in Psychology 8 (3):337-56.
    Little is known with regard to the precise cognitive tools the self uses in acquiring and processing information about itself. In this article, we underline the possibility that inner speech might just represent one such cognitive process. Duval and Wicklund’s theory of self-awareness and the selfconsciousness, and self-knowledge body of work that was inspired by it are reviewed, and the suggestion is put forward that inner speech parallels the state of self-awareness, is more frequently used among highly self-conscious persons, and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  22. added 2010-03-11
    How to Improve on Heterophenomenology: The Self-Measurement Methodology of First-Person Data.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (3-4):3 - 4.
    Heterophenomenology is a third-person methodology proposed by Daniel Dennett for using first-person reports as scientific evidence. I argue that heterophenomenology can be improved by making six changes: (i) setting aside consciousness, (ii) including other sources of first-person data besides first-person reports, (iii) abandoning agnosticism as to the truth value of the reports in favor of the most plausible assumptions we can make about what can be learned from the data, (iv) interpreting first-person reports (and other first-person behaviors) directly in terms (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  23. added 2009-06-08
    Does Heterophenomenology Concede Too Much? Experiments on the Folk Theory of Consciousness.Justin Sytsma - unknown
    It is fairly common in the modern debates over qualia to find assumptions being made about the views of non-philosophers. It is often assumed that the concept is part of the folk theory of consciousness. In fact, even prominent skeptics about qualia will admit that their views run counter to common sense. I illustrate this by considering the work of Daniel Dennett, focusing on his standard articulation of the debate concerning his heterophenomenological method. While Dennett is often accused of not (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. added 2008-12-31
    Heterophenomenogy Versus Critical Phenomenology: A Dialogue with Dan Dennett.Max Velmans - manuscript
    ABSTRACT. The following is an email interchange that took place between Dan Dennett and myself in the period 14th to 28th June, 2001. The discussion tries to clarify some essential features of the "heterophenomenology" developed in his book Consciousness Explained (1996), and how this differs from a form of "critical phenomenology" implicit in my own book Understanding Consciousness (2000), and developed in my edited Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: new methodologies and maps (2000). The departure point for the discussion is a paper (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  25. added 2008-12-31
    A Philosophical Critique of Heterophenomenology.Christian Beenfeldt - 2008 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (8):5-34.
    In this paper Dennett's method of heterophenomenology is discussed. After a brief explanation of the method, three arguments in support of it are considered in turn. First, the argument from the possibility of error and self-delusion of the subject is found to ignore the panoply of intermediate position that one can take with regard to the epistemic status of first-personal knowledge. The argument is also criticized for employing an epistemic double-standard. Second, the argument from the neutrality of heterophenomenology is found (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  26. added 2008-12-31
    Animal Consciousness, Anthromorphism and Heterophenomenology.Manuel Bremer - 2006 - Philosophisches Jahrbuch 113 (2):397-410.
  27. added 2008-12-31
    Transpersonal Heterophenomenology?William A. Adams - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (4):89-93.
    Anthony Freeman's article on transpersonal psychology cited Jorge Ferrer's criticism that while the field claims to be non-dualistic or 'post-Cartesian' (no subject -object or mind-body split), it is nevertheless hopelessly dualistic. . .Freeman proposes a way of salvation for transpersonal psychology by invoking Daniel Dennettapos;s concept of heterophenomenology, which is a third-person investigation of someone elseapos;s first-person experience (as reported). . .Freeman's proposal is a fine demonstration of lateral thinking, calling upon atheist Dennett in support of transpersonal and religious inquiry. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. added 2008-12-31
    Heterophenomenology Versus Critical Phenomenology.Prof Max Velmans - manuscript
    Following an on-line dialogue with Dennett (Velmans, 2001) this paper examines the similarities and differences between heterophenomenology (HP) and critical phenomenology (CP), two competing accounts of the way that conscious phenomenology should be, and normally is incorporated into psychology and related sciences. Dennett’s heterophenomenology includes subjective reports of conscious experiences, but according to Dennett, first person conscious phenomenena in the form of “qualia” such as hardness, redness, itchiness etc. have no real existence. Consequently, subjective reports about such qualia should be (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. added 2008-12-31
    All That Glisters is Not Gold - Heterophenomenology and Transpersonal Theory.G. Hartelius - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (6):63-77.
    Anthony Freeman (2006) proposes that Dennett's heterophenomenology (HP) be fully integrated into transpersonal studies as a solution to the 'subtle Cartesianism' that Jorge Ferrer (2002) detects within the field. Methods virtually indistinguishable from HP are already in use within transpersonal research, so the issue of comparison lies deeper. On close analysis, Ferrer's approach cannot be situated within Dennett's (2003) data levels at all, for participatory transpersonalism conceives a profoundly different relationship between conscious subject and the world: a relational matrix of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  30. added 2008-12-31
    Assumptions of Subjective Measures of Unconscious Mental States: Higher Order Thoughts and Bias.Zoltán Dienes - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (9):25-45.
    This paper considers two subjective measures of the existence of unconscious mental states - the guessing criterion, and the zero correlation criterion - and considers the assumptions underlying their application in experimental paradigms. Using higher order thought theory the impact of different types of biases on the zero correlation and guessing criteria are considered. It is argued that subjective measures of consciousness can be biased in various specified ways, some of which involve the relation between first order states and second (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  31. added 2008-12-31
    To Beep or Not to Beep: Obtaining Accurate Reports About Awareness.R. Hurlburt & C. L. Heavey - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7):113-128.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  32. added 2008-12-31
    Epistemology and the Evidential Status of Introspective Reports I.A. Goldman - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8):1-16.
    The question of trusting introspective reports is a question about evidential warrant or justification. It is therefore a question of epistemology, and it behoves us to approach it within the framework of epistemology, which addresses evidential warrant across a broad spectrum of topics and sources. This paper examines the scientific status of introspective reports from the vantage point of general epistemological theorizing.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  33. added 2008-12-31
    Why Trust the Subject?Andreas Roepstorff - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):9-10.
    It is a great pleasure to introduce this collection of papers on the use of introspective evidence in cognitive science. Our task as guest editors has been tremendously stimulating. We have received an outstanding number of contributions, in terms of quantity and quality, from academics across a wide disciplinary span, both from younger researchers and from the most experienced scholars in the field. We therefore had to redraw the plans for this project a number of times. It quickly became clear (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  34. added 2008-12-31
    The Clinician's Paradox: Believing Those You Must Not Trust.Richard Cytowic - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):9-10.
    Clinicians have a convention whereby symptoms are subjective statements 'as told by' patients, whereas signs are outwardly observable facts. Yet both first-person reports and third-person observations are theory laden and can bias conclusions. Two aspects of the oft-mentioned unreliability of reports are the subject's interpretation of them and the experimenter's assumptions when translating introspective reports into scientifically useful characterizations. Meticulous training of introspectors can address their mischief, whereas investigators can become more attentive to their own theory-laden biases. In the case (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. added 2008-12-31
    Data From Introspective Reports: Upgrading From Common Sense to Science.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):141-156.
    Introspective reports are used as sources of information about other minds, in both everyday life and science. Many scientists and philosophers consider this practice unjustified, while others have made the untestable assumption that introspection is a truthful method of private observation. I argue that neither skepticism nor faith concerning introspective reports are warranted. As an alternative, I consider our everyday, commonsensical reliance on each other’s introspective reports. When we hear people talk about their minds, we neither refuse to learn from (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  36. added 2008-12-31
    Who's on First? Heterophenomenology Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9):19-30.
    There is a pattern of miscommunication bedeviling the people working on consciousness that is reminiscent of the classic Abbott and Costello 'Who's on First?' routine. With the best of intentions, people are talking past each other, seeing major disagreements when there are only terminological or tactical preferences -- or even just matters of emphasis -- that divide the sides. Since some substantive differences also lurk in this confusion, it is well worth trying to sort out. Much of the problem seems (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  37. added 2008-12-31
    Valid and Non-Reactive Verbalization of Thoughts During Performance of Tasks - Towards a Solution to the Central Problems of Introspection as a Source of Scientific Data.K. A. Ericsson - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):1-18.
  38. added 2008-12-31
    Introspective Report - Trust, Self-Knowledge and Science.Anthony J. Marcel - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):167-186.
    This paper addresses whether we have transparent accurate access to our own conscious experience. It first sketches the origin and social history of this issue in the seventeenth century, when the trust one can have in self- knowledge was disputed in the religious, social and scientific domains. It then reviews evidence that our conscious experience is disunified in several ways and has two levels, can be opaque to us, and contains much that is non-explicit; and that attending to one's experience (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. added 2008-12-31
    Verbal Reports on the Contents of Consciousness: Reconsidering Introspectionist Methodology.Eddy A. Nahmias - 2002 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 8.
    Doctors must now take a fifth vital sign from their patients: pain reports. I use this as a case study to discuss how different schools of psychology (introspectionism, behaviorism, cognitive psychology) have treated verbal reports about the contents of consciousness. After examining these differences, I suggest that, with new methods of mapping data about neurobiological states with behavioral data and with verbal reports about conscious experience, we should reconsider some of the introspectionists' goals and methods. I discuss examples from cognitive (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  40. added 2008-12-31
    Can Heterophenomenology Ground a Complete Science of Consciousness?Miri Albahari - 2002 - Noetica.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. added 2008-12-31
    The Role of Phenomenological Reports in Experiments on Consciousness.Morten Overgaard - 2001 - Psycoloquy 12 (29):1-10.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  42. added 2008-12-31
    Phenomenology and Heterophenomenology: Husserl and Dennett on Reality and Science.David L. Thompson - 2000 - In Andrew Brook, Don Ross & David L. Thompson (eds.), Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment. MIT Press.
  43. added 2008-12-31
    Troubles with Heterophenomenology.Eduard Marbach - 1994 - In Roberto Casati, B. Smith & Stephen L. White (eds.), Philosophy and Cognitive Sciences: Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium (Kirchberg Am Wechsel, Austria 1993). Holder-Pichler-Tempsky.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  44. added 2008-12-31
    Consciousness: The Mindlessness/Mindfulness and Verbal Report Controversies.P. J. Benoit & W. L. Benoit - 1986 - Western Journal of Speech Communication 50:41-63.
  45. added 2008-12-31
    Telling More Than They Can Know: The Positivist Account of Verbal Reports and Mental Processes.John Mcclure - 1983 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 13 (1):111–128.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  46. added 2008-12-31
    How to Study Human Consciousness Empirically or Nothing Comes to Mind.Daniel C. Dennett - 1982 - Synthese 53 (2):159-80.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   99 citations  
  47. added 2008-12-31
    Subjects' Access to Cognitive Processes: Demand Characteristics and Verbal Report.John G. Adair & Barry Spinner - 1981 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 11 (1):31–52.
    The present paper examines the arguments and data presented by Nisbett and Wilson relevant to their thesis that subjects do not have access to their own cognitive processes. It is concluded that their review of previous research is selective and incomplete and that the data they present in behalf of their thesis does not withstand a demand characteristics analysis. Furthermore, their use of observer-subject similarity as evidence of subjects' inability to access cognitive processes makes tests of their hypothesis confounded and, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  48. added 2008-12-31
    Limitations on Verbal Reports of Internal Events: A Refutation of Nisbett and Wilson and of Bem.Patricia D. White - 1980 - Psychological Review 87:105-12.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  49. added 2008-12-31
    Verbal Reports on Mental Processes: Issues of Accuracy and Awareness.Marvina C. Rich - 1979 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 9 (1):29–37.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  50. added 2008-12-31
    Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes.Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy D. Wilson - 1977 - Psychological Review 84 (3):231-59.
    Reviews evidence which suggests that there may be little or no direct introspective access to higher order cognitive processes. Ss are sometimes unaware of the existence of a stimulus that importantly influenced a response, unaware of the existence of the response, and unaware that the stimulus has affected the response. It is proposed that when people attempt to report on their cognitive processes, that is, on the processes mediating the effects of a stimulus on a response, they do not do (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1191 citations  
1 — 50 / 51