Russell on substitutivity and the abandonment of propositions

Philosophical Review 120 (2):151-205 (2011)
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Abstract

The paper argues that philosophers commonly misidentify the substitutivity principle involved in Russell’s puzzle about substitutivity in “On Denoting”. This matters because when that principle is properly identified the puzzle becomes considerably sharper and more interesting than it is often taken to be. This article describes both the puzzle itself and Russell's solution to it, which involves resources beyond the theory of descriptions. It then explores the epistemological and metaphysical consequences of that solution. One such consequence, it argues, is that Russell must abandon his commitment to propositions

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Ian Proops
University of Texas at Austin

Citations of this work

Why Ramify?Harold T. Hodes - 2015 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 56 (2):379-415.
Russell on Propositions.Dominic Alford-Duguid & Fatema Amijee - 2022 - In Chris Tillman & Adam Murray (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Propositions. Routledge. pp. 188-208.
Russell on Incomplete Symbols.Bryan Pickel - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (10):909-923.

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References found in this work

Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.
Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.
Frege on demonstratives.John Perry - 1977 - Philosophical Review 86 (4):474-497.

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