Self-knowledge and rationality

Authors
Baron Reed
Northwestern University
Abstract
There have been several recent attempts to account for the special authority of self-knowledge by grounding it in a constitutive relation between an agent's intentional states and her judgments about those intentional states. This constitutive relation is said to hold in virtue of the rationality of the subject. I argue, however, that there are two ways in which we have self-knowledge without there being such a constitutive relation between first-order intentional states and the second-order judgments about them. Recognition of this fact thus represents a significant challenge to the rational agency view
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00314.x
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Doxastic Deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.
Theory of Knowledge.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Silence of Self-Knowledge.Johannes Roessler - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):1-17.
Self-Knowledge, Transparency, and Self-Authorship.Sacha Golob - 2015 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3pt3):235-253.

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