Knowledge from Blindspots

In Rodrigo Borges & Ian Schnee (eds.), Illuminating Errors: New Essays on Knowledge from Non-Knowledge. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 76-91 (2023)
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No False Lemmas (NFL) says: necessarily, S’s belief that p is knowledge only if it is not inferred from any falsehood. Its proponents argue that alleged counterexamples to NFL are really cases of knowledge despite falsehood, wherein the false premise is inessential to the inference; perhaps some nearby truth does the justificatory heavy-lifting. We argue that there can be cases of inferential knowledge from a blindspot premise. Given that in such cases the relevant falsehood is essential to the inference, one cannot employ the knowledge despite falsehood strategy to defend NFL. We conclude by discussing how cases of knowledge from blindspots exemplify one way in which we can gain inferential knowledge defectively or non-ideally.



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Author Profiles

Tim Kearl
University of Glasgow
Rhys Borchert
University of Arizona
Juan Comesaña
Rutgers - New Brunswick

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References found in this work

Blindspots.Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Normative Externalism.Brian Weatherson - 2019 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
A reply to my critics.George Edward Moore - 1942 - In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The philosophy of G. E. Moore. New York,: Tudor Pub. Co..
Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Studia Logica 48 (2):260-261.

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