Counter Closure and Knowledge despite Falsehood

Philosophical Quarterly 64 (257):552-568 (2014)
Certain puzzling cases have been discussed in the literature recently which appear to support the thought that knowledge can be obtained by way of deduction from a falsehood; moreover, these cases put pressure, prima facie, on the thesis of counter closure for knowledge. We argue that the cases do not involve knowledge from falsehood; despite appearances, the false beliefs in the cases in question are causally, and therefore epistemologically, incidental, and knowledge is achieved despite falsehood. We also show that the principle of counter closure, and the concomitant denial of knowledge from falsehood, is well motivated by considerations in epistemological theory--in particular, by the view that knowledge is first in the epistemological order of things.
Keywords Counter-Closure  Knowledge from falsehood  Knowledge First
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DOI 10.1093/pq/pqu033
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Citations of this work BETA
Knowledge Despite Falsehood.Martin Montminy - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):463-475.
Justified Belief From Unjustified Belief.Peter Murphy - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.

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