Counter Closure and Knowledge despite Falsehood

Philosophical Quarterly 64 (257):552-568 (2014)

Authors
Brian Ball
Oxford University
Michael Blome-Tillmann
McGill University
Abstract
Certain puzzling cases have been discussed in the literature recently which appear to support the thought that knowledge can be obtained by way of deduction from a falsehood; moreover, these cases put pressure, prima facie, on the thesis of counter closure for knowledge. We argue that the cases do not involve knowledge from falsehood; despite appearances, the false beliefs in the cases in question are causally, and therefore epistemologically, incidental, and knowledge is achieved despite falsehood. We also show that the principle of counter closure, and the concomitant denial of knowledge from falsehood, is well motivated by considerations in epistemological theory--in particular, by the view that knowledge is first in the epistemological order of things.
Keywords Counter-Closure  Knowledge from falsehood  Knowledge First
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/pq/pqu033
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition Advancing the Debate.Jonathan Evans & Keith E. Stanovich - 2013 - Perspectives on Psychological Science 8 (3):223-241.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1981 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.

View all 20 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Knowledge Despite Falsehood.Martin Montminy - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):463-475.
Justification is Potential Knowledge.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (2):184-206.
Knowledge, Despite Evidence to the Contrary.Rodrigo Borges - 2019 - In Cherie Braden, Rodrigo Borges & Branden Fitelson (eds.), Themes From Klein. Springer Verlag.
Thinking About the Body as Subject.Daniel Morgan - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (4):435-457.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

When Does Falsehood Preclude Knowledge?Neil Feit & Andrew Cullison - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):283-304.
Counter-Closure.Federico Luzzi - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):673-683.
Sensitivity, Safety, and Closure.Sven Bernecker - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (4):367-381.
Knowledge-Closure and Inferential Knowledge.Guido Melchior - 2010 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (3):259-285.
Knowledge and Deductive Closure.James L. White - 1991 - Synthese 86 (3):409 - 423.
Interest-Relative Invariantism and Knowledge From Ignorance.Federico Luzzi - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1):31-42.
Dretske on Knowledge Closure.Steven Luper - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):379 – 394.
Solving the Problem of Easy Knowledge.Tim Black - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):597-617.
The Many Faces of Closure and Introspection.Patrick Allo - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1):91-124.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-07-24

Total views
527 ( #8,074 of 2,271,601 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
75 ( #8,577 of 2,271,601 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature