Essentialist Blindness Would Not Preclude Counterfactual Knowledge

Philosophia Scientiae 16:149-172 (2012)
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Abstract

L’objectif de cet article est double. Il défend d’abord, contre une menace potentielle, la thèse selon laquelle une capacité pour la connaissance essentialiste ne doit pas figurer parmi les capacités fondamentales pour la connaissance des contrefactuels. Il évalue ensuite une conséquence de cette thèse, ou du moins de la défense que j’en fais qui s’appuie sur une discussion des théories de Kment et de Williamson portant sur le lien entre la modalité et les contrefactuels.

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10.4000/philosophiascientiae.745

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Sonia Roca-Royes
University of Stirling

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References found in this work

Knowledge of possibility and of necessity.Bob Hale - 2003 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (1):1–20.
Knowledge of Possibility and of Necessity.Bob Hale - 2003 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (1):1-20.

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