Against Scanlon's Theory of the Strength of Practical Reasons

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (3):1-6 (2015)
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Abstract

We often say that one reason is stronger, or weightier, than another. These are metaphors. What does normative strength or weight really consist in? Scanlon (2014) offers a novel answer to this question. His answer appeals to counterfactuals of various kinds. I argue that appealing to counterfactuals leads to deep problems for his view.

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10.26556/jesp.v9i3.179

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Eric Sampson
Purdue University

Citations of this work

The Type-B Moral Error Theory.Anthony Robert Booth - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (5):2181-2199.
Reasons and Normativity.Jakob Green Werkmäster - 2019 - Dissertation, Lund University

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References found in this work

Slaves of the passions.Mark Andrew Schroeder - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Being Realistic About Reasons.Thomas Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The Value-Based Theory of Reasons.Barry Maguire - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.

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