Scepticism, relativism and the argument from the criterion

Abstract
This article explores the relationship between epistemic relativism and Pyrrhonian scepticism. It is argued that a fundamental argument for contemporary epistemic relativism derives from the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion. Pyrrhonian scepticism is compared and contrasted with Cartesian scepticism about the external world and Humean scepticism about induction. Epistemic relativism is characterized as relativism due to the variation of epistemic norms, and is contrasted with other forms of cognitive relativism, such as truth relativism, conceptual relativism and ontological relativism. An argument from the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion to epistemic relativism is presented, and is contrasted with three other arguments for epistemic relativism. It is argued that the argument from the criterion is the most fundamental argument for epistemic relativism. Finally, it is noted how the argument of the present paper fits with the author’s previous suggestion that a particularist response to the Pyrrhonian sceptic may be combined with a naturalistic view of epistemic warrant to meet the challenge of epistemic relativism.
Keywords epistemic relativism  Pyrrhonian scepticism  problem of the criterion
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DOI 10.1016/j.shpsa.2011.12.026
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References found in this work BETA
Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.
Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes.Lakatos Imre - 1970 - In Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press. pp. 91-195.
On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.Donald Davidson - 1973 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 47:5--20.

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Citations of this work BETA
Why the Epistemic Relativist Cannot Use the Sceptic's Strategy. A Comment on Sankey.Markus Seidel - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (1):134-139.
How the Epistemic Relativist May Use the Sceptic's Strategy: A Reply to Markus Seidel.Howard Sankey - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (1):140-144.
Scepticism, Relativism, and the Structure of Epistemic Frameworks.Steven Bland - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (4):539-544.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

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