Ethics 118 (3):388-409 (2008)

Authors
Kieran Setiya
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
Argues that we know without observation or inference at least some of what we are doing intentionally and that this possibility must be explained in terms of knowledge-how. It is a consequence of the argument that knowing how to do something cannot be identified with knowledge of a proposition.
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DOI 10.1086/528781
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Knowing How.Yuri Cath - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):487-503.
The Epistemic Impact of the Etiology of Experience.Susanna Siegel - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (3):697-722.
Knowledge-How, Abilities, and Questions.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):86-104.
Mental Action.Antonia Peacocke - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (6):e12741.

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