Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):153-175 (2006)
One of the strongest objections to epiphenomenalism is that it precludes any kind of knowledge of qualia, since empirical knowledge has to include a causal relationship between the respective belief and the object of knowledge. It is argued that this objection works only if the causal relationship is understood in a very specific sense (as a 'direct' causal relationship). Epiphenomenalism can, however, live well with other kinds of causal relationships ('indirect' causal relationships) or even with a reliability account of knowledge which does not invoke causation at all. Michael Pauen has argued extensively (this volume of Journal of Consciousness Studies), however, that this line of defence doesn't work because it presupposes the existence of psychophysical laws connecting qualia with physical phenomena which cannot be established under epiphenomenalist presuppositions. It is argued that Pauen's arguments lead to sceptical consequences which threaten not only interactionist alternatives to epiphenomenalism but finally his own account.
|Keywords||Belief Epiphenomenalism Epistemology Functionalism Knowledge Physicalism Qualia Zombie Pauen, Michael|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
On Robinson's Response to the Self-Stultifying Objection.Dwayne Moore - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (4):627-641.
Similar books and articles
In Defence of Qualia-Epiphenomenalism.Volker Gadenne - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):101-114.
Materialism, Functionalism, and Supervenient Qualia.Ausonio Marras - 1993 - Dialogue 32 (3):475-92.
The Knowledge Argument Against the Knowledge Argument.Michael Watkins - 1989 - Analysis 49 (June):158-60.
Epiphenomenalism: Dead End or Way Out?Michael Pauen, Alexander Staudacher & Sven Walter - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):7-19.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads88 ( #58,948 of 2,168,605 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #127,317 of 2,168,605 )
How can I increase my downloads?