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  1. Causal Exclusion Without Physical Completeness and No Overdetermination.Gebharter Alexander - forthcoming - Abstracta – Linguagem, Mente E Ação.
    Hitchcock (2012) demonstrated that the validity of causal exclusion arguments as well as the plausibility of several of their premises hinges on the specific theory of causation endorsed. In this paper I show that the validity of causal exclusion arguments—if represented within the theory of causal Bayes nets the way Gebharter (2015) suggests—actually requires much weaker premises than the ones which are typically assumed. In particular, neither completeness of the physical domain nor the no overdetermination assumption are required.
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  2. Epiphenomenalism in the Moral Philosophy of George Santayana, Particularly as It Affects Free Will.Benjamin W. P. Allen - 1952 - Dissertation, Drew University
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  3. Epiphenomenalism Explained.Norman Bacrac - 2010 - Philosophy Now 81:10-13.
    Epiphenomenalism expressed as a form of materialism in two key axioms; distinguished from Cartesian dualism, physicalism, eliminativism; shown to be compatible with a subjective experience of free choice but not with libertarian free will - the social consequences of this view.
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  4. Zombies and Epiphenomenalism.Andrew R. Bailey - 2009 - Dialogue 48 (1):129.
    RÉSUMÉ: Cette étude examine la relation entre la demande que les zombies sont logiquement/métaphysiquement possible et de la position que la conscience phénoménal est epiphenomenal. Il est souvent présumé que la première entraîne ce dernier, et que, par conséquent, toute implausibility dans la notion de conscience epiphenomenalism remet en question la possibilité réelle de zombies. Quatre façons dont les zombist pourrait répondre sont examinées, et je soutiens que les deux les plus fréquemment rencontrés sont insuffisantes, mais les autres—dont l’un est (...)
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  5. Zombies, Epiphenomenalism, and Physicalist Theories of Consciousness.Andrew R. Bailey - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):481-509.
  6. Interventionism and Epiphenomenalism.Michael Baumgartner - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):359-383.
    In a recent paper, Shapiro and Sober (2007) defend two claims with respect to the master argument for epiphenomenalism, which is designed to rebut non-reductive physicalism: (i) relative to an interventionist account of causation, as most elaborately presented in (Woodward 2003), the master argument turns out to be invalid; and (ii) interventionism provides a means to experimentally uncover micro effects of macro causes. The first part of this paper takes issue with both of these claims by showing that Woodward’s interventionism (...)
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  7. Epiphenomenalism and the Eliminative Strategy.Jason A. Beyer - 1999 - Kinesis 26 (1):18-36.
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  8. Trying Out Epiphenomenalism.Peter Bieri - 1992 - Erkenntnis 36 (3):283-309.
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  9. L'inertie du mental.Renée Bilodeau - 1993 - Dialogue 32 (03):507-525.
    This paper addresses two objections raised against anomalous monism. Firstly, on the basis of Davidson's assertion that all causal relations fall under strict laws, many critics conclude mental properties are causally inert since they are non-nomic. I argue that this conclusion follows only on the further assumption that all causally efficacious properties are nomic properties. It is perfectly consistent, however, to hold that there is a law covering each causal relation without each causal statement being the instantiation of a law. (...)
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  10. Epiphenomenalism as a Solution to the Ontological Mind-Body Problem.Dieter Birnbacher - 1988 - Ratio 1 (1):17-32.
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  11. Against Chalmers' Epiphenomenalism.Glenn Braddock - 2000 - Auslegung 24 (1):45-63.
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  12. Santayana's Amphibious Concepts.Michael Brodrick - 2013 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 49 (2):238-249.
    Most of Santayana’s critics view him as an epiphenomenalist. Angus Kerr-Lawson has written several articles that characterize Santayana’s account of consciousness as epiphenomenalist.1 In “Santayana’s Philosophy of Mind”, John Lachs considers the strengths and weaknesses of Santayana’s epiphenomenalism.2 These views are based on solid evidence. Although he seldom uses the word “epiphenomenalism”, Santayana’s most prominent account of mind-body relations has all the features of that theory. In “Apologia Pro Mente Sua”, Santayana praises an article by Eliseo Vivas that presents him (...)
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  13. Epiphenomenalism: Reply to Dretske.Tyler Burge - 2003 - In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.
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  14. Comments On: Mark Woodhouse, A New Epiphenomenalism?.Keith Campbell - 1974 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (August):170-173.
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  15. Epiphenomenalism.Keith Campbell & Nicholas J. J. Smith - 1993 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Epiphenomenalism is a theory concerning the relation between the mental and physical realms, regarded as radically different in nature. The theory holds that only physical states have causal power, and that mental states are completely dependent on them. The mental realm, for epiphenomenalists, is nothing more than a series of conscious states which signify the occurrence of states of the nervous system, but which play no causal role. For example, my feeling sleepy does not cause my yawning — rather, both (...)
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  16. Explanatory Epiphenomenalism.Neil Campbell - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):437-451.
    I propose a new form of epiphenomenalism, 'explanatory epiphenomenalism', the view that the identification of A's mental properties does not provide a causal explanation of A's behaviour. I arrive at this view by showing that although anomalous monism does not entail type epiphenomenalism (despite what many of Davidson's critics have suggested), it does (when coupled with some additional claims) lead to the conclusion that the identification of A's reasons does not causally explain A's behaviour. I then formalize this view and (...)
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  17. What Was Huxley's Epiphenomenalism?Neil Campbell - 2001 - Biology and Philosophy 16 (3):357-375.
    Thomas Huxley is often identified as the originator of the doctrineknown as ``epiphenomenalism,'' but there appears to be littleappreciation for the details of Huxley's theory. In particular,conflicting interpretations show that there is uncertainty about twoaspects of his position: whether mental states are completelywithout causal powers or simply have no influence on the behavior theyare typically taken to explain, and whether conscious epiphenomena arethemselves physical states of the brain or immaterial items. I clarifythese issues and show that Huxley's brand of epiphenomenalism (...)
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  18. Anomalous Monism and the Charge of Epiphenomenalism.Neil Campbell - 1998 - Dialectica 52 (1):23-39.
    I begin with the view that the usual property‐based epiphenomenalist challenges to anomalous monism are unconvincing in light of Davidson's reluctance to analyze causation in terms of properties. I argue, however, that the challenges against Davidson do hold in the weaker sense that although mental events have causal efficacy the identification of an agent's reasons does not causally explain behaviour. I then show that in light of Davidson's commitment to psychophysical supervenience this does not constitute a serious problem for anomalous (...)
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  19. James's Early Criticism of the Automaton Theory.Milic Capek - 1954 - Journal of the History of Ideas 15 (April):260-279.
  20. Epiphenomenalisms, Ancient and Modern.Victor Caston - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (3):309-363.
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  21. Still Epiphenomenal Qualia: Response to Muller.Dan Cavedon-Taylor - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (1):105-107.
    Hans Muller has recently attempted to show that Frank Jackson cannot assert the existence of qualia without thereby falsifying himself on the matter of such mental states being epiphenomenal with respect to the physical world. I argue that Muller misunderstands the commitments of qualia epiphenomenalism and that, as a result, his arguments against Jackson do not go through.
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  22. Referring to the Qualitative Dimension of Consciousness: Iconicity Instead of Indexicality.Marc Champagne - 2014 - Dialogue 53 (1):135-182.
    This paper suggests that reference to phenomenal qualities is best understood as involving iconicity, that is, a passage from sign-vehicle to object that exploits a similarity between the two. This contrasts with a version of the ‘phenomenal concept strategy’ that takes indexicality to be central. However, since it is doubtful that phenomenal qualities are capable of causally interacting with anything, indexical reference seems inappropriate. While a theorist like David Papineau is independently coming to something akin to iconicity, I think some (...)
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  23. Davidson's Action Theory and Epiphenomenalism.Kam-Yuen Cheng - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Research 22 (April):81-95.
  24. Why the Evolutionary Argument is Not Really an Evolutionary Argument After All.Joseph Corabi - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (3-4):3-4.
    The evolutionary argument is one of the most well-known empirical arguments against epiphenomenalism. In its most persuasive form, it aims to show that because of evolutionary considerations, the smooth correlations between painful qualia and noxious stimuli would be highly unexpected if epiphenomenalism were true, but just what we would expect if an alternative mind--body theory were. Thus, the presence of these correlations is strong evidence against epiphenomenalism. After formulating a canonical version of the argument, I demonstrate that the evolutionary evidence (...)
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  25. Radical Epiphenomenalism: B.F. Skinner's Account of Private Events.Richard E. Creel - 1980 - Behaviorism 8 (1):31-53.
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  26. Mental Causation: The Mind-Body Problem.Anthony Dardis - 2008 - Columbia University Press.
    Anthony Dardis shows how to unravel the knot. He traces its early appearance in the history of philosophical inquiry, specifically in the work of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, and T. H. Huxley.
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  27. McGinn's Materialism and Epiphenomenalism.F. W. Dauer - 2001 - Analysis 61 (2):136-139.
    Colin McGinn urged that while a brain state P explains consciousness, a conception P is cognitively inaccessible to us. This paper argues that McGinn's argument for his form of materialism is committed to P being epiphenomenal or causally inert relative to such things as the movements of our bodies. As a result, McGinn's materialism creates a duality in the brain and thereby faces the same problem of epiphenomenalism which plagues the Cartesian dualist.
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  28. Self-Stultification Objection.F. De Brigard - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (5-6):120-130.
    Epiphenomenalism holds that mental events are caused by physical events while not causing any physical effects whatsoever. The self-stultification objection is a venerable argument against epiphenomenalism according to which, if epiphenomenalism were true, we would not have knowledge of our own sensations. For the past three decades, W.S. Robinson has called into question the soundness of this objection, offering several arguments against it. Many of his arguments attempt to shift the burden of proof onto the opponents of epiphenomenalism, hoping to (...)
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  29. Dynamical Agents: Consciousness, Causation, and Two Specters of Epiphenomenalism.Liam P. Dempsey & Itay Shani - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2):225-243.
    The aim of this paper is to defend the causal efficacy of consciousness against two specters of epiphenomenalism. We argue that these challenges are best met, on the one hand, by rejecting all forms of consciousness-body dualism, and on the other, by adopting a dynamical systems approach to understanding the causal efficacy of conscious experience. We argue that this non-reductive identity theory provides the theoretical resources for reconciling the reality and efficacy of consciousness with the neurophysiology of the brain and (...)
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  30. "Epiphenomenal" Qualia?Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - In Yujin Nagasawa, Peter Ludlow & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's something about Mary: essays on phenomenal consciousness and Frank Jackson's knowledge argument. Little, Brown. pp. 127-136.
  31. The Super-Overdetermination Problem.John Donaldson - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Glasgow
    I examine the debate between reductive and non-reductive physicalists, and conclude that if we are to be physicalists, then we should be reductive physicalists. I assess how both reductionists and non-reductionists try to solve the mind-body problem and the problem of mental causation. I focus on the problem of mental causation as it is supposed to be faced by non-reductionism: the so-called overdetermination problem. I argue that the traditional articulation of that problem is significantly flawed, and I show how to (...)
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  32. Taylor's Refutation of Epiphenomenalism.Richard Double - 1979 - Journal of Critical Analysis 8 (1):23-28.
    In "metaphysics" richard taylor argues that epiphenomenalism is implausible because it leaves open the possibility that human behavior occurs without the presence of mental events. in my paper i examine the sort of possibility involved and conclude that the logical possibility of "mind-less behavior" which epiphenomenalism must allow is an equal possibility for all competing theories of mind. thus, epiphenomenalism is seen to be no worse off in this respect than other theories and taylor's objection fails.
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  33. Epiphenomenalism and Rorty's Theory of Identity.Hoyt Littleton Edge - 1970 - Dissertation, Vanderbilt University
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  34. The Explanatory Role of Consciousness in Action.Naomi M. Eilan - 2003 - In Sabine Maasen, Wolfgang Prinz & Gerhard Roth (eds.), Voluntary Action: Brains, Minds, and Sociality. Oxford University Press. pp. 188-201.
  35. Emergent Substances, Physical Properties, Action Explanations.Jeff Engelhardt - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (6):1125-1146.
    This paper proposes that if individual X ‘inherits’ property F from individual Y, we should be leery of explanations that appeal to X’s being F. This bears on what I’ll call “emergent substance dualism”, the view that human persons or selves are metaphysically fundamental or “new kinds of things with new kinds of causal powers” even though they depend in some sense on physical particulars :5–23, 2006; Personal agency. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008). Two of the most prominent advocates of (...)
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  36. Consciousness Evolving.James H. Fetzer (ed.) - 2002 - John Benjamins.
  37. Consciousness, Adaptation, and Epiphenomenalism.Owen J. Flanagan & Thomas W. Polger - 1998 - In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins.
    Consciousness and evolution are complex phenomena. It is sometimes thought that if adaptation explanations for some varieties of consciousness, say, conscious visual perception, can be had, then we may be reassured that at least those kinds of consciousness are not epiphenomena. But what if other varieties of consciousness, for example, dreams, are not adaptations? We sort out the connections among evolution, adaptation, and epiphenomenalism in order to show that the consequences for the nature and causal efficacy of consciousness are not (...)
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  38. Some Attitudes and Considerations and a Biological Argument for Epiphenomenalism.Horace S. Fries - 1929 - Journal of Philosophy 26 (23):626-634.
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  39. In Defence of Qualia-Epiphenomenalism.Volker Gadenne - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):101-114.
    Epiphenomenalism has been criticized with several objections. It has been argued that epiphenomenalism is incompatible with the alleged causal relevance of mental states, and that it renders knowledge of our own conscious states impossible. In this article, it is demonstrated that qualia-epiphenomenalism follows from some well- founded assumptions, and that it meets the cited objections. Though not free from difficulties, it is at least superior to its main competitors, namely, physicalism and interactionism.
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  40. Where's the Action? Epiphenomenalism and the Problem of Free Will.Shaun Gallagher - 2006 - In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press. pp. 109-124.
    Some philosophers argue that Descartes was wrong when he characterized animals as purely physical automata – robots devoid of consciousness. It seems to them obvious that animals (tigers, lions, and bears, as well as chimps, dogs, and dolphins, and so forth) are conscious. There are other philosophers who argue that it is not beyond the realm of possibilities that robots and other artificial agents may someday be conscious – and it is certainly practical to take the intentional stance toward them (...)
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  41. Santayana's Treatment of Teleology.Brian Jonathan Garrett - 2010 - Bulletin of the Santayana Society 28 (28):1-10.
    Santayana's epiphenomenalism is best understood as part of his thinking about teleology and final causes. Santayana makes a distinction between final causes, which he rejects, and teleology, which he finds ubiquitous. Mental causation is identified with a doctrine of final causes which he argues is an absurd form of causation. Thus mental causes are rejected and Santayana embraces epiphenomenalism.
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  42. Causal Exclusion and Causal Bayes Nets.Alexander Gebharter - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    In this paper I reconstruct and evaluate the validity of two versions of causal exclusion arguments within the theory of causal Bayes nets. I argue that supervenience relations formally behave like causal relations. If this is correct, then it turns out that both versions of the exclusion argument are valid when assuming the causal Markov condition and the causal minimality condition. I also investigate some consequences for the recent discussion of causal exclusion arguments in the light of an interventionist theory (...)
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  43. Acquaintance, Parsimony, and Epiphenomenalism.Brie Gertler - forthcoming - In Sam Coleman (ed.), The Knowledge Argument Then and Now. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Some physicalists (Balog 2012, Howell 2013), and most dualists, endorse the acquaintance response to the Knowledge Argument. This is the claim that Mary gains substantial new knowledge, upon leaving the room, because phenomenal knowledge requires direct acquaintance with phenomenal properties. The acquaintance response is an especially promising way to make sense of the Mary case. I argue that it casts doubt on two claims often made on behalf of physicalism, regarding parsimony and mental causation. I show that those who endorse (...)
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  44. Actions, Norms, Values.Olav Gjelsvik - 1999 - Hawthorne: De Gruyter.
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  45. On Mind and Matter.Olav Gjelsvik - 1999 - In Actions, Norms, Values. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.
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  46. Three Bad Arguments for Intentional Property Epiphenomenalism.Robert Gulick - 1992 - Erkenntnis 36 (3):311 - 331.
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  47. Mental Causation and Epiphenomenalism.John Heil - unknown
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  48. Mental Causation.John Heil - 2002 - In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger. Blackwell. pp. 29--52.
    This volume presents a collection of new, specially written essays by a diverse group of philosophers, including Donald Davidson, Ted Honderich, and Philip Pettit, each of whom is widely known for defending a particular conception of minds and their place in nature.
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  49. Mental Causation.John Heil & Alfred Mele (eds.) - 1993 - Clarendon Press.
    I argue that the two standard models of mental causation fail to capture the crucial causal relevance of the reason-giving relations involved. Their common error is an exclusively mechanical conception of causation, on which any justification is bound to be independent of the causal process involved, based upon a general rule from which the correctness of the particular case follows only by subsumption. I establish possibility of an alternative model, by sketching an account of the causal dependence of perceptual knowledge (...)
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  50. Meaning and the Impotence Hypothesis.Michael P. Hodges - 1979 - Review of Metaphysics 32 (March):515-29.
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