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  1. added 2020-02-12
    The Microstructure View of the Brain-Consciousness Relation.Michael Schmitz - 2008 - In Sven Walter & Helene Bohse (eds.), Selected Contributions to GAP. 6, Sixth International Conference of the Society for Analytical Philosophy. Berlin:
    How can consciousness, how can the mind be causally efficacious in a world which seems—in some sense—to be thoroughly governed by physical causality? Mental causation has been a nagging problem in philosophy since the beginning of the modern age, when, inspired by the rise of physics, a metaphysical picture became dominant according to which the manifest macrophysical world of rocks, trees, colors, sounds etc. could be eliminated in favor of, or identified with, the microconstituents of these entities and their basic (...)
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  2. added 2020-02-07
    Antireductionist Interventionism.Reuben Stern & Benjamin Eva - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Kim’s causal exclusion argument purports to demonstrate that the non-reductive physicalist must treat mental properties (and macro-level properties in general) as causally inert. A number of authors have attempted to resist Kim’s conclusion by utilizing the conceptual resources of Woodward’s (2005) interventionist conception of causation. The viability of these responses has been challenged by Gebharter (2017a), who argues that the causal exclusion argument is vindicated by the theory of causal Bayesian networks (CBNs). Since the interventionist conception of causation relies crucially (...)
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  3. added 2020-02-07
    Physicalism and the Evolution of Consciousness.Roland Puccetti - 1975 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5 (sup2):171-183.
  4. added 2020-02-07
    Reflexions Suggested by Psychophysical Materialism.S. S. Laurie - 1894 - Mind 3 (9):56-76.
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  5. added 2019-12-12
    William James's Objection to Epiphenomenalism.Alexander Klein - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 5 (86):1179–1190.
    James developed an evolutionary objection to epiphenomenalism that is still discussed today. Epiphenomenalists have offered responses that do not grasp its full depth. I thus offer a new reading and assessment of James’s objection. Our life-essential, phenomenal pleasures and pains have three features that suggest that they were shaped by selection, according to James: they are natively patterned, those patterns are systematically linked with antecedent brain states, and the patterns are “universal” among humans. If epiphenomenalism were true, phenomenal patterns could (...)
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  6. added 2019-12-06
    Ontological Novelty, Emergence, and the Mind-Body Problem.Katalin Balog - 2006 - In Günter Abel (ed.), Kreativität. Hamburg, Germany: pp. 371-399.
    This paper is an exposition and comparison between two views concerning fundamental ontology in the context of the Mind-Body Problem: physicalism and emergent property dualism. I assess the pros and cons of each position and argue that physicalism provides an overall more plausible metaphysics.
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  7. added 2019-10-16
    Panpsychism and Real Mental Causation.Lorenzo Sleakes - manuscript
    The following paper is a panpsychist metaphysics and seeks to avoid any radical emergence of mentality. Science has progressed by stripping the world of all mental qualities but a complete understanding of the world must ultimately put these back. The two types of mental qualities that must be reinstated as fundamentals are the private worlds of individual subjects and phenomenal qualities like colors. I view these as separate aspects of mind although they have a history of being conflated. In this (...)
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  8. added 2019-09-20
    Santayana's Anticipations of Deleuze: Total Natural Events and Quasi-Pragmatism.Joshua M. Hall - 2017 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 53 (2):270.
    In a monograph published last year, literary theorist Mark Noble notes that, in the way Deleuze understands the relationship between materialism and subjectivity, Deleuze “also sounds curiously like Santayana.” For example, the work of both philosophers “locates human value in a source at once immanent and alien.” Noble also wonders “whether the lesson of Santayana’s own negotiation with his tendency to humanize the non-human ground of experience also anticipates the thrill Deleuze chases when positing the univocity of being.” In the (...)
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  9. added 2019-06-06
    Santayana's Amphibious Concepts.Michael Brodrick - 2013 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 49 (2):238.
    Most of Santayana’s critics view him as an epiphenomenalist. Angus Kerr-Lawson has written several articles that characterize Santayana’s account of consciousness as epiphenomenalist.1 In “Santayana’s Philosophy of Mind”, John Lachs considers the strengths and weaknesses of Santayana’s epiphenomenalism.2 These views are based on solid evidence. Although he seldom uses the word “epiphenomenalism”, Santayana’s most prominent account of mind-body relations has all the features of that theory. In “Apologia Pro Mente Sua”, Santayana praises an article by Eliseo Vivas that presents him (...)
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  10. added 2019-06-06
    Santayana’s Treatment of Teleology: Bulletin of the Santayana Society.Brian Jonathan Garrett - 2010 - Overheard in Seville 28 (28):1-10.
    Santayana's epiphenomenalism is best understood as part of his thinking about teleology and final causes. Santayana makes a distinction between final causes, which he rejects, and teleology, which he finds ubiquitous. Mental causation is identified with a doctrine of final causes which he argues is an absurd form of causation. Thus mental causes are rejected and Santayana embraces epiphenomenalism.
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  11. added 2019-06-06
    Interventionism and Epiphenomenalsim.Michael Baumgartner - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):359-383.
    One of the central objectives Shapiro and Sober pursue in is to show that what they call the master argument for epiphenomenalism, which is a type of causal exclusion argument, fails. Epiphe nomenalism, according to the terminology adopted in, designates the thesis that supervening macro properties have no causal influence on micro proper ties that are caused by the micro supervenience bases of those macro properties. Well-known classical exclusion arguments are designed to yield such macro-tomicro epiphenomenalism along the lines of (...)
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  12. added 2019-06-06
    The Causal Inefficacy of Content.Gabriel M. A. Segal - unknown
    The paper begins with the assumption that psychological event tokens are identical to or constituted from physical events. It then articulates a familiar apparent problem concerning the causal role of psychological properties. If they do not reduce to physical properties, then either they must be epiphenomenal or any effects they cause must also be caused by physical properties, and hence be overdetermined. It then argues that both epiphenomenalism and over-determinationism are prima facie perfectly reasonable and relatively unproblematic views. The paper (...)
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  13. added 2019-06-06
    A Pill Against Epiphenomenalism.Patrick Spät - 2006 - Abstracta 2 (2):172-179.
    This paper argues that epiphenomenalism – the view that physical states cause mental states, but not vice versa – is counterintuitive. Though we cannot prove its falsehood we can give strong reasons for not believing in inefficacious mental states. In doing so, this paper claims that the well-known counter-examples like arguments from the common sense or the theory of evolution are correct. Unfortunately, many arguments against epiphenomenalism do not contain empirical facts from the neurosciences. This paper tries both to do (...)
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  14. added 2019-06-06
    Zombies, Epiphenomenalism, and Physicalist Theories of Consciousness.Andrew Bailey - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):481-509.
    The University of Guelph, Guelph, ON N1G 2W1, CANADA.
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  15. added 2019-06-06
    Mental causation: A real phenomenon in a physicalistic world without epiphenomenalism or overdetermination.Albert Newen & Rimas Čuplinskas - 2002 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):139.
    The so-called problem of mental causation as discussed in the recent literature raises three central challenges for an adequate solution from a physicalist perspective: the threat of epiphenomenalism, the problem of externalism (or the difficulty in accounting for the causal efficacy of extrinsic mental properties) and the problem of causal exclusion (or the threat of over determination). We wish to account for mental causationas a real phenomenon within a physicalistic framework without accepting epiphenomenalism or overdetermination. The key ideas of our (...)
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  16. added 2019-06-06
    Mental Causation.John Heil & Alfred Mele (eds.) - 1993 - Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    Common sense and philosophical tradition agree that mind makes a difference. What we do depends not only on how our bodies are put together, but also on what we think. Explaining how mind can make a difference has proved challenging, however. Some have urged that the project faces an insurmountable dilemma: either we concede that mentalistic explanations of behavior have only a pragmatic standing or we abandon our conception of the physical domain as causally autonomous. Although each option has its (...)
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  17. added 2019-03-21
    Dualism and Exclusion.Bram Vaassen - 2019 - Erkenntnis:1-10.
    Many philosophers argue that exclusion arguments cannot exclude non-reductionist physicalist mental properties from being causes without excluding properties that are patently causal as well. List and Stoljar (2017) recently argued that a similar response to exclusion arguments is also available to dualists, thereby challenging the predominant view that exclusion arguments undermine dualist theories of mind. In particular, List and Stoljar maintain that exclusion arguments against dualism require a premise that states that, if a property is metaphysically distinct from the sufficient (...)
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  18. added 2019-01-30
    Nietzsche on the Superficiality of Consciousness.Mattia Riccardi - 2018 - In Manuel Dries (ed.), Nietzsche on consciousness and the embodied mind. De Gruyter. pp. 93-112.
    Abstract: Nietzsche’s famously wrote that “consciousness is a surface” (EH, Why I am so clever, 9: 97). The aim of this paper is to make sense of this quite puzzling contention—Superficiality, for short. In doing this, I shall focus on two further claims—both to be found in Gay Science 354—which I take to substantiate Nietzsche’s endorsement of Superficiality. The first claim is that consciousness is superfluous—which I call the “superfluousness claim” (SC). The second claim is that consciousness is the source (...)
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  19. added 2018-11-29
    Mad Qualia.Umut Baysan - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):467-485.
    This paper revisits some classic thought experiments in which experiences are detached from their characteristic causal roles, and explores what these thought experiments tell us about qualia epiphenomenalism, i.e., the view that qualia are epiphenomenal properties. It argues that qualia epiphenomenalism is true just in case it is possible for experiences of the same type to have entirely different causal powers. This is done with the help of new conceptual tools regarding the concept of an epiphenomenal property. One conclusion is (...)
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  20. added 2018-09-02
    Causal Emergence and Epiphenomenal Emergence.Umut Baysan - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-14.
    According to one conception of strong emergence, strongly emergent properties are nomologically necessitated by their base properties and have novel causal powers relative to them. In this paper, I raise a difficulty for this conception of strong emergence, arguing that these two features are incompatible. Instead of presenting this as an objection to the friends of strong emergence, I argue that this indicates that there are distinct varieties of strong emergence: causal emergence and epiphenomenal emergence. I then explore the prospects (...)
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  21. added 2018-08-11
    Monismo. Anómalo?: Donald Davidson e o problema da causalidade mental.Diana Couto - 2017 - Kinesis 20 (9):61-86.
  22. added 2018-07-14
    Mind and the Causal Exclusion Problem.Dwayne Moore - 2018 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Mind and the Causal Exclusion Problem The causal exclusion problem is an objection to nonreductive physicalist models of mental causation. Mental causation occurs when behavioural effects have mental causes: Jennie eats a peach because she wants one; Marvin goes to Harvard because he chose to, etc. Nonreductive physicalists typically supplement adherence to mental causation with … Continue reading Mind and the Causal Exclusion Problem →.
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  23. added 2018-06-13
    Can the Russellian Monist Escape the Epiphenomenalist’s Paradox?Lok-Chi Chan - forthcoming - Topoi:1-10.
    Russellian monism—an influential doctrine proposed by Russell (The analysis of matter, Routledge, London, 1927/1992)—is roughly the view that physics can only ever tell us about the causal, dispositional, and structural properties of physical entities and not their categorical (or intrinsic) properties, whereas our qualia are constituted by those categorical properties. In this paper, I will discuss the relation between Russellian monism and a seminal paradox facing epiphenomenalism, the paradox of phenomenal judgment: if epiphenomenalism is true—qualia are causally inefficacious—then any judgment (...)
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  24. added 2018-05-13
    Why Does Pain Hurt?: An Inquiry Into the Limits of Evolutionary Explanation.Richard Oxenberg - manuscript
    In this essay I argue that Darwinian theory, far from supporting a philosophy of metaphysical materialism, actually calls materialism into question. Once this is recognized we see that evolutionary theory, for all its successes (which are considerable), is more limited than is generally supposed in its ability to reveal or explain the ultimate thrust of life.
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  25. added 2018-02-27
    Epiphenomenal Properties.Umut Baysan - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):419-431.
    What is an epiphenomenal property? This question needs to be settled before we can decide whether higher-level properties are epiphenomenal or not. In this paper, I offer an account of what it is for a property to have some causal power. From this, I derive a characterisation of the notion of an epiphenomenal property. I then argue that physically realized higher-level properties are not epiphenomenal because laws of nature impose causal similarities on the bearers of such properties, and these similarities (...)
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  26. added 2018-02-21
    The Evolutionary Argument for Phenomenal Powers.Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):293-316.
    Epiphenomenalism is the view that phenomenal properties – which characterize what it is like, or how it feels, for a subject to be in conscious states – have no physical effects. One of the earliest arguments against epiphenomenalism is the evolutionary argument (James 1890/1981; Eccles and Popper 1977; Popper 1978), which starts from the following problem: why is pain correlated with stimuli detrimental to survival and reproduction – such as suffocation, hunger and burning? And why is pleasure correlated with stimuli (...)
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  27. added 2018-02-16
    “The Hard Problem of Consciousness” and Two Arguments for Interactionism.Vadim V. Vasilyev - 2009 - Faith and Philosophy 26 (5):514-526.
    The paper begins with a restatement of Chalmers’s “hard problem of consciousness.” It is suggested that an interactionist approach is one of the possible solutions of this problem. Some fresh arguments against the identity theory and epiphenomenalism as main rivals of interactionism are developed. One of these arguments has among its corollaries a denial of local supervenience, although not of the causal closure principle. As a result of these considerations a version of “local interactionism” (compatible with causal closure) is proposed. (...)
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  28. added 2017-09-05
    On Causal Relevance: A Reply to Sullivan.Paul Raymont - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (2):367-376.
  29. added 2017-09-04
    Conscious Primitives and Their Reality.Simone Gozzano - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (2):247-255.
    : In The Varieties of Consciousness, Kriegel argues that it is possible to devise a method to sort out the irreducible primitive phenomenologies that exist. In this paper I argue that his neutrality notwithstanding, Kriegel assumes a form of realism that leaves unresolved many of the conundrums that characterize the debate on consciousness. These problems are evident in the centrality he assigns to introspection and his characterization of cognitive phenomenology. Keywords : Consciousness; Introspection; Realism; Type-identity; Dispositional Properties I primitivi della (...)
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  30. added 2017-02-11
    Why the Evolutionary Argument is Not Really an Evolutionary Argument After All.Joseph Corabi - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (3-4):3-4.
    The evolutionary argument is one of the most well-known empirical arguments against epiphenomenalism. In its most persuasive form, it aims to show that because of evolutionary considerations, the smooth correlations between painful qualia and noxious stimuli would be highly unexpected if epiphenomenalism were true, but just what we would expect if an alternative mind--body theory were. Thus, the presence of these correlations is strong evidence against epiphenomenalism. After formulating a canonical version of the argument, I demonstrate that the evolutionary evidence (...)
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  31. added 2017-02-09
    Santayana's Non-Reductive Naturalism.Angus Kerr-Lawson - 1989 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 25 (3):229 - 250.
  32. added 2017-02-07
    Causal Exclusion Without Physical Completeness and No Overdetermination.Alexander Gebharter - 2017 - Abstracta 10:3-14.
    Hitchcock demonstrated that the validity of causal exclusion arguments as well as the plausibility of several of their premises hinges on the specific theory of causation endorsed. In this paper I show that the validity of causal exclusion arguments—if represented within the theory of causal Bayes nets the way Gebharter suggests—actually requires much weaker premises than the ones which are typically assumed. In particular, neither completeness of the physical domain nor the no overdetermination assumption are required.
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  33. added 2017-01-29
    Editors' Introduction -- Epiphenomenalism: Dead End or Way Out?Michael Pauen & Walter Staudacher - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):7-19.
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  34. added 2017-01-28
    Epiphenomenalism in the Moral Philosophy of George Santayana, Particularly as It Affects Free Will.Benjamin W. P. Allen - 1952 - Dissertation, Drew University
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  35. added 2017-01-27
    Self-Stultification Objection.F. De Brigard - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (5-6):120-130.
    Epiphenomenalism holds that mental events are caused by physical events while not causing any physical effects whatsoever. The self-stultification objection is a venerable argument against epiphenomenalism according to which, if epiphenomenalism were true, we would not have knowledge of our own sensations. For the past three decades, W.S. Robinson has called into question the soundness of this objection, offering several arguments against it. Many of his arguments attempt to shift the burden of proof onto the opponents of epiphenomenalism, hoping to (...)
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  36. added 2017-01-27
    An Argument Against Epiphenomenalism.Jason Megill - 2013 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 9 (2):5 - 17.
    I formulate an argument against epiphenomenalism; the argument shows that epiphenomenalism is extremely improbable. Moreover the argument suggests that qualia not only have causal powers, but have their causal powers necessarily. I address possible objections and then conclude by considering some implications the argument has for dualism.
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  37. added 2017-01-26
    Epiphenomenalism and the Notion of Causation.Sven Walter, B. McLaughlin & J. Cohen - 2009 - In Martina Fürst, Wolfgang Gombocz & Christian Hiebaum (eds.), Gehirne Und Personen. Ontos.
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  38. added 2017-01-24
    A Limited Defense of Epiphenomenalism.Steve Tammelleo - 2008 - South African Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):40-51.
    The present paper shows that the clearest formulation of J. M. E. McTaggart's antipassage argument, that of D. H. Mellor in _Real Time II, is unsound when its premises are interpreted so that it is valid. This argument need mislead us no longer. The crucial item in the interpretation of the premises is the copula 'is', as in 'E is past'. The copula may be either tensed or tenseless. While this ambiguity of the copula has been noted before, its implications (...)
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  39. added 2017-01-18
    Seven Habits of Highly Effective Thinkers.Stephen Yablo - 2000 - In Bernard Elevitch (ed.), The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Philosophy Documentation Center. pp. 35-45.
    By effective thinkers I mean not people who think effectively, but people who understand “how it’s done,” i.e., people not paralyzed by the philosophical problem of epiphenomenalism. I argue that mental causes are not preempted by either neural or narrow content states, and that extrinsically individuated mental states are not out of proportion with their putative effects. I give three examples/models of how an extrinsic cause might be more proportional to an effect than the competition.
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  40. added 2017-01-15
    Consciousness and Action: Does Cognitive Science Support (Mild) Epiphenomenalism?Morgan Wallhagen - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (3):539-561.
    Questions about the function of consciousness have long been central to discussions of consciousness in philosophy and psychology. Intuitively, consciousness has an important role to play in the control of many everyday behaviors. However, this view has recently come under attack. In particular, it is becoming increasingly common for scientists and philosophers to argue that a significant body of data emerging from cognitive science shows that conscious states are not involved in the control of behavior. According to these theorists, nonconscious (...)
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  41. added 2016-12-17
    Acquaintance, Parsimony, and Epiphenomenalism.Brie Gertler - forthcoming - In Sam Coleman (ed.), The Knowledge Argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Some physicalists (Balog 2012, Howell 2013), and most dualists, endorse the acquaintance response to the Knowledge Argument. This is the claim that Mary gains substantial new knowledge, upon leaving the room, because phenomenal knowledge requires direct acquaintance with phenomenal properties. The acquaintance response is an especially promising way to make sense of the Mary case. I argue that it casts doubt on two claims often made on behalf of physicalism, regarding parsimony and mental causation. I show that those who endorse (...)
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  42. added 2016-12-08
    McGinn's Materialism and Epiphenomenalism.F. W. Dauer - 2001 - Analysis 61 (2):136-139.
    Colin McGinn urged that while a brain state P explains consciousness, a conception P is cognitively inaccessible to us. This paper argues that McGinn's argument for his form of materialism is committed to P being epiphenomenal or causally inert relative to such things as the movements of our bodies. As a result, McGinn's materialism creates a duality in the brain and thereby faces the same problem of epiphenomenalism which plagues the Cartesian dualist.
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  43. added 2016-08-31
    Mounting Evidence That Minds Are Neural EM Fields Interacting with Brains.Mostyn W. Jones - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (1-2):159-183.
    Evidence that minds are neural electromagnetic fields comes from research into how separate brain activities bind to form unified percepts and unified minds. Explanations of binding using synchrony, attention, and convergence are all problematic. But the unity of EM fields explains binding without these problems. These unified fields neatly explain correlations and divergences between synchrony, attention, convergence, and unified minds. The simplest explanation for the unity of both minds and fields is that minds are fields. Treating minds as the fields' (...)
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  44. added 2015-12-04
    Mental Causation.David Robb - forthcoming - In Brian McLaughlin (ed.), Macmillan's Interdisciplinary Handbooks: Philosophy of Mind. Macmillan.
    This is an introduction to mental causation. It is written primarily for students new to the topic. The chapter is organized around the following argument: P1. Everything we do is caused by biochemical processes within our bodies and brains. P2. If everything we do is caused by biochemical processes within our bodies and brains, then nothing we do has a mental cause. C. Therefore, nothing we do has a mental cause.
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  45. added 2015-10-15
    Causal Exclusion and Causal Bayes Nets.Alexander Gebharter - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):353-375.
    In this paper I reconstruct and evaluate the validity of two versions of causal exclusion arguments within the theory of causal Bayes nets. I argue that supervenience relations formally behave like causal relations. If this is correct, then it turns out that both versions of the exclusion argument are valid when assuming the causal Markov condition and the causal minimality condition. I also investigate some consequences for the recent discussion of causal exclusion arguments in the light of an interventionist theory (...)
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  46. added 2015-08-31
    Emergent Substances, Physical Properties, Action Explanations.Jeff Engelhardt - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (6):1125-1146.
    This paper proposes that if individual X ‘inherits’ property F from individual Y, we should be leery of explanations that appeal to X’s being F. This bears on what I’ll call “emergent substance dualism”, the view that human persons or selves are metaphysically fundamental or “new kinds of things with new kinds of causal powers” even though they depend in some sense on physical particulars :5–23, 2006; Personal agency. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008). Two of the most prominent advocates of (...)
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  47. added 2015-08-26
    Mentale Verursachung, innere Erfahrung und handelnde Personen. Eine Verteidigung des Epiphänomenalismus.David Hommen - 2013 - mentis.
    Die Annahme, dass mentale Zustände wie Überzeugungen, Wünsche und Gefühle physische Ereignisse bewirken (wie körperliches Verhalten und willentliche Handlungen) ist ebenso verbreitet wie problematisch, weil sie im Widerspruch zu der Überzeugung steht, dass mentale Zustände Phänomene nicht-physischer Natur sind und physische Phänomene ausschließlich physische Ursachen haben. Der Epiphänomenalismus, der diesen als Leib-Seele-Problem bekannten Widerspruch auflöst, indem er die kausale Wirksamkeit des Mentalen bestreitet, stößt unter Laien und Philosophen jedoch auf erheblichen Widerstand. Die vorliegende Studie wendet sich den Intuitionen zu, die (...)
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  48. added 2015-08-26
    Mental Causation: The Mind-Body Problem.Anthony Dardis - 2008 - Columbia University Press.
    Anthony Dardis shows how to unravel the knot. He traces its early appearance in the history of philosophical inquiry, specifically in the work of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, and T. H. Huxley.
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  49. added 2015-08-11
    The Unplanned Obsolescence of Psychological Science and an Argument for its Revival.Stan Klein - 2016 - Pyshcology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice 3:357-379.
    I examine some of the key scientific pre-commitments of modern psychology, and argue that their adoption has the unintended consequence of rendering a purely psychological analysis of mind indistinguishable from a purely biological treatment. And, since these pre-commitments sanction an “authority of the biological”, explanation of phenomena traditionally considered the purview of psychological analysis is fully subsumed under the biological. I next evaluate the epistemic warrant of these pre-commitments and suggest there are good reasons to question their applicability to psychological (...)
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  50. added 2015-07-22
    The Super-Overdetermination Problem.John Donaldson - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Glasgow
    I examine the debate between reductive and non-reductive physicalists, and conclude that if we are to be physicalists, then we should be reductive physicalists. I assess how both reductionists and non-reductionists try to solve the mind-body problem and the problem of mental causation. I focus on the problem of mental causation as it is supposed to be faced by non-reductionism: the so-called overdetermination problem. I argue that the traditional articulation of that problem is significantly flawed, and I show how to (...)
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