Non-Realist Cognitivism, Truth and Objectivity

Acta Analytica 32 (2):193-212 (2017)
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Abstract

In On What Matters, Derek Parfit defends a new metaethical theory, which he calls non-realist cognitivism. It claims that normative judgments are beliefs; that some normative beliefs are true; that the normative concepts that are a part of the propositions that are the contents of normative beliefs are irreducible, unanalysable and of their own unique kind; and that neither the natural features of the reality nor any additional normative features of the reality make the relevant normative beliefs true. The aim of this article is to argue that Parfit’s theory is problematic because its defenders have no resources to make sense of the nature of normative truth, which is an essential element of their view. I do this by showing how the traditional theories of truth are not available for the non-realist cognitivists.

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Author's Profile

Jussi Suikkanen
University of Birmingham

Citations of this work

On Parfit’s Ontology.Kian Mintz-Woo - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (5):707-725.
Cognitivism and Metaphysical Weight: A Dilemma for Relaxed Realism.Annika Böddeling - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (3):546-559.
Non-Naturalism and Reference.Jussi Suikkanen - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 11 (2):1-24.

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