This chapter contains sections titled: I II.

In Habits of the Heart and The Good Society, Bellah et al. diagnose our loss of public life in areas such as education and relate this loss both to flaws in moral ecology and to our institutions. Their opposition to the Lockean metaphysic of self and community and to objectivist epistemology as a way of understanding schools is helpful in that it naturally suggests the kind of piecemeal, contextualized change that we locate within Dewey's viewpoint. But, I argue, Bellah et (...) al.'s penchant for “first philosophy” ultimately taints their work. While I applaud their turn to Dewey, I find their choice of a “metaphysical”, rather than a Rortyan reading of Dewey misguided. The proper alternative to a Lockean metaphysics is not a communitarian/Aristotelian one; the proper corrective to objectivist epistemology is not “Deweyan epistemology” or “critical theory”. We need to see, as in Rorty, that democracy exists prior to normative philosophy just as it has priority over substantive religion. To think otherwise would lead to a loss of contact with the ordinary, specific, ever-changing realms where our lives, and our democratic institutions — including the university — must either thrive or flounder. Finally, there is no epistemology or metaphysics that will adequately “ground” the university's workings. Instead, there is only, as Dewey put it, growth or failure to grow, guided by hints and resonances that arise in evolving circumstances. (shrink)

As a contribution to thinking about the possibility of spiritual education, I examine Pierre Hadot's important distinction between ‘philosophy as theory’, a detached investigation into ‘the natures of things’, and ‘philosophy as a way of life’, practical exercises which Socrates introduced as a means of ‘learning to die’. While most philosophy today amounts to ‘philosophy as theory’, ‘philosophy as a way of life’ remains a respectable and viable tradition and a most exacting education of the spirit. I illustrate it here (...) through an examination of some of its practitioners such as St Bernard of Clairvaux, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Etty Hillesum. (shrink)

Unfortunately, Wittgenstein has entered the philosophical canon , an entrance that has served to reify interpretations of his work. In this essay I refer to recent books by Richard Eldridge (1997) and Phillip Shields (1998) which allow us again to see The Philosophical Investigations as something more than a stultifying relic. Specifically, these authors, by reading Wittgenstein's work not merely as text but also as performance, allow us to enact our own liberating performances of that work. To engage in such (...) enactments of freedom is the essence of philosophical education in the sense established by extra-canonical writers such as Socrates and the Stoics, on the one hand, and Emerson and James, on the other. At least this is so if my use of the work of classicist Pierre Hadot, on the one hand, and brief reference to literary critic Richard Poirier, on the other, is at all successful in illuminating theses from Eldridge and Shields on the nature of Wittgensteinian philosophy. (shrink)

As a contribution to thinking about the possibility of spiritual education, I examine Pierre Hadot's important distinction between ‘philosophy as theory’, a detached investigation into ‘the natures of things’, and ‘philosophy as a way of life’, practical exercises which Socrates introduced as a means of ‘learning to die’. While most philosophy today amounts to ‘philosophy as theory’, ‘philosophy as a way of life’ remains a respectable and viable tradition and a most exacting education of the spirit. I illustrate it here (...) through an examination of some of its practitioners such as St Bernard of Clairvaux, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Etty Hillesum. (shrink)