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Andrew Russo
Johns Hopkins University
Andrew Russo
University of Central Oklahoma
  1. A Defense of Causal Invariantism.Martin Montminy & Andrew Russo - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (1):49-75.
    Causal contextualism holds that sentences of the form ‘c causes e’ have context-sensitive truth-conditions. We consider four arguments invoked by Jonathan Schaffer in favor of this view. First, he argues that his brand of contextualism helps solve puzzles about transitivity. Second, he contends that how one describes the relata of the causal relation sometimes affects the truth of one’s claim. Third, Schaffer invokes the phenomenon of contrastive focus to conclude that causal statements implicitly designate salient alternatives to the cause and (...)
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  2. Kim’s dilemma: why mental causation is not productive.Andrew Russo - 2016 - Synthese 193 (7):2185-2203.
    Loewer (in: Physicalism and its discontents, 2001; Philos Phenomenol Res 65:655–663, 2002; in: Contemporary debates in philosophy of mind, 2007) has argued that the nonreductive physicalist should respond to the exclusion problem by endorsing the overdetermination entailed by their view. Kim’s (Physicalism, or something near enough, 2005; in: Contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind, 2007) argument against this reply is based on the premise that mental causation must be a productive relation in order to sustain human agency. In this (...)
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  3. Why It Doesn’t Matter I’m Not Insane.Andrew Russo - 2011 - Southwest Philosophy Review 27 (1):157-165.
    Harry Frankfurt has argued that Descartes’s madness doubt in the First Meditation is importantly different from his dreaming doubt. The madness doubt does not provide a reason for doubting the senses since were the meditator to suppose he was mad his ability to successfully complete the philosophical investigation he sets for himself in the first few pages of the Meditations would be undermined. I argue that Frankfurt’s interpretation of Descartes’s madness doubt is mistaken and that it should be understood as (...)
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  4. Till Death Do Us Part: The Moral Problems of Personites.Andrew Russo & Martin Montminy - manuscript
    According to the worm theory, persons are (maximal) aggregates of person-stages existing at different times. Personites, on the other hand, are non-maximal aggregates of stages that are nonetheless very much like persons. Their existence appears to make instances of prudential self-sacrifice morally problematic: the personites that exist at the time of the sacrifice but not at the time of the reward seem to be unfairly exploited. Instances of punishment appear to give rise to a similar problem. We argue that these (...)
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  5. Worm-theoretic Persistence and Temporal Predication.Andrew Russo - 2022 - Southwest Philosophy Review 38 (1):227-236.
    Mark Johnston (2016, 2017) has raised concerns that a worm-theoretic account of persistence through time is incompatible with ethical singularity: that within the life of any actual person, there is only one morally considerable being, namely that person. To deny ethical singularity is to deny a core feature of our ordinary ethical and prudential thinking. The worm theory, Johnston concludes, proves to be “disastrous … for our ordinary moral outlook”. This paper defends the worm theory from Johnston’s argument. Though I (...)
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  6. The supervenience argument against non-reductive physicalism.Andrew Russo - 2011 - In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
    This short paper is a "quick and dirty" introduction for non-philosophers (with some background in propositional logic) to Jaegwon Kim's famous supervenience argument against non-reductive physicalism (also known as the exclusion problem). It motivates the problem of mental causation, introduces Kim's formulation of the issue centered around mind-body supervenience, presents the argument in deductive form, and makes explicit why Kim concludes that vindicating mental causation demands a reduction of mind.
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  7. A Defense of Nonreductive Mental Causation.Andrew Russo - 2013 - Dissertation, The University of Oklahoma
    Mental causation is a problem and not just a problem for the nonphysicalist. One of the many lessons learned from Jaegwon Kim’s writings in the philosophy of mind is that mental causation is a problem for the nonreductive physicalist as well. A central component of the common sense picture we have of ourselves as persons is that our beliefs and desires causally explain our actions. But the completeness of the “brain sciences” threatens this picture. If all of our actions are (...)
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  8.  5
    Burden of Proof.Andrew Russo - 2018 - In Robert Arp, Steven Barbone & Michael Bruce (eds.), Bad Arguments. Chichester, UK: Wiley. pp. 137–139.
    The burden of proof (BOP) fallacy is an informal fallacy involving the failure to recognize or properly assign the BOP in a persuasive reasoned dialogue, that is, an interchange between two or more parties whose aim is to prove or defend a position and, in doing so, persuade the other side of its truth or plausibility. In some such dialogues, the amount or strength of evidence required in order to accomplish this goal reasonably may differ for one of the parties (...)
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  9.  2
    The Supervenience Argument against Non‐Reductive Physicalism.Andrew Russo - 2011 - In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments. Oxford, UK: Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 314–317.
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