The notion that there is a category mistake or some other conceptual confusion in regarding seeing, hearing, and other forms of perception as events, states, or processes is incorrect. Ryle's analysis of "seeing" as an achievement word does not rule out our regarding seeing as an event, but in fact suggests that we do so when we carry the analysis beyond the point where Ryle leaves it. Furthermore there are uses of "see" not noticed by Ryle which justify our saying (...) that within certain contexts seeing is a state and within other contexts a process. The question of what these events, states, and processes are cannot be met without recognizing a fundamental duality of aspect that characterizes perception. This duality can be formulated in terms of the way perception is known. One who observes a perceiver knows the perceiver's perception in a categorically different way than the perceiver knows it. From this it can be seen that perceptual events, states, and processes have both a physical aspect and an epistemological aspect. Any attempt to reduce one of these aspects to the other would involve a category mistake. (shrink)

When phenomenological descriptions of perceptual experience are given it often seems that the distinction between mode and content of perceptual experience is not given the attention it deserves and that consequently certain philosophical difficulties develop which might have been avoided. While it will no doubt be admitted that the distinction between the “how” and the “what” of appearing is of importance in the phenomenology of perception, at first sight the making of such a distinction may seem so simple as to (...) be hardly worth discussing. It may seem to involve a mere matter of distinguishing modifiers of the verb “to perceive” from this verb's direct objects and their modifiers, but further consideration shows the situation is not that simple. In some cases there are alternative ways of phenomenological description such that what one description seems to indicate to be content is what the other description seems to indicate to be mode, and yet the two descriptions are seen to be equivalent in intent. If we analyze one expression in accordance with its grammar then the alternative expression must be considered idiomatic, that is, not analyzable in accordance with its grammar, for otherwise the two expressions could not be considered compatible. (shrink)

In recent years sense–datum theories have received much criticism, but there is one type of error frequently involved in the sense–datum concept which is in need of further consideration. This error consists in a category confusion of such a nature that what is properly regarded as perceptual mode is treated as though it were the attribute of a thing. The mode or manner of perception is mistakenly transferred to the sense–datum with results which a little careful reflection shows to be (...) absurd. In what follows a specific case of this error connected with the notion of phenomenal organization will be discussed. (shrink)