4 found
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  1.  57
    Do Four-Dimensionalists Have to Be Counterpart Theorists?George Djukic - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2):292 – 311.
    In 'Four-Dimensional Objects' Peter van Inwagen gives two arguments for the claim that proponents of four-dimensionalism have to be counterpart theorists. Recently Jack Copeland, Heather Dyke, and Diane Proudfoot, echoing in part points made by Mark Heller in this journal in 1993, have sought to rebut one of van Inwagen's arguments. In this paper I shall criticize their discussion and by implication certain points made by Heller. In so doing I shall also rebut a possible objection to van Inwagen's second (...)
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  2.  96
    A Critique of Langsam's The Theory of Appearing Defended.George Djukic & Vladimir B. Popescu - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 112 (1):69-91.
    In this paper we consider, and reject, Harold Langsams defenceof the Theory of Appearing, in this journal (1997), in the faceof three standard arguments against it. These arguments are:the argument from hallucination; the argument from the samecause-same effect principle; and the argument from perceptualtime-gap.
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  3.  9
    A Critique of Langsam's "The Theory of Appearing Defended".George Djukic & Vladimir Popescu - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 112 (1):69-91.
    In this paper we consider, and reject, Harold Langsam's defence of the Theory of Appearing, in this journal , in the face of three standard arguments against it. These arguments are: the argument from hallucination; the argument from the same cause-same effect principle; and the argument from perceptual time-gap.
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  4.  11
    Kant on Existence as a Property of Individuals.George Djukic - 1996 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 13 (4):469-481.