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  1. added 2018-10-19
    On the Humphrey Objection to Modal Realism.Michael De - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (2):159-179.
    An intuitive objection to modal realism is that merely possible worlds and their inhabitants seem to be irrelevant to an analysis of modality. Kripke originally phrased the objection in terms of being concerned about one’s modal properties without being concerned about the properties one’s other-worldly counterparts have. The author assesses this objection in a variety of forms, and then provides his own formulation that does not beg the question against the modal realist. Finally, the author considers two potential answers to (...)
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  2. added 2018-08-10
    Essential Bundle Theory and Modality.Mark Jago - 2018 - Synthese:1-16.
    Bundle theories identify material objects with bundles of properties. On the traditional approach, these are the properties possessed by that material object. That view faces a deep problem: it seems to say that all of an object’s properties are essential to it. Essential bundle theory attempts to overcome this objection, by taking the bundle as a specification of the object’s essential properties only. In this paper, I show that essential bundle theory faces a variant of the objection. To avoid the (...)
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  3. added 2018-08-01
    Las contrapartes incongruentes y el espacio absoluto.Maite Ezcurdia - 1995 - Dianoia 41 (41):107-124.
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  4. added 2018-07-03
    Counteridenticals.Alexander W. Kocurek - 2018 - The Philosophical Review 127 (3):323-369.
    A counteridentical is a counterfactual with an identity statement in the antecedent. While counteridenticals generally seem non-trivial, most semantic theories for counterfactuals, when combined with the necessity of identity and distinctness, attribute vacuous truth conditions to such counterfactuals. In light of this, one could try to save the orthodox theories either by appealing to pragmatics or by denying that the antecedents of alleged counteridenticals really contain identity claims. Or one could reject the orthodox theory of counterfactuals in favor of a (...)
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  5. added 2018-04-04
    Binding Bound Variables in Epistemic Contexts.Brian Rabern - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-31.
    Quine insisted that the satisfaction of an open modalised formula by an object depends on how that object is described. Kripke’s "objectual" interpretation of quantified modal logic, whereby variables are rigid, is commonly thought to avoid these Quinean worries. Yet there remain residual Quinean worries in the epistemic case. Theorists have recently been toying with assignment-shifting treatments of epistemic contexts. On such views an epistemic operator ends up binding all the variables in its scope. One might worry that this yields (...)
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  6. added 2018-03-15
    Intrinsicality and Counterpart Theory.Michael De - 2016 - Synthese 193 (8).
    It is shown that counterpart theory and the duplication account of intrinsicality —two key pieces of the Lewisian package—are incompatible. In particular, the duplication account yields the result that certain intuitively extrinsic modal properties are intrinsic. Along the way I consider a potentially more general worry concerning certain existential closures of internal relations. One conclusion is that, unless the Lewisian provides an adequate alternative to the duplication account, the reductive nature of their total theory is in jeopardy.
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  7. added 2018-03-08
    Relativized Metaphysical Modality.Benj Hellie, Adam Russell Murray & Jessica Wilson - forthcoming - In Otávio Bueno & Scott Shalkowski (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Modality. New York: Routledge.
    Relativized Metaphysical Modality (RMM: Murray and Wilson, 'Relativized metaphysical modality', Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 2012; Murray, Perspectives on Modal Metaphysics, 2017) exploits 'two-dimensionalist' resources to metaphysical, rather than epistemological, ends: the second dimension offers perspective-dependence without contingency, diverting attacks on 'Classical' analyses of modals (in effect, analyses validating S5 and the Barcan Formulae). Here, we extend the RMM program in two directions. First, we harvest resources for RMM from Lewis's 1980 'Context--Index' (CI) framework: (a) the ban in CI on binding (...)
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  8. added 2018-02-17
    Reply to Forbes.William Seager - 1982 - Analysis 42 (4):224.
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  9. added 2017-04-21
    Possible Worlds and the Objective World.Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):389-422.
    David Lewis holds that a single possible world can provide more than one way things could be. But what are possible worlds good for if they come apart from ways things could be? We can make sense of this if we go in for a metaphysical understanding of what the world is. The world does not include everything that is the case—only the genuine facts. Understood this way, Lewis's “cheap haecceitism” amounts to a kind of metaphysical anti-haecceitism: it says there (...)
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  10. added 2017-02-13
    Individuals, Worlds, and Relations.Ohad Nachtomy - 2001 - The Leibniz Review 11:117-124.
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  11. added 2017-02-13
    Counterparts, Logic and Metaphysics: Reply to Ramachandran.Graeme Forbes - 1990 - Analysis 50 (3):167 - 173.
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  12. added 2017-02-13
    Free and Classical Counterparts: Response to Lewis.Graeme Forbes - 1987 - Analysis 47 (3):147 - 152.
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  13. added 2017-02-13
    Transworld Identity Sentences.Aryeh Siegel - 1981 - Philosophia 10 (1-2):25-34.
    The problem of identity across possible worlds is raised with the following questions: What does it mean to say of something in one possible world that it is identical with something in another possible world? How are we to decide whether an individual in one possible world is identical with an individual in another?1 Because the questions concern meaning and verification, it appears to be the case that they presuppose that there are one or more sentences whose meaning and method (...)
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  14. added 2017-01-26
    Free Intuitionistic Logic and its S4 Counterpart.Raymond D. Gumb - 1985 - Logique Et Analyse 28 (10):283-294.
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  15. added 2017-01-17
    The Counterpart Argument for Modal Scepticism.Jimmy Alfonso Licon - 2013 - Logos and Episteme 4 (1):21-29.
    Surely, it is possible that you believe falsely about this-or-that modal matter. In light of the various ways the world could be arranged, it is plausible thatthere is a nearby possible world, which would be almost identical to the actual world, if it were actualized, where you and your modal counterpart disagree over modal belief p. You might be tempted to think that your modal belief is true, while hers is not. It is not clear why this is so; after (...)
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  16. added 2017-01-15
    Counterpart Theory V. The Multiverse: Reply to Watson.Jim Stone - 2011 - Analysis 71 (1):96-100.
    Suppose that reality consists of parallel universes of every variety imaginable. No path through space and time leads from one to another, and each universe is causally isolated from the rest. Some physicists believe a ‘multiverse’ hypothesis not terribly distant from this one simplifies quantum mechanics and provides an elegant explanation of why our universe has its particular laws. Suppose as science advances we come to accept the multiverse hypothesis, so construed.
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  17. added 2017-01-15
    Counterpart Theory and Four-Dimensionalism: A Reply to Eagle.Jim Stone - 2007 - Analysis 67 (3):263-267.
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  18. added 2017-01-15
    Three-Dimensionalism and Counterpart Theory.Simon Langford - 2005 - Analysis 65 (4):321-325.
    Jim Stone argues that one cannot combine three-dimensionalism with counterpart theory. This paper argues to the contrary.
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  19. added 2017-01-15
    Why Counterpart Theory and Three-Dimensionalism Are Incompatible.J. Stone - 2005 - Analysis 65 (1):24-27.
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  20. added 2017-01-15
    Counterpart Theory and Three-Dimensionalism: A Reply.J. Stone - 2005 - Analysis 65 (4):325-329.
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  21. added 2017-01-15
    Why Counterpart Theory and Four-Dimensionalism Are Incompatible.Jim Stone - 2005 - Analysis 65 (4):329-333.
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  22. added 2017-01-14
    Appendix D. Counterpart Semantics for the Cheap Haecceitist.Robert Stalnaker - 2012 - In Mere Possibilities: Metaphysical Foundations of Modal Semantics. Princeton University Press. pp. 154-156.
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  23. added 2017-01-04
    Quidditism and the Resemblance of Properties.Ghislain Guigon - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):177-184.
    It is widely agreed that properties play causal roles: they capture the causal powers of things. But do properties have their causal roles essentially? David Lewis did not think so. He adhered to the doctrine of quidditism, namely the doctrine that the identity of properties is primitive and that they can trade their causal roles. Quidditism is controversial. But Lewis did not see why he should want to reject it. He knew that he could avoid quidditism on the cheap by (...)
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  24. added 2017-01-04
    Overall Similarity, Natural Properties, and Paraphrases.Ghislain Guigon - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):387-399.
    I call anti-resemblism the thesis that independently of any contextual specification there is no determinate fact of the matter about the comparative overall similarity of things. Anti-resemblism plays crucial roles in the philosophy of David Lewis. For instance, Lewis has argued that his counterpart theory is anti-essentialist on the grounds that counterpart relations are relations of comparative overall similarity and that anti-resemblism is true. After Lewis committed himself to a form of realism about natural properties he maintained that anti-resemblism is (...)
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  25. added 2016-12-30
    Truths Qua Grounds.Ghislain Guigon - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):99-125.
    A number of philosophers have recently found it congenial to talk in terms of grounding. Grounding discourse features grounding sentences that are answers to questions about what grounds what. The goal of this article is to explore and defend a counterpart-theoretic interpretation of grounding discourse. We are familiar with David Lewis's applications of the method of counterpart theory to de re modal discourse. Counterpart-theoretic interpretations of de re modal idioms and grounding sentences share similar motivations, mechanisms, and applications. I shall (...)
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  26. added 2016-12-08
    Second-Order Predication and the Metaphysics of Properties.Andy Egan - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):48-66.
    Problems about the accidental properties of properties motivate us--force us, I think--not to identify properties with the sets of their instances. If we identify them instead with functions from worlds to extensions, we get a theory of properties that is neutral with respect to disputes over counterpart theory, and we avoid a problem for Lewis's theory of events. Similar problems about the temporary properties of properties motivate us--though this time they probably don't force us--to give up this theory as well, (...)
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  27. added 2016-12-08
    Indexicality and Actuality.Peter van Inwagen - 1980 - Philosophical Review 89 (3):403-426.
  28. added 2016-04-14
    Causes and Counterparts.Alex Kaiserman - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (1):17-28.
    It follows from David Lewis's counterpart-theoretic analysis of modality and his counterfactual theory of causation that causal claims are relativized to a set of counterpart relations. Call this Shlewis's view. I show how Shlewis's view can provide attractively unified solutions to similar modal and causal puzzles. I then argue that Shlewis's view is better motivated, by his own lights, than the view Lewis actually held, and also better motivated than a similar approach which relativizes causal claims to sets of ‘contrast (...)
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  29. added 2016-02-10
    Classical Theism and Modal Realism Are Incompatible.Chad Vance - 2016 - Religious Studies 52 (4):561-572.
    The standard conception of God is that of a necessary being. On a possible worlds semantics, this entails that God exists at every possible world. According to the modal realist account of David Lewis, possible worlds are understood to be real, concrete worlds—no different in kind from the actual world. Some have argued that Lewis’s view is incompatible with classical theism (e.g., Sheehy, 2006). More recently, Ross Cameron (2009) has defended the thesis that Lewisian modal realism and classical theism are (...)
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  30. added 2016-01-11
    Modal Paradox: Parts and Counterparts, Points and Counterpoints.Nathan Salmon - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1):75-120.
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  31. added 2016-01-11
    Rigidity and Identity Across Possible Worlds.M. J. More - 1982 - Analysis 42 (2):83 - 84.
    Two criteria for rigid designation are distinguished; one according to which 'e' is rigid if 'e might not have been e' is false and the other according to which 'e' is rigid if it designates the same thing in all possible worlds in which it designates anything at all. Such criteria are not equivalent since 'x could not but be f' is not entailed by 'nothing other than x could be f'. I illustrate the latter lack of entailment.
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  32. added 2016-01-05
    Some Extensions of Counterpart Theory and Possible Worlds Framework with Respect to Counterfactuals and Causal Modalities.Pat Hanna Johnston - 1972 - Dissertation, University of Cincinnati
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  33. added 2016-01-05
    About Identity Through Possible Worlds.R. L. Purtill - 1968 - Noûs 2 (1):87-89.
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  34. added 2015-10-15
    Haecceitism.Sam Cowling - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  35. added 2015-09-25
    "The Metaphysics of Modality" by Graeme Forbes. [REVIEW]Mark A. Brown - 1990 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (3):615.
  36. added 2015-09-25
    Possible Worlds and Identity.B. J. Garrett - 1986 - Philosophical Books 27 (2):65-72.
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  37. added 2015-09-25
    Identity Through Possible Worlds: Some Questions.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1967 - Noûs 1 (1):1-8.
  38. added 2015-09-25
    Meaning and Necessity.V. C. C. - 1957 - Review of Metaphysics 10 (3):536-536.
  39. added 2015-09-07
    Harm to Future Persons: Non-Identity Problems and Counterpart Solutions.Anthony Wrigley - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):175-190.
    Non-Identity arguments have a pervasive but sometimes counter-intuitive grip on certain key areas in ethics. As a result, there has been limited success in supporting the alternative view that our choices concerning future generations can be considered harmful on any sort of person-affecting principle. However, as the Non-Identity Problem relies overtly on certain metaphysical assumptions, plausible alternatives to these foundations can substantially undermine the Non-Identity argument itself. In this paper, I show how the pervasive force and nature of Non-Identity arguments (...)
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  40. added 2015-09-02
    Truthmaking: With and Without Counterpart Theory.Phillip Bricker - 2015 - In Barry Loewer & Jonathan Schaffer (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to David Lewis. Blackwell.
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  41. added 2015-08-04
    Coextension and Identity.Ghislain Guigon - 2015 - In Ghislain Guigon & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.), Nominalism About Properties: New Essays. Routledge. pp. 135-155.
    This chapter is concerned with the coextension difficulty for nominalist theories of properties that reject tropes alongside universals. After carefully explaining the coextension difficulty and describing the theories it targets, the chapter describes different solutions to the difficulty. These solutions differ with respect to how much involved they are into a dualist approach to coextension. A dualist approach to a case of coextension consists in agreeing with the realist that the relevant ascriptions of properties are numerically distinct. A monist approach (...)
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  42. added 2015-04-22
    Transworld Identity.Penelope Mackie - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  43. added 2015-04-22
    Comments on Plantinga's Argument of Transworld Identity.Zhang Lifeng - 2012 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 7 (1):164-178.
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  44. added 2015-04-22
    Counterparts and Qualities.Manfred Kupffer - unknown
    David Lewis proposed to deal with the semantics of sentences that state what is possible for an individual in terms of possible individuals that are in ways the first individual might have been, so called counterparts of the individual. In this book, I defend counterpart semantics as an approach to the semantics of modality and natural language semantics in particular. Counterpart semantics has a rival, the standard Kripkean semantics that deals with the same sentences in terms of an accessibility relation (...)
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  45. added 2015-04-22
    The Problem of Transworld Identity.Lars Gundersen - 1995 - Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 30.
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  46. added 2015-04-22
    Essentialism and Trans-World Identity.John Norman Hooker - 1974 - Dissertation, Vanderbilt University
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  47. added 2015-04-22
    Identity-Statements and Essentialism.Michael J. Loux - 1970 - New Scholasticism 44 (3):431-439.
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  48. added 2015-04-11
    Counterparts and Identity.Robert Stalnaker - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1):121--40.
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  49. added 2015-04-07
    Transitivity and Proportionality in Causation.Neil McDonnell - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1211-1229.
    It is commonly assumed that causation is transitive and in this paper I aim to reconcile this widely-held assumption with apparent evidence to the contrary. I will discuss a familiar approach to certain well-known counterexamples, before introducing a more resistant sort of case of my own. I will then offer a novel solution, based on Yablo’s proportionality principle, that succeeds in even these more resistant cases. There is a catch, however. Either proportionality is a constraint on which causal claims are (...)
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  50. added 2015-04-07
    Events and Their Counterparts.Neil McDonnell - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1291-1308.
    This paper argues that a counterpart-theoretic treatment of events, combined with a counterfactual theory of causation, can help resolve three puzzles from the causation literature. First, CCT traces the apparent contextual shifts in our causal attributions to shifts in the counterpart relation which obtains in those contexts. Second, being sensitive to shifts in the counterpart relation can help diagnose what goes wrong in certain prominent examples where the transitivity of causation appears to fail. Third, CCT can help us resurrect the (...)
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1 — 50 / 129