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  1. Representing Counterparts.Andrew Bacon - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Logic 11 (2):90-113.
    This paper presents and motivates a counterpart theoretic semantics for quantifi ed modal logic based on a fleshed out account of Lewis's notion of a `possibility.' According to the account a possibility consists of a world and some haecceitistic information about how each possible individual gets represented de re. A semantics for quanti ed modal logic based on evaluating formulae at possibilities is developed. It is shown that this framework naturally accommodates an actuality operator, addressing recent objections to counterpart theory, (...)
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  2. Was Leibniz Entitled to Possible Worlds?Lynne Rudder Baker - 1985 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15 (1):57-74.
    Leibniz has enjoyed a prominent place in the history of thought about possible worlds.' I shall argue that on the feading interpretation of Leibniz's account of contingency — an ingenious interpretation with ample textual support — possible worlds may be invoked by Leibniz only on pain of inconsistency. Leibnizian contingency, as reconstructed in detail by Robert C. Sleigh, Jr.,z will be shown to preclude propositions with different truth-values in different possible worlds.
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  3. Property Identities and Modal Arguments.Derek Ball - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11 (13).
    Physicalists about the mind are committed to claims about property identities. Following Kripke's well-known discussion, modal arguments have emerged as major threats to such claims. This paper argues that modal arguments can be resisted by adopting a counterpart theoretic account of modal claims, and in particular modal claims involving properties. Thus physicalists have a powerful motive to adopt non-Kripkean accounts of the metaphysics of modality and the semantics of modal expressions.
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  4. Modal Realism, Counterpart Theory, and Unactualized Possibilities.Joseph A. Baltimore - 2014 - Metaphysica 15 (1):209–217.
    It is a commonsense thesis that unactualized possibilities are not parts of actuality. To keep his modal realism in line with this thesis, David Lewis employed his indexical account of the term “actual.” I argue that the addition of counterpart theory to Lewis’s modal realism undermines his strategy for respecting the commonsense thesis. The case made here also reveals a problem for Lewis’s attempt to avoid haecceitism.
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  5. Indeterminacy, Identity and Counterparts: Evans Reconsidered.Elizabeth Barnes - 2009 - Synthese 168 (1):81 - 96.
    In this paper I argue that Gareth Evans’ famous proof of the impossibility of de re indeterminate identity fails on a counterpart-theoretic interpretation of the determinacy operators. I attempt to motivate a counterpart-theoretic reading of the determinacy operators and then show that, understood counterpart-theoretically, Evans’ argument is straightforwardly invalid.
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  6. New Work for Counterpart Theorists: Determinism.Gordon Belot - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (2):185-195.
    Recently Carolyn Brighouse and Jeremy Butterfield have argued that David Lewis's counterpart theory makes it possible both to believe in the reality of spacetime points and to consider general relativity to be a deterministic theory, thus avoiding the ‘hole argument’ of John Earman and John Norton. Butterfield's argument relies on Lewis's own counterpart-theoretic analysis of determinism. In this paper, I argue that this analysis is inadequate. This leaves a gap in the Butterfield–Brighouse defence against the hole argument.
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  7. Alethic Modalities, Temporal Modalities, and Representation.Jiri Benovsky - 2015 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 29:18-34.
    In this article, I am interested in four versions of what is often referred to as "the Humphrey objection". This objection was initially raised by Kripke against Lewis's modal counterpart theory, so this is where I will start the discussion. As we will see, there is a perfectly good answer to the objection. I will then examine other places where a similar objection can be raised: it can arise in the case of temporal counterpart theory (in fact, it can arise (...)
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  8. Counterpart Theory and the Argument From Modal Concerns.Steffen Borge - 2006 - Theoria 72 (4):269-285.
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  9. Counterpart Theory Vindicated: A Reply to Merricks.Andrea Borghini - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (1):67–73.
    The paper shows – contra what has been argued by Trenton Merricks – that counterpart theory, when conjoined with composition as identity, does not entail mereological essentialism. What Merrick’s argument overlooks is that contingent identity is but one of the effects of grounding identity across possible worlds on similarity.
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  10. Truthmaking: With and Without Counterpart Theory.Phillip Bricker - 2015 - In Barry Loewer & Jonathan Schaffer (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to David Lewis. Blackwell.
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  11. Panini's View of Meaning and its Western Counterpart.Johannes Bronkhorst - 1992 - In Maksim Stamenov (ed.), Current Advances in Semantic Theory. John Benjamins. pp. 73--455.
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  12. "The Metaphysics of Modality" by Graeme Forbes. [REVIEW]Mark A. Brown - 1990 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (3):615.
  13. Counterpart Theory, Natural Properties, and Essentialism.Todd Buras - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy 103 (1):27-42.
    David Lewis advised essentialists to judge his counterpart theory a false friend. He also argued that counterpart theory needs natural properties. This essay argues that natural properties are all essentialists need to find a true friend in counterpart theory. Section one explains why Lewis takes counterpart theory to be anti-essentialist and why he thinks it needs natural properties. Section two establishes the connection between the natural properties counterpart theory needs and the essentialist consequences Lewis disavows. Section three answers two objections: (...)
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  14. Meaning and Necessity.V. C. C. - 1957 - Review of Metaphysics 10 (3):536-536.
  15. The Necessity of Being.Joseph Chiari - 1973 - New York: Gordian Press.
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  16. Identity Through Possible Worlds: Some Questions.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1967 - Noûs 1 (1):1-8.
  17. Individual Essences and Possible Worlds.Robert C. Coburn - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1):165-183.
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  18. Modal Realism, Counterpart Theory, and the Possibility of Multiversal Rectitude.E. Conee - 2011 - Analysis 71 (4):680-684.
    Jim Stone has argued that a multiversal version of Modal Realism together with Counterpart Theory cannot account for a certain intuitive possibility. Roughly, it is the possibility that all free moral choices of a certain sort are the right choices in all cases in the multiverse. The present work offers an explanation of how the metaphysics in question can account for the intuitive possibility in question.
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  19. Haecceitism.Sam Cowling - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  20. Haecceitism for Modal Realists.Sam Cowling - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (3):399-417.
    In this paper, I examine the putative incompatibility of three theses: (1) Haecceitism, according to which some maximal possibilities differ solely in terms of the non-qualitative or de re possibilities they include; (2) Modal correspondence, according to which each maximal possibility is identical with a unique possible world; (3) Counterpart theory, according to which de re modality is analyzed in terms of counterpart relations between individuals. After showing how the modal realism defended by David Lewis resolves this incompatibility by rejecting (...)
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  21. Adequacy Conditions for Counterpart Theory.M. J. Cresswell - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):28 – 41.
    David Lewis's modal realism claims that nothing can exist in more than one world or time, and that statements about how something would have been are to be analysed in terms of its counterpart . I first explain why the counterpart relation depends on de re modal statements in an intensional language, so that intuitive properties of similarity relations cannot be used to show that the counterpart relation is not an equivalence relation. I then look at test sentences in (the (...)
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  22. Mencken's English Counterpart.Michael Dirda - 1995 - The Chesterton Review 21 (4):546-547.
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  23. Do Four-Dimensionalists Have to Be Counterpart Theorists?George Djukic - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2):292 – 311.
    In 'Four-Dimensional Objects' Peter van Inwagen gives two arguments for the claim that proponents of four-dimensionalism have to be counterpart theorists. Recently Jack Copeland, Heather Dyke, and Diane Proudfoot, echoing in part points made by Mark Heller in this journal in 1993, have sought to rebut one of van Inwagen's arguments. In this paper I shall criticize their discussion and by implication certain points made by Heller. In so doing I shall also rebut a possible objection to van Inwagen's second (...)
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  24. How to Be a Modal Realist.Cian Dorr - manuscript
    This paper investigates the form a modal realist analysis of possibility and necessity should take. It concludes that according to the best version of modal realism, the notion of a world plays no role in the analysis of modal claims. All contingent claims contain some de re element; the effect of modal operators on these elements is described by a counterpart theory which takes the same form whether the de re reference is to a world or to something else. This (...)
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  25. Propositions and Counterpart Theory.Cian Dorr - 2005 - Analysis 65 (3):210–218.
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  26. Reply to Stone on Counterpart Theory and Four-Dimensionalism.Antony Eagle - 2007 - Analysis 67 (2):159 - 162.
    Recently, Jim Stone has argued that counterpart theory is incompatible with the existence of temporal parts. I demonstrate that there is no such incompatibility.
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  27. Second-Order Predication and the Metaphysics of Properties.Andy Egan - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):48-66.
    Problems about the accidental properties of properties motivate us--force us, I think--not to identify properties with the sets of their instances. If we identify them instead with functions from worlds to extensions, we get a theory of properties that is neutral with respect to disputes over counterpart theory, and we avoid a problem for Lewis's theory of events. Similar problems about the temporary properties of properties motivate us--though this time they probably don't force us--to give up this theory as well, (...)
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  28. Possibility Relative to a Sortal.Delia Graff Fara - 2012 - In Karen Bennett & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, volume 7. Oxford University Press. pp. 1.
    This paper is an informal presentation of the ideas presented formally in ”Relative-Sameness Counterpart Theory”. Relative-sameness relations -- such as being the same person as -- are like David Lewis’s “counterpart” relations in the following respects: (i) they may hold over time or across worlds between objects that aren’t cross-time or cross-world identical (I propose), and (ii) there are a multiplicity of them, different ones of which may be variously invoked in different contexts. They differ from his counterpart relations, however, (...)
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  29. Dear Haecceitism.Delia Graff Fara - 2009 - Erkenntnis 70 (3):285–297.
    If a counterpart theorist’s understanding of the counterpart relation precludes haecceitist differences between possible worlds, as David Lewis’s does, how can he admit haecceitist possibilities, as Lewis wants to? Lewis (Philosophical Review 3–32, 1983; On the Plurality of Worlds, 1986) devised what he called a ‘cheap substitute for haecceitism,’ which would allow for haecceitist possibilities while preserving the counterpart relation as a purely qualitative one. The solution involved lifting an earlier (Journal of Philosophy 65(5):113–126, 1968; 68(7):203–211, 1971) ban on there (...)
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  30. Relative-Sameness Counterpart Theory.Delia Graff Fara - 2008 - Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (2):167-189.
    Here I propose a coherent way of preserving the identity of material objects with the matter that constitutes them. The presentation is formal, and intended for RSL. An informal presentation is in preliminary draft! -/- Relative-sameness relations—such as being the same person as—are like David Lewis's "counterpart" relations in the following respects: (i) they may hold between objects that aren't identical (I propose), and (ii) there are a multiplicity of them, different ones of which may be variously invoked in different (...)
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  31. Counterparts and Actuality.Michael Fara & Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Mind 114 (453):1-30.
    Many philosophers, following David Lewis, believe that we should look to counterpart theory, not quantified modal logic, as a means of understanding modal discourse. We argue that this is a mistake. Significant parts of modal discourse involve either implicit or explicit reference to what is actually the case, raising the question of how talk about actuality is to be represented counterpart-theoretically. By considering possible modifications of Lewis's counterpart theory, including actual modifications due to Graeme Forbes and Murali Ramachandran, we argue (...)
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  32. Counterparts.Fred Feldman - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (13):406-409.
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  33. Comparatives in Counterpart Theory: Another Approach.Graeme Forbes - 1994 - Analysis 54 (1):37 - 42.
    The article considers whether arguments involving sentences that make cross-world comparisons ("I could have been taller than I actually am") are better handled by counterpart theory than by standard modal semantics. The author describes a modal object-language in which such statements may be symbolized and gives both a Kripkean and a counterpart-theoretic semantics for it.
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  34. Counterparts, Logic and Metaphysics: Reply to Ramachandran.Graeme Forbes - 1990 - Analysis 50 (3):167 - 173.
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  35. Free and Classical Counterparts: Response to Lewis.Graeme Forbes - 1987 - Analysis 47 (3):147 - 152.
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  36. More on Counterpart Theory.Graeme Forbes - 1983 - Analysis 43 (3):149 - 152.
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  37. Thisness and Vagueness.Graeme Forbes - 1983 - Synthese 54 (2):235-259.
    This paper is about two puzzles, or two versions of a single puzzle, which deserve to be called paradoxes, and develops some apparatus in terms of which the apparently conflicting principles which generate the puzzles can be rendered consistent. However, the apparatus itself is somewhat controversial: the puzzles are modal ones, and the resolution to be advocated requires the adoption of a counterpart theoretic semantics of essentially the kind proposed by David Lewis, which in turn requires qualified rejection of certain (...)
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  38. Canonical Counterpart Theory.Graeme Forbes - 1982 - Analysis 42 (1):33 - 37.
    In a recent article in Analysis, Graeme Hunter and William Seager (1981) attempt to rescue counterpart theory (CT) from some objections of Hazen 1979. They see these objections as arising from ‘uncritical use of the translation scheme originally proposed by Lewis’, and intend to meet them by refraining from use of that scheme. But they do not offer a new scheme; they say ‘…it is no more necessary to have one to capture the sense of modal idiom than it is (...)
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  39. A Counterpart.Marilyn R. Forney - 1982 - Acm Sigcas Computers and Society 12 (3):6-6.
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  40. The Survival of My Counterpart.Peter A. French - 1982 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 20 (1):53-60.
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  41. Possible Worlds and Identity.B. J. Garrett - 1986 - Philosophical Books 27 (2):65-72.
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  42. Comparatives in Counterpart Theory: Another Approach.F. Graeme - 1994 - Analysis 54 (1):37-42.
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  43. Truths Qua Grounds.Ghislain Guigon - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    A number of philosophers have recently found it congenial to talk in terms of grounding. Grounding discourse features grounding sentences that are answers to questions about what grounds what. The goal of this article is to explore and defend a counterpart-theoretic interpretation of grounding discourse. We are familiar with David Lewis's applications of the method of counterpart theory to de re modal discourse. Counterpart-theoretic interpretations of de re modal idioms and grounding sentences share similar motivations, mechanisms, and applications. I shall (...)
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  44. Quidditism and the Resemblance of Properties.Ghislain Guigon - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):177-184.
    It is widely agreed that properties play causal roles: they capture the causal powers of things. But do properties have their causal roles essentially? David Lewis did not think so. He adhered to the doctrine of quidditism, namely the doctrine that the identity of properties is primitive and that they can trade their causal roles. Quidditism is controversial. But Lewis did not see why he should want to reject it. He knew that he could avoid quidditism on the cheap by (...)
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  45. Coextension and Identity.Ghislain Guigon - 2015 - In Ghislain Guigon & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.), Nominalism About Properties: New Essays. Routledge. pp. 135-155.
    This chapter is concerned with the coextension difficulty for nominalist theories of properties that reject tropes alongside universals. After carefully explaining the coextension difficulty and describing the theories it targets, the chapter describes different solutions to the difficulty. These solutions differ with respect to how much involved they are into a dualist approach to coextension. A dualist approach to a case of coextension consists in agreeing with the realist that the relevant ascriptions of properties are numerically distinct. A monist approach (...)
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  46. Overall Similarity, Natural Properties, and Paraphrases.Ghislain Guigon - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):387-399.
    I call anti-resemblism the thesis that independently of any contextual specification there is no determinate fact of the matter about the comparative overall similarity of things. Anti-resemblism plays crucial roles in the philosophy of David Lewis. For instance, Lewis has argued that his counterpart theory is anti-essentialist on the grounds that counterpart relations are relations of comparative overall similarity and that anti-resemblism is true. After Lewis committed himself to a form of realism about natural properties he maintained that anti-resemblism is (...)
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  47. Free Intuitionistic Logic and its S4 Counterpart.Raymond D. Gumb - 1985 - Logique Et Analyse 28 (10):283-294.
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  48. The Problem of Transworld Identity.Lars Gundersen - 1995 - Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 30.
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  49. 2. Reflections on Counterpart Theory.Allen Hazen - 2012 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 7:41.
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  50. Counterpart-Theoretic Semantics for Modal Logic.Allen Hazen - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (6):319-338.
1 — 50 / 128