This paper aims to establish three major theses: (1) Not only declarative sentences, but also interrogatives and imperatives, may be classified as true or as false. (2) Declarative, imperative, and interrogative utterances may also be classified as honest or as dishonest. (3) Whether an utterance is honest or dishonest is logically independent of whether it is true or is false. The establishment of the above theses follows upon the adoption of a principle for identifying what is meant by any sentence, (...) declarative, interrogative, or imperative. The analysis aims to show that meaning is to be attributed to the uttered or written sentence-token, rather to the thereby exhibited sentence-type. Further, the meaning of the sentential token is to be identified with a purpose of the speaker, that the speaker would reveal to the addressee by uttering the sentence. The to be revealed purpose is analysed into two components: an ultimate concern (that the addressee stand in such and such a relation--e.g., of believing, or informing the speaker about, or making it true that) and an ultimate topic of concern (the state of affairs, i.e., proposition, relative to which the speaker would have the addressee stand in the specified relation). Sentential utterances "signify" different purposes by "expressing" different ultimate concerns and "indicating" different ultimate topics of concern. Variations in expressed concern are correlated with variations in sentential form, such as declarative, interrogative and imperative. Variations in indicated topic of concern are correlated with variations in the subject and predicate of the uttered sentence. Thus, for example, utterances of "Johnny will jump in the lake," "Will Johnny jump in the lake?" and "Johnny, go jump in the lake!" all indicate one and the same ultimate topic of concern but express different ultimate concerns with this topic. A sentential utterance is true or false according as its indicated topic of concern is true or false. Hence, declaratives, interrogatives and imperatives may all be classified as true or as false. But honesty or dishonesty is a function (explained in the paper) of the expressed concern, rather than of the topic of concern. Hence, although utterances of all sentential forms are honest or dishonest, their honesty or dishonesty is logically independent of their truth or falsity. (shrink)

I am grateful to Professor Wheatley for his note, [3], on my analysis of interrogatives, [1]. His comments bring out very clearly a number of considerations that deserve our closest attention. For example, he shows that if we can classify interrogatives as true and false—as I proposed to do—then we can properly inquire about what sentences contradict them, and what sentences are contingently or logically equivalent to them. Furthermore, he shows that, on my analysis, no indirect question can contradict any (...) other indirect question and he accordingly, and correctly, looks for such contradictories among declarative sentences. Finally, he notes, [3], p. 54, that in my article, I have treated only inquisitive questions and have said nothing about deliberative or practical questions. While practical questions demand a different kind of treatment than that which Wheatley speculatively, albeit very tentatively, extrapolates for me, still these questions do form a kind of interrogative that did not get any attention in my article. (shrink)

The fifth volume of the Collected Papers of C. S. Peirce, entitled Pragmatism and Pragmaticism, contains papers dealing with two distinguishable, but interconnected doctrines: Pragmatism and Critical Common-sensism. The latter, antedating in its earliest expositions the first formulation of the pragmatic doctrine in 1877, 8, is however later conceived by Peirce as a consequence of pragmatism. The two doctrines will be advisedly treated here in isolation, and first pragmatism.

The fifth volume of the Collected Papers of C. S. Peirce, entitled Pragmatism and Pragmaticism, contains papers dealing with two distinguishable, but interconnected doctrines: Pragmatism and Critical Common-sensism. The latter, antedating in its earliest expositions the first formulation of the pragmatic doctrine in 1877, 8, is however later conceived by Peirce as a consequence of pragmatism. The two doctrines will be advisedly treated here in isolation, and first pragmatism.

This paper approaches a theory relating authorship, meaning and purpose by semiformalized developments of two "presupposed theories": of purposeful behavior and of sign-reading. The theory of purposeful behavior is made to rest upon two undefined predicates. `Wt(a,p,q)' abbreviates the claim that at time t, person a works at bringing it about that p in order to bring it about that q. `Bt(a,p)' abbreviates the claim that at time t, person a brings it about that p. A number of definitions and (...) laws are based upon these two predicates. One practical utility of the symbolism is a constraint to symbolize differently a purpose, according as what is intended is a purposing or a thing purposed. The theory of sign-reading undertakes to assimilate sign-reading to inference. The theory proposes `Rt(a,p,q)' as a basic undefined predicate, abbreviating the claim that at time t, person a reads that p as a sign that q. The theory of deliberate sign-production, and more particularly of authorship, is approached by permitting the two above sets of symbols to supply arguments one for the other. Specifically, making a deliberate or a candid sign is defined as bringing about a state of affairs in order that an addressee will read the bringing about by the sign-maker of that state of affairs as a sign that such and so. The laws of the two first parts of the paper are then appealed to in order to show that when the sign-making is candid (defined in the paper), the such and so mentioned above must be a feigned or actual purpose of the author. The paper concludes with a brief consideration of what in this total signified purpose of the sign-making might be indentified by reference to the conventional sign-type (sentence) presented. Thus "meaning" of a sentence is thence viewed as an abstraction from the signified meaning (always a purpose) of the uttering. (shrink)