Tarski's manner of defining truth is generally considered highly significant. About why, there is less consensus. I argue first, that in his truth-definitions Tarski was trying to solve a set of philosophical problems; second, that he solved them successfully; third, that all of these that are simply problems about defining truth are as well or better solved by a simpler account of truth. But one of his crucial problems remains: to give an account of validity, one requires an account not (...) just of truth but of truth under varying interpretations. Tarski's account has the merit of generalizing to this, to model theory and to abstract algebra. (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article:F.H. Bradley, Collected Works Volumes 1–5.

What I call the minimal notion of truth is just that which the redundancy thesis claims suffices for all legitimate purposes. I argue that the minimal notion is legitimate and useful whatever one's preferred theory of truth. I rebut some arguments against the redundancy thesis which are in effect arguments against the legitimacy of the minimal notion. Finally I compare the minimal notion with a slightly stronger notion I call the semiminimal notion, and argue that this does issue a refutation (...) of the redundancy thesis as I have defined it. (shrink)

This essay attempts to clarify certain notions that the author finds useful for the discussion of relativism and then to show what kinds of relativism about values, rationality, and truth are and are not coherent.

Much philosophy of science is methodology of science. How should one go about doing and evaluating it? The question is one of the methodology of methodology, i.e. of metamethodology. There is a vague thesis common to Descartes and more recent philosophers such as Quine and Lakatos: that what is good methodology, good evidence, good reason for accepting, rejecting or revising beliefs in mathematics and in the sciences properly so called, does not differ in significant kind from what is good methodology, (...) evidence or reason elsewhere, even in epistemology and ethics; and further, that mathematics and the natural sciences provide good paradigms for methodology generally. Following von Hayek,1 I call this form of epistemological and methodological monism: Scientism. (shrink)