Contributions of Vaiśeṣika philosophy to Ayurvedic medicine; a study.

77 ff. ; RS Deshmukh, Religion in Vedic Literature, p. 331. Jacobi seems to take the extreme view that the conception of immortality of the Soul was unknown ...

I want to argue that there is a task of ‘culture research’ other than what is practised in the empirical disciplines such as Social Anthropology or historical disciplines such as Literary Studies. Suppose ‘Cultures’ are looked upon as different legacies of ways of going about in the world resulting from the different pasts of different groups of people. Such ways can be either approached as a phenomena to be explained or as an embodiment of knowledge dispositions to be learnt. However, (...) the predominant tool for approaching knowledge dispositions is to look at them as explicitly or implicitly held propositions. One consequence of this propensity is to construe understanding a culture as arriving at the beliefs held by the community characterised by that culture. I will show that there is a way of extending the Fregean distinction between ‘object’ and ‘concept’ in such a way as to make it serviceable to conceptualise non-propositional forms of knowledge, and consequently, a more adequate tool for identifying the objects of culture research. (shrink)

Commentary on Tattvacintāmaṇi of Gaṅgeśa, 13th cent., work on Hindu logic and epistemology of the Navya Nyaya school of Hindu philosophy; critical edition.

Classical treatises, with six commentaries, of the Dvaita and Advaita school in Hindu philosophy.

The paper discusses the attitude of the bhagavadgita in relation to war and peace and justifies its views on independent grounds. The views that the gita is primarily interested in teaching either war or peace, And that the teachings of war and peace are necessarily incompatible are repudiated. The paper shows that the central message of the gita is something more basic and comprehensive, And that the war, As envisaged by the gita, Is not incompatible with a life of peace (...) and righteousness. In this context the concept of 'righteous war' is explained and its scrupulous and exceptional use vindicated. (shrink)

Provided we blame others accurately, is blaming them morally right even if we are guilty of similar wrongdoing ourselves? On the one hand, hypocrisy seems to render blame morally wrong, and unjustified; but on the other, even hypocritical blaming seems better than silence. I develop an account of the wrongness of hypocritical blaming which resolves this apparent dilemma. When holding others accountable for their moral failings, we ought to be willing to reason, together with them, about our own, similar failings. (...) Hypocrisy undermines this process of mutual deliberation. Thus, even if better than silence, hypocritical blaming is second-best, and that is why it is wrong. (shrink)

Commentary on Tattvacintāmaṇi of Gaṅgeśa, 13th century, work on Hindu logic and epistemology of the Navya Nyaya school of Hindu philosophy.

0. Introduction: the Propositional Model of Knowledge "Philosophers have not done justice to the distinction which is quite familiar to all of us between ...

Priyanshu Prabal Upadhyaya, b. 1919, Sanskrit scholar; contributed articles on various aspects of Indic philosophy, Vedic and Sanskrit literature.

Humanism in Indian context; collection of lectures.

Anonymous commentary on Brahmasūtra of Bādarāyaṇa, aphoristic work on Vedanta philosophy.

Hypocrisy seems to be a distinctive moral wrong. This thesis offers an account of that wrong. The distinctive wrong of hypocrisy is not a rational failing, or a deception of others. It is a problem in how we critique, and blame, others, when we ourselves are guilty of similar faults. Not only does it seem wrong to blame others hypocritically; it is also widely remarked that hypocrites ‘lack standing’ to blame. I defend both judgments. When we engage others in response (...) to wrongdoing, there is both instrumental and non-instrumental value in ensuring that those who face similar moral predicaments reason about these predicaments, and the appropriate responses to them, together. Hypocrisy is wrong because it hampers our ability to realise that value. And hypocrites lose standing to blame for a similar reason. Standing depends on the value of particular people engaging in an accountability procedure together, a value which the hypocrite forestalls, by failing to acknowledge wrongdoing in the course of blaming. This account of a duty to blame non-hypocritically helps unpack the relationship between hypocrisy and a range of other defects in a person’s standing. It also responds to a central sceptical challenge to the wrongness of hypocritical blaming. The challenge is that accurate hypocritical blaming can’t be wrong because it is morally good, and indeed is morally better than not blaming others at all. My response: hypocritical blaming is wrong, not because it is morally worse than not blaming at all, but because it is second-best, i.e. worse than non-hypocritical blaming, which enables mutual deliberation about wrongdoing. (shrink)