I describe three major areas in which I argue that Christians’ belief that abortion is morally wrong is inconsistent with other important abortion-related main-stream Christian beliefs or actions based on those beliefs. The three areas are: (1) abortion and soul-saving; (2) abortion prevention and violence; and (3) abortion and the fate of frozen fertilized human eggs. I make no direct argument about the moral status of abortion itself.
The aim of this paper is to defend the evidential Argument from Evil from the challenge brought against it by skeptical theists. That challenge is rooted in skeptical theism's assessment that the so-called Noseeum Inference, which is at the heart of the Evidential Argument from Evil, is unsound due to the epistemic gap between God and humans. I will argue that that epistemic gap could be bridged if God were to build the bridge by assisting us to understand his morally (...) sufficient reasons for causing or allowing horrendous suffering of the innocent. I further argue that if God exists, he would be able to assist us, given his omnipotence, and he would want to assist us, given his omnibenevolence manifested in the Summum Bonum for humans. If so, then the soundness of the Noseeum Inference and the Evidential Argument from Evil would be upheld against the epistemic gap challenge from skeptical theists. (shrink)
Christianity's claim of privileged access to correct morality has always been a key element in its ability to attract and retain adherents. Jesus' Sermon on the Mount has been considered the most complete and authoritative exposition of Christian ethics this side of the Ten Commandments. In this article I will argue that the moral authority of Jesus and some important aspects of Christian ethics can be called into question by a number of seriously flawed moral imperatives from the Sermon on (...) the Mount. (shrink)
The Free Will Theodicy attempts to defeat the Argument from Evil by claiming that the suffering of the innocent is justified by the existence of free will. I argue against the FWT by demonstrating that there are at least three logically possible worlds, one without FW and two with it, such that, if given a choice, all conscious beings would act rationally in choosing to live in any of those three worlds rather than in the current world. This choice outcome (...) undermines the FWT's contention that FW adequately justifies the quantity and severity of the SOI in this world. (shrink)