The self-limiting revolutions of 1989 in Central Europe offer an alternative paradigm of revolutionary change that is reminiscent more of the American struggle for independence in 1776 than the Jacobin tendencies that grew out of the French Revolution of 1789. In order to understand the contradictory impulses of the revolutions of 1989—the desire for a radical renewal and the concern for preservation—this article takes as its point of departure the political thought of Hannah Arendt and Edmund Burke.

A sociologist, a historian and a legal scholar looked at the state of contemporary western societies and none of them liked what they saw. Wolfgang Streeck, Perry Anderson and Martin Loughlin share a concern for the erosion of democracy in Europe, along with the virtues that make democratic citizenship a viable basis for self-governing societies. From their differing perspectives, they decry the advance of neoliberalism, which prioritises individual aspirations at the expense of the common good.

The series of Velvet revolutions in 1989, which brought about the collapse of communism in Europe, seem to have vindicated those political theorists and activists who believed in the possibility of non-violent power. The relative success of the 1989 revolutions has validated a new paradigm of revolutionary change based on the assumption that radical changes were attainable through moderate means. Yet the legacy of these non-violent revolutions also points towards the limits of political strategies fundamentally opposed to violence. The article (...) shows that the key architects of non-violent revolutions in 1989 were well aware of the contingent nature of all political actions, and were thus willing to take risks in their pursuit of freedom. (shrink)

Excerpt“Europe is not America,” opined the leading editorial in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung1 in the midst of the most severe financial crisis that the United States has experienced in its history. A few days later, when it became obvious that European-style capitalism was not immune to the problems caused by the reckless investment strategies of banks around the globe, the outburst of this European (German?) Schadenfreude dissipated. Yet, the underlying assumption remained: the economic downturn in the United States was indicative (...) of a profound crisis of the neo-liberal capitalist order that had been championed by different U.S. administrations for at…. (shrink)