Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Rule-Following and Intentionality" by Alexander Miller and Olivia Sultanescu

This is an automatically generated and experimental page

If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.

Azzouni, Jody, 2017, The Rule-Following Paradox and its Implications for Metaphysics. Springer International Publishing AG. (Scholar)
Blackburn, Simon, 1984 [2002], “The Individual Strikes Back”, Synthese, 58(3): 281–301; reprinted in Miller and Wright 2002: 28–44 (ch. 3). doi:10.1007/BF00485244 (Scholar)
Boghossian, Paul A., 1989 [2002], “The Rule-Following Considerations”, Mind, 98(392): 507–549; reprinted in Miller and Wright 2002:141–87 (ch. 9). doi:10.1093/mind/XCVIII.392.507 (Scholar)
–––, 1990, “The Status of Content”, Philosophical Review, 99(2): 157–184; reprinted in Boghossian 2008: 51–70 (ch. 2). doi:10.2307/2185488 (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “Is Meaning Normative?” Philosophy–Science–Scientific Philosophy, Paderborn: Mentis, 205–218. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, Content and Justification: Philosophical Papers, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2012, “Blind Rule-Following”, in Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge: Themes From the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, Annalisa Coliva (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 27–48 (ch. 1). (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Is (Determinate) Meaning a Naturalistic Phenomenon?”, in Meaning Without Representation: Essays on Truth, Expression, Normativity, and Naturalism, Steven Gross, Nicholas Tebben, and Michael Williams (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 331–358. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722199.003.0016 (Scholar)
–––, forthcoming, “The Normativity of Meaning Revisited”, in Meaning, Decision, and Norms: Themes from the Work of Allan Gibbard, Billy Dunaway and David Plunkett (eds.), Ann Arbor, MI: Maize Books. (Scholar)
Brandom, Robert, 1994, Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Bridges, Jason, 2014, “Rule-Following Skepticism, Properly So Called”, in Varieties of Skepticism: Essays after Kant, Wittgenstein, and Cavell, James Conant and Andrea Kern (eds.), Berlin: De Gruyter, 249–288. doi:10.1515/9783110336795.249 (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “Meaning and Understanding”, in Glock and Hyman 2016: 375–389. doi:10.1002/9781118884607.ch23">10.1002/9781118884607.ch23 (Scholar)
Byrne, Alex, 1996, “On Misinterpreting Kripke’s Wittgenstein”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 56(2): 339–343. doi:10.2307/2108524 (Scholar)
Child, William, 2001, “Pears’s Wittgenstein: Rule-Following, Platonism, Naturalism”, in Wittgensteinian Themes: Essays in Honour of David Pears, David Charles and William Child (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 81–114 (ch. 4). (Scholar)
–––, 2011, Wittgenstein, New York: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203817759 (Scholar)
–––, 2019a, “‘We Can Go No Further’: Meaning, Use, and the Limits of Language”, in Wittgenstein and the Limits of Language, Hanne Appelqvist (ed.), New York: Routledge, ch. 4. (Scholar)
–––, 2019b, “Meaning, Use, and Supervenience”, in Wittgenstein on Philosophy, Objectivity, and Meaning, James Conant and Sebastian Sunday (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 211–230. doi:10.1017/9781108151764.012 (Scholar)
Churchland, Paul M., 1981, “Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes”, Journal of Philosophy, 78(2): 67–90. doi:10.2307/2025900 (Scholar)
Davidson, Donald, 1984, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2001, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Davies, David, 1998, “How Sceptical Is Kripke’s ‘Sceptical Solution’?”, Philosophia, 26(1–2): 119–140. doi:10.1007/bf02380061 (Scholar)
Ebbs, Gary, 2016, “Rules and Rule-Following”, in Glock and Hyman 2016: 390–406. doi:10.1002/9781118884607.ch24 (Scholar)
Field, Hartry H., 1980, Science Without Numbers: A Defence of Nominalism, Oxford: Blackwell and Princton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1989, Realism, Mathematics and Modality, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Fodor, Jerry A., 1990, A Theory of Content and Other Essays, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Fogelin, Robert J., 1976 [1987], Wittgenstein, London: Routledge. Second edition, 1987. (Scholar)
Gampel, Eric H., 1997, “The Normativity of Meaning”, Philosophical Studies, 86(3): 221–242. doi:10.1023/a:1017967412131 (Scholar)
Gibbard, Alan, 2012, Meaning and Normativity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199646074.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “Responses to Hattiangadi, Wikforss, and Williamson”, Inquiry, 61(7): 767–782. doi:10.1080/0020174x.2018.1502072 (Scholar)
Ginsborg, Hannah, 2011a, “Inside and Outside Language: Stroud’s Nonreductionism about Meaning”, in The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding: Reflections on the Thought of Barry Stroud, Jason Bridges, Niko Kolodny, and Wai-hung Wong (eds.), New York: Oxford University Press, ch 8. (Scholar)
–––, 2011b, “Primitive Normativity and Skepticism about Rules”, Journal of Philosophy, 108(5): 227–254. doi:10.5840/jphil2011108518 (Scholar)
–––, 2012, “Meaning, Understanding and Normativity”, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 86: 127–146. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8349.2012.00211.x (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “Leaps in the Dark: Epistemological Skepticism in Kripke’s Wittgenstein”, in Skepticism: Historical and Contemporary Inquiries, G. Anthony Bruno and A.C. Rutherford (eds.), London: Routledge, ch. 8. (Scholar)
–––, 2020, “Wittgenstein on Going On”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 50(1): 1–17. doi:10.1017/can.2019.48 (Scholar)
–––, forthcoming, “Going on as One Ought: Kripke and Wittgenstein on the Normativity of Meaning”, Mind & Language, first online: 8 March 2021. doi:10.1111/mila.12342 (Scholar)
Glock, Hans-Johann and John Hyman (eds.), 2016, A Companion to Wittgenstein, Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons. doi:10.1002/9781118884607 (Scholar)
Glüer, Kathrin, 1999, “Sense and Prescriptivity”, Acta Analytica, 14(23): 111–128. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “Rule-Following and Charity: Wittgenstein and Davidson on Meaning Determination”, in Verheggen 2017b: 46–68 (ch. 4). doi:10.1017/9781316145364.005">10.1017/9781316145364.005 (Scholar)
Glüer, Kathrin and Peter Pagin, 1998, “Rules of Meaning and Practical Reasoning”, Synthese, 117(2): 207–227. doi:10.1023/a:1005162503125 (Scholar)
Glüer, Kathrin and Åsa Wikforss, 2009, “Against Content Normativity”, Mind, 118(469): 31–70. doi:10.1093/mind/fzn154 (Scholar)
–––, 2018 [2020], “The Normativity of Meaning and Content”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/meaning-normativity/>. (Scholar)
Goldfarb, Warren, 1985, “Kripke on Wittgenstein on Rules”, Journal of Philosophy, 82(9): 471–488; reprinted in Miller and Wright 2002: 92–107 (ch. 6). doi:10.2307/2026277 (Scholar)
–––, 2012, “Rule-Following Revisited”, in Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Mind, Jonathan Ellis and Daniel Guevara (eds.), New York: Oxford University Press, 73–90. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199737666.003.0005 (Scholar)
Grice, H. Paul, 1989, Studies in the Ways of Words, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Guardo, Andrea, 2012, “Kripke’s Account of the Rule-Following Considerations: Kripke’s Account of Rule-Following Considerations”, European Journal of Philosophy, 20(3): 366–388. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0378.2010.00414.x (Scholar)
Haase, Matthias, 2009, “The Laws of Thought and the Power of Thinking”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume, 35: 249–297. doi:10.1080/00455091.2009.10717650 (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “The Representation of Language”, in Language, Form(s) of Life, and Logic: Investigations after Wittgenstein, Christian Martin (ed.), Boston: De Gruyter, 219–250,. (Scholar)
Haddock, Adrian, 2012, “Meaning, Justification, and ‘Primitive Normativity’”, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 86: 147–174. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8349.2012.00212.x (Scholar)
Hale, Bob, 2017, “Rule-Following, Objectivity, and Meaning” in Hale, Wright, and Miller 2017: 619–648. doi:10.1002/9781118972090.ch24">10.1002/9781118972090.ch24 (Scholar)
Hale, Bob, Crispin Wright, and Alexander Miller (eds.), 2017, A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, second edition, Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons. doi:10.1002/9781118972090 (Scholar)
Handfield, Toby and Alexander Bird, 2008, “Dispositions, Rules, and Finks”, Philosophical Studies, 140(2): 285–298. doi:10.1007/s11098-007-9148-2 (Scholar)
Hanks, Peter, 2017, “Predication and Rule-Following”, in Philosophy and Logic of Predication, Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), (Studies in Philosophy of Language and Linguistics, 7), Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 199–223. (Scholar)
Hattiangadi, Anandi, 2003, “Making It Implicit: Brandom on Rule Following”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 66(2): 419–431. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00269.x (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “Is Meaning Normative?”, Mind & Language, 21(2): 220–240. doi:10.1111/j.0268-1064.2006.00312.x (Scholar)
–––, 2007, Oughts and Thoughts: Rule-Following and the Normativity of Content, Oxford: Clarendon Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219025.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “The Normativity of Meaning”, in Hale, Wright, and Miller 2017: 649–669. doi:10.1002/9781118972090.ch25 (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “The Normativity of meaning and the Hard Problem of Intentionality”, Inquiry, 61(7): 742–754. doi:10.1080/0020174x.2018.1424524 (Scholar)
Horwich, Paul, 1998, Meaning, Oxford: Clarendon Press. doi:10.1093/019823824x.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2010, Truth-Meaning-Reality, Oxford: Clarendon Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199268900.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2012, Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy, Oxford: Clarendon Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199588879.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Kripke’s Wittgenstein”, in Meaning Without Representation: Expression, Truth, Normativity, and Naturalism, Steven Gross, Nicholas Tebben, and Michael Williams (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 359–376. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722199.003.0017 (Scholar)
Jackman, Henry, 2003, “Foundationalism, Coherentism and Rule-Following Scepticism”, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 11(1): 25–41. doi:10.1080/0967255032000050420 (Scholar)
Kremer, Michael, 2000, “Wilson on Kripke’s Wittgenstein”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60(3): 571–584. doi:10.2307/2653815 (Scholar)
Kripke, Saul A., 1972, Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1982, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Kusch, Martin, 2006, A Sceptical Guide to Meaning and Rules: Defending Kripke’s Wittgenstein, Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. (Scholar)
Lewis, David, 1983, “New Work for a Theory of Universals”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61(4): 343–377. doi:10.1080/00048408312341131 (Scholar)
Mackie, J. L., 1977, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, Harmondsworth: Penguin. (Scholar)
Martin, Charles Burton, 1994, “Dispositions and Conditionals”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 44(174): 1–8. doi:10.2307/2220143 (Scholar)
Martin, Charles Burton and John Heil, 1998, “Rules and Powers”, Philosophical Perspectives, 12: 283–312. doi:10.1111/0029-4624.32.s12.13 (Scholar)
McDowell, John, 1984 [1998], “Wittgenstein on Following a Rule”, Synthese, 58(3): 325–363; reprinted in McDowell 1998b: 221–262 (ch. 11). doi:10.1007/BF00485246 (Scholar)
–––, 1992 [1998], “Meaning and Intentionality in Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 17: 40–52; reprinted in McDowell 1998b: 263–278 (ch. 12). doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1992.tb00141.x (Scholar)
–––, 1998a, “Response to Crispin Wright”, in Knowing Our Own Minds, Barry C. Smith, Crispin Wright, and Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 47–62. (Scholar)
–––, 1998b, Mind, Value, and Reality, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “How Not to Read Philosophical Investigations: Brandom’s Wittgenstein”, in R. Haller and K. Puhl (eds.), Wittgenstein and the Future of Philosophy: A Reassessment after Fifty Years, Vienna: obvhpt, 245-56; reprinted in The Engaged Intellect: Philosophical Essays, Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2009, ch. 6. (Scholar)
McGinn, Colin, 1984, Wittgenstein on Meaning, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Merino-Rajme, Carla, 2015, “Why Lewis’ Appeal to Natural Properties Fails to Kripke’s Rule-Following Paradox”, Philosophical Studies, 172(1): 163–175. doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0282-3 (Scholar)
Miller, Alexander, 2006, “Meaning Scepticism”, in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Language, Michael Devitt and Richard Hanley (eds.), Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 91–113. doi:10.1002/9780470757031.ch5 (Scholar)
–––, 2010a, “The Argument from Queerness and the Normativity of Meaning”, in Wahrheit, Bedeutung, Existenz, Martin Grajner and Adolf Rami (eds.), Boston: De Gruyter, 107–124. doi:10.1515/9783110324068.107 (Scholar)
–––, 2010b, “Kripke’s Wittgenstein, Factualism, and Meaning”, in The Later Wittgenstein on Language, Daniel Whiting (ed.), Palgrave Macmillan, 167–190. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “Rule-Following Skepticism”, in The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard (eds.), New York: Routledge, ch. 42. (Scholar)
–––, 2012, “Semantic Realism and the Argument from Motivational Internalism”, in Prospects for Meaning, Richard Schantz (ed.), Boston: De Gruyter, 345–362. (Scholar)
–––, 2015a, “Rule Following, Error Theory and Eliminativism”, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 23(3): 323–336. doi:10.1080/09672559.2015.1042004 (Scholar)
–––, 2015b, “Blind Rule-Following and the ‘antinomy of Pure Reason”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 65(260): 396–416. doi:10.1093/pq/pqv023 (Scholar)
–––, 2018, Philosophy of Language, third edition, New York: Routledge. First edition 1998. (Scholar)
–––, 2019, “Rule-Following, Meaning, and Primitive Normativity”, Mind, 128(511): 735–760. doi:10.1093/mind/fzx033 (Scholar)
–––, 2020, “What Is the Sceptical Solution?”, Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy, 8(2). doi:10.15173/jhap.v8i2.4060 (Scholar)
Miller, Alexander and Crispin Wright (eds.), 2002, Rule-Following and Meaning, Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. doi:10.4324/9781315710679 (Scholar)
Millikan, Ruth Garrett, 1984, Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Myers, Robert H., and Claudine Verheggen, 2016, Donald Davidson’s Triangulation Argument: A Philosophical Inquiry, New York: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781315885117 (Scholar)
Pears, David Francis, 1988, The False Prison: A Study of the Development of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy, Volume Two, Oxford: Clarendon Press. doi:10.1093/019824486x.001.0001 (Scholar)
Pettit, Philip, 1990 [2002], “The Reality of Rule-Following”, Mind, 99(393): 1–21; reprinted in Miller and Wright 2002: 188–208 (ch. 10). doi:10.1093/mind/XCIX.393.1 (Scholar)
Rosen, Gideon, 1997, “Who Makes the Rules Around Here?”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 57(1): 163–171. doi:10.2307/2953786 (Scholar)
Sellars, Wilfrid, 1956 [1997], “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”, in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 1, Herbert Feigl and Michael Scriven (eds.), Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 253–329; reprinted in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, Richard Rorty (ed.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997. (Scholar)
Soames, Scott, 1997, “Skepticism about Meaning: Indeterminacy, Normativity, and the Rule-Following Paradox”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume, 23: 211–249. doi:10.1080/00455091.1997.10715967 (Scholar)
Stroud, Barry, 1990 [2000], “Wittgenstein on Meaning, Understanding, and Community”, in Wittgenstein—Towards a Re-Evaluation: Proceedings of the Fourteenth International Wittgenstein Symposium, Rudolf Haller and Johannes Brandl (eds.), Wien: Springer, 27–36; reprinted in Stroud 2000: 80–94 (ch. 6). (Scholar)
–––, 1996 [2000], “Mind, Meaning, and Practice”, in The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein, Hans D. Sluga and David G. Stern (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 296–319; reprinted in Stroud 2000: 170–192 (ch. 11). doi:10.1017/CCOL0521460255.010 (Scholar)
–––, 2000, Meaning, Understanding, and Practice: Philosophical Essays, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0199252149.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2011 [2018], “Meaning and Understanding”, in The Oxford Handbook to Wittgenstein, O. Kuusela and M. McGinn (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 294–310; reprinted in Stroud 2018: ch. 18. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, Seeing, Knowing, Understanding: Philosophical Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198809753.001.0001 (Scholar)
Sultanescu, Olivia, 2021, “Meaning Scepticism and Primitive Normativity”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 102(2): 357–376. doi:10.1111/papq.12339 (Scholar)
–––, forthcoming, “Meaning, Rationality and Guidance”, Philosophical Quarterly. doi:10.1093/pq/pqac004 (Scholar)
Sultanescu, Olivia and Claudine Verheggen, 2019, “Davidson’s Answer to Kripke’s Sceptic”, Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy, 7(2): 7–28. doi:10.15173/jhap.v7i2.3487 (Scholar)
Travis, Charles, 2006, Thought’s Footing: A Theme in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, Oxford: Clarendon Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199291465.001.0001 (Scholar)
Verheggen, Claudine, 2000, “The Meaningfulness of Meaning Questions”, Synthese, 123(2): 195–216. doi:10.1023/a:1005243504897 (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “Wittgenstein’s Rule-Following Paradox and the Objectivity of Meaning”, Philosophical Investigations, 26(4): 285–310. doi:10.1111/1467-9205.00204 (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “How Social Must Language Be?”, Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 36(2): 203–219. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5914.2006.00303.x (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “Semantic Normativity and Naturalism”, Logique et Analyse, 54 (216): 553–567. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Towards a New Kind of Semantic Normativity”, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 23(3): 410–424. doi:10.1080/09672559.2015.1042005 (Scholar)
–––, 2017a, “Davidson’s Treatment of Wittgenstein’s Rule-Following Paradox”, in Verheggen 2017b: 69–96 (ch. 5). doi:10.1017/9781316145364.006 (Scholar)
––– (ed.), 2017b, Wittgenstein and Davidson on Language, Thought, and Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781316145364 (Scholar)
Warren, Jared, 2020, “Killing Kripkenstein’s Monster”, Noûs, 54(2): 257–289. doi:10.1111/nous.12242 (Scholar)
Weatherson, Brian, 2009 [2021], “David Lewis”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter2021), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/david-lewis/ (Scholar)
Whiting, Daniel, 2006, “Between Primitivism and Naturalism: Brandom’s Theory of Meaning”, Acta Analytica, 21(3): 3–22. doi:10.1007/s12136-006-1007-9 (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “The Normativity of Meaning Defended”, Analysis, 67(2): 133–140. doi:10.1093/analys/67.2.133 (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Is Meaning Fraught with Ought?”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 90(4): 535–555. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2009.01354.x (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “What Is the Normativity of Meaning?”, Inquiry, 59(3): 219–238. doi:10.1080/0020174x.2013.852132 (Scholar)
Wikforss, Åsa Maria, 2001, “Semantic Normativity”, Philosophical Studies, 102(2): 203–226. doi:10.1023/a:1004746319850 (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “Does Semantics Need Normativity? Comments on Allan Gibbard, Meaning and Normativity”, Inquiry, 61(7): 755–766. doi:10.1080/0020174x.2018.1424528 (Scholar)
Williams, J. R. G., 2007, “Eligibility and Inscrutability”, Philosophical Review, 116(3): 361–399. doi:10.1215/00318108-2007-002 (Scholar)
Williams, Meredith, 1999, Wittgenstein, Mind and Meaning: Towards a Social Conception of Mind, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, Blind Obedience: The Structure and Content of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy, London: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203870815 (Scholar)
Wilson, George M., 1994 [2002], “Kripke on Wittgenstein and Normativity”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 19: 366–390; reprinted in Miller and Wright 2002: 234–259 (ch. 12). doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1994.tb00295.x (Scholar)
–––, 1998, “Semantic Realism and Kripke’s Wittgenstein”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 58(1): 99–122. doi:10.2307/2653632 (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “The Sceptical Solution”, in The Legitimacy of Truth: Proceedings of the Third Meeting of Italian and American Philosophers, Riccardo Dottori (ed.), Hamburg: Lit Verlag, 171–188. (Scholar)
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1953 [2009], Philosophical Investigations, G. E. M. Anscombe (trans.), Oxford: Blackwell. Revised fourth edition with P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte (eds.), Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. (Scholar)
–––, 1956 [1978], Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, G. H. von Wright, Rush Rhees, and G. E. M. Anscombe (eds.), G. E. M. Anscombe (trans.), Oxford: B. Blackwell. Revised edition Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978 (Scholar)
Wright, Crispin, 1980, Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics, London: Duckworth. (Scholar)
–––, 1984 [2001], “Kripke’s Account of the Argument Against Private Language”, The Journal of Philosophy, 81(12): 759–778; reprinted in Wright 2001: 91–115. doi:10.2307/2026031 (Scholar)
–––, 1989 [2002], “Critical Notice: Wittgenstein on Meaning, by Colin McGinn”, Mind, 98(390): 289–305; reprinted as “Critical Notice of Colin McGinn’s Wittgenstein on Meaning” in Miller and Wright 2002: 108–128 (ch. 7). doi:10.1093/mind/XCVIII.390.289 (Scholar)
–––, 1992, Truth and Objectivity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1995 [2003], “Truth in Ethics”, Ratio, 8(3): 209–226; reprinted in Wright 2003: 183–203. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1995.tb00084.x (Scholar)
–––, 2001, Rails to Infinity: Essays on Themes from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, Saving The Differences: Essays on Themes from “Truth and Objectivity”, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “Rule-Following without Reasons: Wittgenstein’s Quietism and the Constitutive Question”, Ratio, 20(4): 481–502. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9329.2007.00379.x (Scholar)
Zalabardo, José L., 1997 [2002], “Kripke’s Nonnativity Argument”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 27(4): 467–488; reprinted in Miller and Wright 2002: 274–293 (ch. 14). doi:10.1080/00455091.1997.10717482 (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “Wittgenstein on Accord”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 84(3): 311–329. doi:10.1111/1468-0114.00176 (Scholar)

Generated Mon Jan 13 11:52:26 2025

Applied ethics	Epistemology	History of Western Philosophy	Meta-ethics	Metaphysics	Normative ethics
Philosophy of biology	Philosophy of language	Philosophy of mind	Philosophy of religion	Science Logic and Mathematics	More ...