Works by McMullen, Matthew N. (exact spelling)

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  1. Reflective and Evaluative Modes of Mental Simulation.Keith D. Markman & Matthew N. McMullen - 2005 - In David R. Mandel, Denis J. Hilton & Patrizia Catellani (eds.), The Psychology of Counterfactual Thinking. London: Routledge. pp. 77--93.
    A number of researchers have focused on the distinction between upward counterfactuals that simulate a better reality and downward counterfactuals that simulate a worse reality. In this chapter the authors will discuss the important aspects of a model (Markman and McMullen 2003) that attempts to explain how the very same counterfactual can engender dramatically different affective reactions. According to the model, the consequences of simulation direction are moderated by what we have termed simulation mode--relatively stronger tendencies to engage in reflective (...)
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    The Interplay between Counterfactual Reasoning and Feedback Dynamics in Producing Inferences about the Self.Keith D. Markman, Ronald A. Elizaga, Jennifer J. Ratcliff & Matthew N. McMullen - 2007 - Thinking and Reasoning 13 (2):188 – 206.
    Counterfactual reasoning research typically demonstrates contrast effects—nearly winning evokes frustration, whereas nearly losing evokes exhilaration. The present work, however, describes conditions under which assimilative responses (i.e., when judgements are pulled towards a comparison standard) also occur. Participants solved analogies and learned that they had either nearly attained a target score or nearly failed to attain it. Participants in the no trajectory condition received this feedback in the absence of any prior feedback, whereas those in the trajectory condition received feedback after (...)
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    Counterfactuals Need Not be Comparative: The Case of “As If”.Keith D. Markman & Matthew N. McMullen - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):461-462.
    Byrne (2005) assumes that counterfactual thinking requires a comparison of facts with an imagined alternative. In our view, however, this assumption is unnecessarily restrictive. We argue that individuals do not necessarily engage in counterfactual simulations exclusively to evaluate factual reality. Instead, comparative evaluation is often suspended in favor of experiencing the counterfactual simulation as if it were real.
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