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  1. Ernest W. Adams (1998). Remarks on Wishes and Counterfactuals. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (3):191–196.
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  2. Peter Alexander & Mary Hesse (1962). Symposium: Subjunctive Conditionals. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 36:185 - 214.
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  3. Sean Allen-Hermanson (2001). The Pragmatist's Troubles With Bivalence and Counterfactuals. Dialogue 40 (4):669-90.
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  4. Sean Allen-Hermanson (2001). The Pragmatist's Troubles with Bivalence and Counterfactuals. Dialogue 40 (04):669-.
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  5. Luis Alonso-Ovalle (2009). Counterfactuals, Correlatives, and Disjunction. Linguistics and Philosophy 32 (2):207-244.
    The natural interpretation of counterfactuals with disjunctive antecedents involves selecting from each of the disjuncts the worlds that come closest to the world of evaluation. It has been long noticed that capturing this interpretation poses a problem for a minimal change semantics for counterfactuals, because selecting the closest worlds from each disjunct requires accessing the denotation of the disjuncts from the denotation of the disjunctive antecedent, which the standard boolean analysis of or does not allow (Creary and Hill, Philosophy of (...)
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  6. Peter Alward, Comments on “If It Were the Case That Counterfactuals Behaved Differently in Indirect Reports, It Might Be the Case That Counterfactuals Are Context-Sensitive”.
    Tillman’s central thesis is that counterfactual conditionals are not context-sensitive: the propositions expressed (or semantically encoded) by counterfactual sentences do not vary with the contexts in which they are uttered.1 The main concern of Tillman’s paper is to show that arguments offered in support of the context-sensitivity of counterfactuals are unsound. In these comments, I am going to focus on the “variability argument” for context-sensitivity and Tillman’s response to it.
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  7. Alan Ross Anderson (1951). A Note on Subjunctive and Counterfactual Conditionals. Analysis 12 (2):35 - 38.
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  8. Ana Arregui (2009). On Similarity in Counterfactuals. Linguistics and Philosophy 32 (3):245-278.
    This paper investigates the interpretation of counterfactual conditionals. The main goal of the paper is to provide an account of the semantic role of similarity in the evaluation of counterfactuals. The paper proposes an analysis according to which counterfactuals are treated as predications “ de re ” over past situations in the actual world. The relevant situations enter semantic composition via the interpretation of tense. Counterfactuals are treated as law-like conditionals with de re predication over particular facts. Similarity with respect (...)
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  9. N. Asher & E. McCready (2007). Were, Would, Might and a Compositional Account of Counterfactuals. Journal of Semantics 24 (2):93-129.
    This paper has two purposes. We first give a new dynamic account of epistemic modal operators that account for both their test-like behaviour with respect to whole information states and their capacity to induce quantificational dependencies across worlds (modal subordination). We then use this theory, together with an analysis of conditionals and irrealis moods, to give a fully compositional semantics of indicative and counterfactual conditionals. In our analysis, the distinction between counterfactual and indicative conditionals follows directly from the interaction between (...)
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  10. M. R. Ayers (1965). Counterfactuals and Subjunctive Conditionals. Mind 74 (295):347-364.
    The author maintains that there is no special problem about the verification or analysis of counterfactual or unfulfilled conditional statements. there is no special problem about the verification or analysis of subjunctive conditionals. it exhausts the peculiar philosophical interest of these two classes of statement to explain why no philosopher ought to think them peculiarly interesting, and to explain why so many do. the author states that it should not be supposed that if he achieves his aim, all the difficulties (...)
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  11. John Bacon (1971). The Subjunctive Conditional as Relevant Implication. Philosophia 1 (1-2):61-80.
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  12. S. Barker (1999). Counterfactuals, Probabilistic Counterfactuals and Causation. Mind 108 (431):427-469.
    It seems to be generally accepted that (a) counterfactual conditionals are to be analysed in terms of possible worlds and inter-world relations of similarity and (b) causation is conceptually prior to counterfactuals. I argue here that both (a) and (b) are false. The argument against (a) is not a general metaphysical or epistemological one but simply that, structurally speaking, possible worlds theories are wrong: this is revealed when we try to extend them to cover the case of probabilistic counterfactuals. Indeed (...)
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  13. Stephen Barker (2011). Can Counterfactuals Really Be About Possible Worlds? Noûs 45 (3):557-576.
    The standard view about counterfactuals is that a counterfactual (A > C) is true if and only if the A-worlds most similar to the actual world @ are C-worlds. I argue that the worlds conception of counterfactuals is wrong. I assume that counterfactuals have non-trivial truth-values under physical determinism. I show that the possible-worlds approach cannot explain many embeddings of the form (P > (Q > R)), which intuitively are perfectly assertable, and which must be true if the contingent falsity (...)
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  14. Stephen Barker (1991). Even, Still and Counterfactuals. Linguistics and Philosophy 14 (1):1 - 38.
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  15. David Barnett (2012). Counterfactual Entailment. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (1pt1):73-97.
    Counterfactual Entailment is the view that a counterfactual conditional is true just in case its antecedent entails its consequent. I present an argument for Counterfactual Entailment, and I develop a strategy for explaining away apparent counterexamples to the view. The strategy appeals to the suppositional view of counterfactuals, on which a counterfactual is essentially a statement, made relative to the supposition of its antecedent, of its consequent.
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  16. David Barnett (2010). Zif Would Have Been If: A Suppositional View of Counterfactuals. Noûs 44 (2):269-304.
    Let us call a statement of the form ‘If A was, is, or will be the case, then C was, is, or will be the case’ an indicative conditional. And let us call a statement of the form ‘If A had been, were, or were to be the case, then C would have been, would be, or would come to be the case’ a subjunctive, or counterfactual, conditional.
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  17. David Barnett (2009). The Myth of the Categorical Counterfactual. Philosophical Studies 144 (2):281 - 296.
    I aim to show that standard theories of counterfactuals are mistaken, not in detail, but in principle, and I aim to say what form a tenable theory must take. Standard theories entail a categorical interpretation of counterfactuals, on which to state that, if it were that A, it would be that C is to state something, not relative to any supposition or hypothesis, but categorically. On the rival suppositional interpretation, to state that, if it were that A, it would be (...)
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  18. Elizabeth Lane Beardsley (1949). "Non-Accidental" and Counterfactual Sentences. Journal of Philosophy 46 (18):573-591.
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  19. Jonathan Bennett (1984). Counterfactuals and Temporal Direction. Philosophical Review 93 (1):57-91.
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  20. Jonathan Bennett (1974). Counterfactuals And Possible Worlds. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (December):381-402.
  21. Tomasz Bigaj (2013). How to Evaluate Counterfactuals in the Quantum World. Synthese 190 (4):619-637.
    In the article I discuss possible amendments and corrections to Lewis’s semantics for counterfactuals that are necessary in order to account for the indeterministic and non-local character of the quantum world. I argue that Lewis’s criteria of similarity between possible worlds produce incorrect valuations for alternate-outcome counterfactuals in the EPR case. Later I discuss an alternative semantics which rejects the notion of miraculous events and relies entirely on the comparison of the agreement with respect to individual facts. However, a controversy (...)
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  22. John Bigelow (1980). Subjunctive Reasoning. Linguistics and Philosophy 4 (1):129-139.
    Subjunctives have always posed a severe threat to truth-conditional semantics and the correspondence theory of truth. If we are ever forced to fall into some sort of coherence theory of truth, then the problem of subjunctives is very likely to be the first thing which makes this plain. It is instructive to work through the details of Pollock's very thorough working-out of a kind of coherence theory for subjunctives.I find Pollock's book a kind of cautionary tale for coherence theorists. The (...)
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  23. Maria Bittner, Conditionals as Attitude Reports.
    Most theories of conditionals and attitudes do not analyze either phenomenon in terms of the other. A few view attitude reports as a species of conditionals (e.g. Stalnaker 1984, Heim 1992). Based on evidence from Kalaallisut, this paper argues for the opposite thesis: conditionals are a species of attitude reports. The argument builds on prior findings that conditionals are modal topic-comment structures (e.g. Haiman 1978, Bittner 2001), and that in mood-based Kalaallisut English future (e.g. Ole will win) translates into a (...)
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  24. N. A. Blue (1981). A Metalinguistic Interpretation of Counterfactual Conditionals. Journal of Philosophical Logic 10 (2):179 - 200.
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  25. Luc Bovens (1998). Sequential Counterfactuals, Cotenability and Temporal Becoming. Philosophical Studies 90 (1):79-101.
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  26. Rachael Briggs (2012). Interventionist Counterfactuals. Philosophical Studies 160 (1):139-166.
    A number of recent authors (Galles and Pearl, Found Sci 3 (1):151–182, 1998; Hiddleston, Noûs 39 (4):232–257, 2005; Halpern, J Artif Intell Res 12:317–337, 2000) advocate a causal modeling semantics for counterfactuals. But the precise logical significance of the causal modeling semantics remains murky. Particularly important, yet particularly under-explored, is its relationship to the similarity-based semantics for counterfactuals developed by Lewis (Counterfactuals. Harvard University Press, 1973b). The causal modeling semantics is both an account of the truth conditions of counterfactuals, and (...)
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  27. Robert Brown & John Watling (1952). Counterfactual Conditionals. Mind 61 (242):222-233.
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  28. Martin Bunzl (1980). Causal Preemption and Counterfactuals. Philosophical Studies 37 (2):115 - 124.
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  29. John W. Carroll (2005). Boundary in Context. Acta Analytica 20 (1):43-54.
    A contextualist account of modal assertions is sketched that makes their truth sensitive to the presuppositions of the conversation. Support for the account is mustered by considering its application to the context-sensitivity of assertions of subjunctive conditional sentences, explanation sentences, and knowledge sentences.
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  30. Patrizia Catellani & Patrizia Milesi (2005). When the Social Context Frames the Case: Counterfactuals in the Courtroom. In David R. Mandel, Denis J. Hilton & Patrizia Catellani (eds.), The Psychology of Counterfactual Thinking. Routledge.
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  31. David J. Chalmers, The Tyranny of the Subjunctive.
    (1a) If Prince Albert Victor killed those people, he is Jack the Ripper (and Jack the Ripper killed those people). (1b) If Prince Albert Victor had killed those people, Jack the Ripper wouldn't have (and Prince Albert wouldn't have been Jack the Ripper).
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  32. Roderick M. Chisholm (1946). The Contrary-to-Fact Conditional. Mind 55 (220):289-307.
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  33. Jon Cogburn & Jeffrey W. Roland (2013). Safety and the True–True Problem. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2):246-267.
    Standard accounts of semantics for counterfactuals confront the true–true problem: when the antecedent and consequent of a counterfactual are both actually true, the counterfactual is automatically true. This problem presents a challenge to safety-based accounts of knowledge. In this paper, drawing on work by Angelika Kratzer, Alan Penczek, and Duncan Pritchard, we propose a revised understanding of semantics for counterfactuals utilizing machinery from generalized quantifier theory which enables safety theorists to meet the challenge of the true–true problem.
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  34. Jonathan Cohen (1954). A Relation of Counterfactual Conditionals to Statements of What Makes Sense. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 55:45 - 82.
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  35. Stuart Cornwell (1992). Counterfactuals and the Applications of Mathematics. Philosophical Studies 66 (1):73 - 87.
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  36. Richard Creath (1989). Counterfactuals for Free. Philosophical Studies 57 (1):95 - 101.
    Quine does not like counterfactuals. He thinks them unclear, and so he eschews them. It is enough, he thinks, for science to say of what it is that it is and that it is all that is. There is no need to say of what is not that it is not, or even worse, to say of what is not what it would be if ...
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  37. Charles B. Cross (2011). Comparative World Similarity and What is Held Fixed in Counterfactuals. Analysis 71 (1):91-96.
    Berit Brogaard and Joe Salerno (Counterfactuals and Context, ANALYSIS 68 (2008): 39-46) argue that the standard Stalnaker-Lewis counterexamples to hypothetical syllogism, strengthening the antecedent, and contraposition trade on a failure to hold fixed the context in which truth values are determined for the premises and conclusion in each counterexample. I argue that no contextual fallacy is committed in the standard counterexamples, and I offer a different view of what it is for a fact to be held fixed by a counterfactual (...)
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  38. J. C. D'Alessio (1967). On Subjunctive Conditionals. Journal of Philosophy 64 (10):306-310.
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  39. Charles B. Daniels & James B. Freeman (1980). An Analysis of the Subjunctive Conditional. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 21 (4):639-655.
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  40. Cora Diamond (1959). Mr. Goodman on Relevant Conditions and the Counterfactual. Philosophical Studies 10 (3):42 - 45.
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  41. B. J. Diggs (1952). Counterfactual Conditionals. Mind 61 (244):513-527.
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  42. Vladan Djordjevic (2013). Similarity and Cotenability. Synthese 190 (4):681-691.
    In this paper I present some difficulties for Lewis’s and similar theories of counterfactuals, and suggest that the problem lies in the notion of absolute similarity. In order to explain the problem, I discuss the relation between Lewis’s and Goodman’s theory, and show that the two theories are not related in the way Lewis thought they were.
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  43. Vladan Djordjevic (2012). Goodman's Only World. In Majda Trobok, Nenad Miscevic & Berislav Zarnic (eds.), Between Logic and Reality: Modeling Inference, Action and Understanding. Springer. 269.
    An incorrect interpretation of Goodman’s theory of counterfactuals is persistently being offered in the literature. I find that strange. Even more so since the incorrectness is rather obvious. In this paper I try to figure out why is that happening. First I try to explain what Goodman did say, which of his claims are ignored, and what he did not say but is sometimes ascribed to him. I emphasize one of the bad features of the interpretation: it gives counterfactuals some (...)
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  44. Dylan Dodd (2012). Counterfactuals and Chance: Reply to Williams. Analytic Philosophy 53 (4):362-365.
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  45. Daniel Dohrn, DeRose on the Conditionals of Deliberation.
    I take issue with two claims of DeRose: Conditionals of deliberation must not depend on backtracking grounds. ‘Were’ed-up conditionals coincide with future-directed indicative conditionals; the only difference in their meaning is that they must not depend on backtracking grounds. I use Egan’s counterexamples to causal decision theory to contest the first and an example of backtracking reasoning by David Lewis to contest the second claim. I tentatively outline a rivaling account of ‘were’ed-up conditionals which combines features of the standard analysis (...)
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  46. Daniel Dohrn, What Zif.
    In a series of articles, David Barnett (2006, 2009, 2010) has developed a general theory of conditionals. The grand aim is to reconcile the two main rivals: a suppositional and a truth-conditional view (Barnett 2006, 521). While I confine my critical discussion to counterfactuals, I will give some hints how they might spell trouble for his suppositional view in general.
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  47. Cian Dorr, Against Counterfactual Miracles.
    This paper considers how counterfactuals should be evaluated on the assumption that determinism is true. I argue against Lewis's influential view that then the actual laws of nature would have been false if something had happened that never actually happened, and in favour of the competing view that history would have been different all the way back. I argue that we can do adequate justice to our ordinary practice of relying on a wide range of historical truths in evaluating counterfactuals (...)
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  48. P. B. Downing (1958). Subjunctive Conditionals, Time Order, and Causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59:125 - 140.
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  49. Antony Eagle, 'Might' Counterfactuals.
    A ‘might’ counterfactual is a sentence of the form ‘If it had been the case that A, it might have been the case that C’. Recently, John Hawthorne has argued that the truth of many ‘might’ counterfactuals precludes the truth of most ‘would’ counterfactuals. I examine the semantics of ‘might’ counterfactuals, with one eye towards defusing this argument, but mostly with the aim of understanding this interesting class of sentences better.
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  50. Dorothy Edgington (2008). Counterfactuals. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1part1):1-21.
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