In Proceedings First Joint Conference of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology and the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Barcelona, Spain (2004)
|Abstract||The purpose of the paper is twofold. I first outline a philosophical theory of concepts based on conceptual role semantics. This approach is explicitly intended as a framework for the study and explanation of conceptual change in science. Then I point to the close similarities between this philosophical framework and the theory theory of concepts, suggesting that a convergence between psychological and philosophical approaches to concepts is possible. An underlying theme is to stress that using a non-atomist account of concepts is crucial for the successful study of conceptual development and change|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Paul Thagard (1990). The Conceptual Structure of the Chemical Revolution. Philosophy of Science 57 (2):183-209.
Harold I. Brown (1986). Sellars, Concepts, and Conceptual Change. Synthese 68 (August):275-307.
Paul R. Thagard (1990). Concepts and Conceptual Change. Synthese 82 (2):255-74.
Peter Gärdenfors & Frank Zenker (2013). Theory Change as Dimensional Change: Conceptual Spaces Applied to the Dynamics of Empirical Theories. Synthese 190 (6):1039-1058.
Ralph Wedgwood (2001). Conceptual Role Semantics for Moral Terms. Philosophical Review 110 (1):1-30.
Ingo Brigandt, An Alternative to Kitcher's Theory of Conceptual Progress and His Account of the Change of the Gene Concept.
Ingo Brigandt (2006). A Theory of Conceptual Advance: Explaining Conceptual Change in Evolutionary, Molecular, and Evolutionary Developmental Biology. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads78 ( #10,150 of 549,090 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,317 of 549,090 )
How can I increase my downloads?