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  1. Ken Akiba (2000). Logic and Truth. Journal of Philosophical Research 25:101-123.
    It is usually held that what distinguishes a good inference from a bad one is that a good inference is truth-preserving. Against this view, this paper argues that a logical inference is good or bad depending not on whether it is truth-preserving or not, but whether it belongs to a logical system the addition of which makes a deductively conservative extension of the derivation relations among the atomic statements. To so argue, the paper first contends that the meaning of the (...)
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  2. Edgar Andrade-Lotero & Catarina Dutilh Novaes (2012). A Contentious Trinity: Levels of Entailment in Brandom's Pragmatist Inferentialism. Philosophia 40 (1):41-53.
    We investigate the relations among Brandom’s three dimensions of semantic inferential articulation, namely, incompatibility entailments, committive consequences, and permissive consequences. In his unpublished manuscript “Conceptual Content and Discursive Practice” Brandom argues that (1) incompatibility entailment implies committive consequence, and that (2) committive consequence in turn implies permissive consequence. We criticize this hierarchy both on internal and external grounds. Firstly, we prove that, using Brandom’s own definitions, the reverse of (1) also holds, and that the reverse of (2) may hold (but (...)
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  3. Edgar Andrade-Lotero & Catarina Dutilh Novaes (2012). A Contentious Trinity: Levels of Entailment in Brandom's Pragmatist Inferentialism. Philosophia 40 (1):41-53.
    We investigate the relations among Brandom’s three dimensions of semantic inferential articulation, namely, incompatibility entailments, committive consequences, and permissive consequences. In his unpublished manuscript “Conceptual Content and Discursive Practice” Brandom argues that (1) incompatibility entailment implies committive consequence, and that (2) committive consequence in turn implies permissive consequence. We criticize this hierarchy both on internal and external grounds. Firstly, we prove that, using Brandom’s own definitions, the reverse of (1) also holds, and that the reverse of (2) may hold (but (...)
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  4. Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge (2012). Sellars and Pretense on "Truth & 'Correspondence'" (with a Detour Through Meaning Attribution). Discusiones Filosóficas 13 (21):33-63.
    In this paper, we show how an internal tension in Wilfrid Sellars’s understanding of truth, as well as an external tension in his account of meaning attribution, can be resolved while adhering to a Sellarsian spirit, by appealing to the particular fictionalist accounts of truth-talk and proposition-talk (including meaning-attribution) that we have developed elsewhere.
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  5. Christian Barth & Holger Sturm (eds.) (2012). Brandoms Expressive Vernunft. Historische und Systematische Untersuchungen. Mentis.
  6. Arvid Båve (2013). Compositional Semantics for Expressivists. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253):633-659.
    I here propose a hitherto unnoticed possibility of solving embedding problems for noncognitivist expressivists in metaethics by appeal to Conceptual Role Semantics. I show that claims from the latter as to what constitutes various concepts can be used to define functions from states expressed by atomic sentences to states expressed by complex sentences, thereby allowing an expressivist semantics that satisfies a rather strict compositionality constraint (as well as a further, substantial explanatory constraint). The proposal can be coupled with several different (...)
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  7. Nuel Belnap (1962). Tonk, Plonk and Plink. Analysis 22 (6):130-134.
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  8. Jonathan Berg (1993). Inferential Roles, Quine, and Mad Holism. In Holism: A Consumer Update. Amsterdam: Rodopi. 283-301.
    Jerry Fodor and Ernie LePore argue against inferential role semantics on the grounds that either it relies on an analytic/synthetic distinction vulnerable to Quinean objections, or else it leads to a variety of meaning holism frought with absurd consequences. However, the slide from semantic atomism to meaning holism might be prevented by distinctions not affected by Quine's arguments against analyticity; and the absurd consequences Fodor and LePore attribute to meaning holism obtain only on an implausible construal of inferential roles.
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  9. Ned Block (1998). Conceptual Role Semantics. In Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge. 242-256.
    According to Conceptual Role Semantics ("CRS"), the meaning of a representation is the role of that representation in the cognitive life of the agent, e.g. in perception, thought and decision-making. It is an extension of the well known "use" theory of meaning, according to which the meaning of a word is its use in communication and more generally, in social interaction. CRS supplements external use by including the role of a symbol inside a computer or a brain. The uses appealed (...)
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  10. Ned Block (1997). Semantics, Conceptual Role. In [Book Chapter] (Unpublished). Routledge. 242--256.
    According to Conceptual Role Semantics ("CRS"), the meaning of a representation is the role of that representation in the cognitive life of the agent, e.g. in perception, thought and decision-making. It is an extension of the well known "use" theory of meaning, according to which the meaning of a word is its use in communication and more generally, in social interaction. CRS supplements external use by including the role of a symbol inside a computer or a brain. The uses appealed (...)
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  11. Ned Block (1993). Holism, Hyper-Analyticity and Hyper-Compositionality. Mind and Language 8 (1):1-26.
  12. Ned Block (1988). Functional Role and Truth Conditions. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61:157-181.
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  13. Ned Block (1986). Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):615-78.
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  14. Paul Boghossian (2003). Blind Reasoning. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):225–248.
    The paper asks under what conditions deductive reasoning transmits justification from its premises to its conclusion. It argues that both standard externalist and standard internalist accounts of this phenomenon fail. The nature of this failure is taken to indicate the way forward: basic forms of deductive reasoning must justify by being instances of ‘blind but blameless’ reasoning. Finally, the paper explores the suggestion that an inferentialist account of the logical constants can help explain how such reasoning is possible.
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  15. Paul Boghossian (2001). How Are Objective Epistemic Reasons Possible? Philosophical Studies 106 (1-2):340-380.
    in Philosophical Studies, Dec 2001, pp. 340-380.
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  16. Paul A. Boghossian (1994). Inferential-Role Semantics and the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction. Philosophical Studies 73 (2-3):109-122.
    This is a critical discussion of Jerry Fodor and Ernie Lepore's "Holism". The paper questions the existence of a slippery slope from some inferential liaisons are constitutive of meaning' to all inferential liaisons are constitutive of meaning'. "Interalia", it defends the existence of an analytic/synthetic distinction.
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  17. Paul A. Boghossian (1993). Does an Inferential Role Semantics Rest Upon a Mistake? Mind and Language 8 (1):27-40.
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  18. Jesús Zamora Bonilla (2005). Science as a Persuasion Game: An Inferentialist Approach. Episteme 2 (3):189-201.
    Scientific research is reconstructed as a language game along the lines of Robert Brandom's inferentialism. Researchers are assumed to aim at persuading their colleagues of the validity of some claims. The assertions each scientist is allowed or committed to make depend on her previous claims and on the inferential norms of her research community. A classification of the most relevant types of inferential rules governing such a game is offered, and some ways in which this inferentialist approach can be used (...)
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  19. Robert Brandom (2011). Perspectives on Pragmatism: Classical, Recent, and Contemporary. Harvard University Press.
    Classical American pragmatism: the pragmatist -- Enlightenment-and its problematic semantics -- Analyzing pragmatism: pragmatics and pragmatisms -- A Kantian rationalist pragmatism: pragmatism -- Inferentialism, and modality in Sellars's arguments against -- Empiricism -- Linguistic pragmatism and pragmatism about norms: an arc of -- Thought from Rorty's eliminative materialism to his pragmatism -- Vocabularies of pragmatism: synthesizing naturalism and -- Historicism -- Towards an analytic pragmatism: meaning-use analysis -- Pragmatism, expressivism, and anti-representationalism: -- Local and global possibilities.
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  20. Robert Brandom (2007). Inferentialism and Some of its Challenges. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (3):651-676.
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  21. Robert Brandom (2000). Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism. Harvard University Press.
    This new work provides an approachable introduction to the complex system that Making It Explicit mapped out.
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  22. Robert B. Brandom (2009). Pragmatism, Inferentialism, and Modality in Sellars's Arguments Against Empiricism. In Willem A. DeVries (ed.), Empiricism, Perceptual Knowledge, Normativity, and Realism: Essays on Wilfrid Sellars. Oxford University Press.
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  23. Robert B. Brandom (1994). Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment. Harvard University Press.
    What would something unlike us--a chimpanzee, say, or a computer--have to be able to do to qualify as a possible knower, like us? To answer this question at the very heart of our sense of ourselves, philosophers have long focused on intentionality and have looked to language as a key to this condition. Making It Explicit is an investigation into the nature of language--the social practices that distinguish us as rational, logical creatures--that revises the very terms of this inquiry. Where (...)
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  24. Robert B. Brandom (1994). Reasoning and Representing. In M. Michael & John O'Leary-Hawthorne (eds.), Philosophy in Mind: The Place of Philosophy in the Study of Mind. Kluwer. 129-160.
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  25. Robert B. Brandom (1993). The Social Anatomy of Inference. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):661-666.
  26. Ingo Brigandt (2004). Conceptual Role Semantics, the Theory Theory, and Conceptual Change. In Proceedings First Joint Conference of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology and the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Barcelona, Spain.
    The purpose of the paper is twofold. I first outline a philosophical theory of concepts based on conceptual role semantics. This approach is explicitly intended as a framework for the study and explanation of conceptual change in science. Then I point to the close similarities between this philosophical framework and the theory theory of concepts, suggesting that a convergence between psychological and philosophical approaches to concepts is possible. An underlying theme is to stress that using a non-atomist account of concepts (...)
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  27. Robert Briscoe (2007). Communication and Rational Responsiveness to the World. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2):135-159.
    Donald Davidson has long maintained that in order to be credited with the concept of objectivity – and, so, with language and thought – it is necessary to communicate with at least one other speaker. I here examine Davidson’s central argument for this thesis and argue that it is unsuccessful. Subsequently, I turn to Robert Brandom’s defense of the thesis in Making It Explicit. I argue that, contrary to Brandom, in order to possess the concept of objectivity it is not (...)
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  28. H. G. Callaway (2008). Meaning Without Analyticity: Essays on Logic, Language and Meaning. Cambridge Scholars.
    Meaning without Analyticity draws upon the author’s essays and articles, over a period of 20 years, focused on language, logic and meaning. The book explores the prospect of a non-behavioristic theory of cognitive meaning which rejects the analytic-synthetic distinction, Quinean behaviorism, and the logical and social-intellectual excesses of extreme holism. Cast in clear, perspicuous language and oriented to scientific discussions, this book takes up the challenges of philosophical communication and evaluation implicit in the recent revival of the pragmatist tradition—especially those (...)
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  29. H. G. Callaway (1995). Intentionality Naturalized: Continuity, Reconstruction, and Instrumentalism. Dialectica 49 (2-4):147-68.
    This paper explicates and defends a social-naturalist conception of internationality and intentions, where internationality of scientific expressions is fundamental. Meanings of expressions are a function of their place in language-systems and of the relations of systems to object-level evidence and associated community activities-including deliberation and experiment. Naturalizing internationality requires social-intellectual reconstruction exemplified by the scientific community at its best. This approach emphasizes normative elements of pragmatic conceptions of meaning and their function in orientation. It requires social conditions and intellectual practices (...)
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  30. H. G. Callaway (1990). Review of Fodor, Psychosemantics. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 33 (2):251-59..
    This is my expository and critical review of Jerry Fodor's Psychosemantics. See also Callaway 1992, Meaning Holism and Semantic Realism.
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  31. Damiano Canale & Giovanni Tuzet (2007). On Legal Inferentialism. Toward a Pragmatics of Semantic Content in Legal Interpretation? Ratio Juris 20 (1):32-44.
    In this paper we consider whether a pragmatics of semantic content can be a useful approach to legal interpretation. More broadly speaking, since a pragmatic conception of meaning is a component of inferential semantics, we consider whether an inferentialist approach to legal interpretation can be useful in dealing with some problems of this important aspect of law. In other words, we ask whether Legal Inferentialism is a suitable conception for legal interpretation. In Section 1 we briefly consider the semantics/pragmatics debate (...)
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  32. William Child (2001). Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism. Robert B. Brandom. Mind 110 (439):721-725.
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  33. Timothy Childers & Ondrej Majer (eds.) (2003). Logica Yearbook 2002. Filosofia.
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  34. Dongho Choi (2008). Inferentialism, compositionality and the thickness of meaning. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 39:335-344.
    The aim of this paper is to introduce Robert Brandom’s Inferentialism (Inferential theory of meaning) and Fodor and Lepore’ compositionality objection, and to protect Inferentialism from the objection based on compositionality. According to Inferentialism, To grasp or understand a concept is to have practical mastery over the inferences in which it is involved. However, Fodor and Lepore oppose Inferentialism by offering the compositionality objection. They argue that compositionality is needed to explain productivity, systematicity and learnability of language, meaning is compositional. (...)
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  35. Matthew Chrisman (2010). Expressivism, Inferentialism, and the Theory of Meaning. In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    One’s account of the meaning of ethical sentences should fit – roughly, as part to whole – with one’s account of the meaning of sentences in general. When we ask, though, where one widely discussed account of the meaning of ethical sentences fits with more general accounts of meaning, the answer is frustratingly unclear. The account I have in mind is the sort of metaethical expressivism inspired by Ayer, Stevenson, and Hare, and defended and worked out in more detail recently (...)
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  36. Matthew Chrisman (2008). Expressivism, Inferentialism, and Saving the Debate. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):334 - 358.
    Theoretical reasoning aims to expand our knowledge of how the world is. Practical reasoning aims to expand our knowledge of how to behave in the world as we know it to be. Although this distinction between theoretical and practical reasoning is notoriously central to normative ethical theorizing, its significance has, I think, been underappreciated and misconstrued in the metaethical debate about realism. I suspect that this is the result of two aspects of that debate: (a) the realism debate has been (...)
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  37. Jon Cogburn (2004). Tonking a Theory of Content: An Inferentialist Rejoinder. Logic and Logical Philosophy 13:31-55.
    If correct, Christopher Peacocke’s [20] “manifestationism without verificationism,” would explode the dichotomy between realism and inferentialism in the contemporary philosophy of language. I first explicate Peacocke’s theory, defending it from a criticism of Neil Tennant’s. This involves devising a recursive definition for grasp of logical contents along the lines Peacocke suggests. Unfortunately though, the generalized account reveals the Achilles’ heel of the whole theory. By inventing a new logical operator with the introduction rule for the existential quantifier and the elimination (...)
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  38. Jon Cogburn & Jason Megill (2010). Are Turing Machines Platonists? Inferentialism and the Computational Theory of Mind. Minds and Machines 20 (3):423-439.
    We first discuss Michael Dummett’s philosophy of mathematics and Robert Brandom’s philosophy of language to demonstrate that inferentialism entails the falsity of Church’s Thesis and, as a consequence, the Computational Theory of Mind. This amounts to an entirely novel critique of mechanism in the philosophy of mind, one we show to have tremendous advantages over the traditional Lucas-Penrose argument.
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  39. James Henry Collin (2013). Semantic Inferentialism and the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. Philosophy Compass 8 (9):846-856.
    Alvin Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism makes the case that the conjunction of evolutionary theory and naturalism cannot be rationally believed, as, if both evolutionary theory and naturalism were true, it would be highly unlikely that our cognitive faculties are reliable. I present Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism and survey a theory of meaning espoused by Robert Brandom, known as semantic inferentialism. I argue that if one accepts semantic inferentialism, as it is developed by Brandom, then Plantinga's motivation for the (...)
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  40. Cesare Cozzo (2008). On the Copernican Turn in Semantics. Theoria 74 (4):295-317.
    Alberto Coffa used the phrase "the Copernican turn in semantics" to denote a revolutionary transformation of philosophical views about the connection between the meanings of words and the acceptability of sentences and arguments containing those words. According to the new conception resulting from the Copernican turn, here called "the Copernican view", rules of use are constitutive of the meanings of words. This view has been linked with two doctrines: (A) the instances of meaning-constitutive rules are analytically and a priori true (...)
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  41. Edward Craig (ed.) (1997). [Book Chapter] (Unpublished). Routledge.
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  42. Robert C. Cummins (1992). Conceptual Role Semantics and the Explanatory Role of Content. Philosophical Studies 65 (1-2):103-127.
    I've tried to argue that there is more to representational content than CRS can acknowledge. CRS is attractive, I think, because of its rejection of atomism, and because it is a plausible theory of targets. But those are philosopher's concerns. Someone interested in building a person needs to understand representation, because, as AI researchers have urged for some time, good representation is the secret of good performance. I have just gestured in the direction I think a viable theory of representation (...)
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  43. Michael Devitt (1993). Localism and Analyticity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):641-646.
    In their discussion of semantic holism, Fodor and Lepore claim that Quine showed that any inferential properties constituting a meaning cannot be distinguished on epistemic grounds like apriority. But they often write as if Quine showed that such properties cannot be distinguished at all. The paper argues that Quine did not show the latter. It goes on to propose a criterion for distinguishing the constitutive properties: they are the ones that determine reference. Fodor is not in a position to reject (...)
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  44. Fabian Dorsch (2013). Non‐Inferentialism About Justification – The Case of Aesthetic Judgements. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253):660-682.
    In this article, I present two objections against the view that aesthetic judgements – that is, judgemental ascriptions of aesthetic qualities like elegance or harmony – are justified non-inferentially. The first is that this view cannot make sense of our practice to support our aesthetic judgements by reference to lower-level features of the objects concerned. The second objection maintains that non-inferentialism about the justification of aesthetic judgements cannot explain why our aesthetic interest in artworks and other objects is limited to (...)
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  45. Janice Dowell, J. L. (2006). Making It Totally Explicit. Philosophical Papers 35 (2):137-170.
    This paper begins by isolating the reductive component of Brandom's inferentialism. In order to assess to what extent that reductive component is supported by the considerations Brandom marshals in its defense, I assess the comparative degree of support those considerations provide a non-reductive counterpart of Brandom's original, reductive theory. One of the central claims here is that once the reductive and non-reductive theories are placed side-by-side, it is clear that, save one, all of the considerations Brandom marshals in defense of (...)
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  46. Michael A. E. Dummett (1991). The Logical Basis of Metaphysics. Harvard University Press.
    Such a conception, says Dummett, will form "a base camp for an assault on the metaphysical peaks: I have no greater ambition in this book than to set up a base ...
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  47. Michael Esfeld, Inferentialism and the Normativity Trilemma.
    It is common to base an inferential semantics on a social, normative pragmatics, thus conceiving meaning as consisting in certain normative relations (Wittgenstein, Sellars, Brandom). This position faces a trilemma, which is of wider application, concerning all normative statements: (1) Normative statements are true or false. Regarding a certain normative statement as true does not imply that it is true, not even if a whole community takes the statement in question to be true (cognitivism). (2) There are no normative entities (...)
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  48. Hartry Field (1978). Mental Representation. Erkenntnis 13 (July):9-61.
  49. Hartry Field (1977). Logic, Meaning, and Conceptual Role. Journal of Philosophy 74 (July):379-409.
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  50. J. A. Fodor & E. LePore (1993). Why Meaning (Probably) Isn't Conceptual Role. Philosophical Issues 3 (4):15-35.
    It's an achievement of the last couple of decades that people who work in linguistic semantics and people who work in the philosophy of language have arrived at a friendly, de facto agreement as to their respective job descriptions. The terms of this agreement are that the semanticists do the work and the philosophers do the worrying. The semanticists try to construct actual theories of meaning (or truth theories, or model theories, or whatever) for one or another kind of expression (...)
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