Graduate studies at Western
Episteme: Journal of Social Epistemology 2 (2):43-48 (2005)
|Abstract||Most epistemologists of testimony assume that testifying requires that the beliefs to which speakers attest are identical to the beliefs that hearers accept. I argue that this characterization of testimony is misleading. Characterizing testimony in terms of duplicating speaker/hearer belief unduly resticts the variety of beliefs that might be accepted from speaker testimony|
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