Re-Thinking the Duplication of Speaker/Hearer Belief in the Epistemology of Testimony

Abstract
Most epistemologists of testimony assume that testifying requires that the beliefs to which speakers attest are identical to the beliefs that hearers accept. I argue that this characterization of testimony is misleading. Characterizing testimony in terms of duplicating speaker/hearer belief unduly resticts the variety of beliefs that might be accepted from speaker testimony
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References found in this work BETA
Elizabeth Fricker (1994). Against Gullibility. In A. Chakrabarti & B. K. Matilal (eds.), Knowing from Words. Kluwer.

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