Re-Thinking the Duplication of Speaker/Hearer Belief in the Epistemology of Testimony

Episteme: Journal of Social Epistemology 2 (2):43-48 (2005)
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Abstract

Most epistemologists of testimony assume that testifying requires that the beliefs to which speakers attest are identical to the beliefs that hearers accept. I argue that this characterization of testimony is misleading. Characterizing testimony in terms of duplicating speaker/hearer belief unduly resticts the variety of beliefs that might be accepted from speaker testimony

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Joel Buenting
University of Alberta

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References found in this work

Studies in the way of words.Herbert Paul Grice - 1989 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Against Gullibility.Elizabeth Fricker - 1994 - In A. Chakrabarti & B. K. Matilal (eds.), Knowing from Words. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Critical Notice.Elizabeth Fricker - 1995 - Mind 104 (414):393 - 411.

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