Conceptual diversity in epistemology
| Abstract | Rational belief belongs to a cluster of normative concepts that also includes reasonable, justified, and warranted belief. Each of these notions is commonly used by epistemologists, and along with the notion of knowledge, they form a central part of the subject matter of epistemology. However, there is no generally agreed way of understanding these notions. Nor is there even agreement as to whether they are equivalent. Some epistemologists employ them interchangeably; other epistemologists choose to express their conclusions using only one of the above notions and avoid making use of the other notions; yet other epistemologists distinguish among two or more of the notions. | |||||||||
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