Metaphilosophy 34 (1/2):154-173 (2003)
|Abstract||The dual aim of this article is to reveal and explain a certain phenomenon of epistemic injustice as manifested in testimonial practice, and to arrive at a characterisation of the anti–prejudicial intellectual virtue that is such as to counteract it. This sort of injustice occurs when prejudice on the part of the hearer leads to the speaker receiving less credibility than he or she deserves. It is suggested that where this phenomenon is systematic it constitutes an important form of oppression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR].|
|Keywords||feminism politics epistemology|
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