The intentional and the intended

Erkenntnis 33 (2):191 - 209 (1990)
The paper defends the thesis that for S to V intentionally is for S to V as (in the way) S intended to. For the normal agent the relevant sort of intention is an intention that one's intention to V generate an instance of one's V-ing along some (usually dimly-conceived) productive path. Such an account allows us to say some actions are intentional to a greater or lesser extent (a desirable option for certain cases of wayward causal chains), preserves the intuitive link between intention and intentionally, and supports the common sense view that the concept of intending is more basic than those of acting with an intention and of acting intentionally. The remainder of the paper responds to certain apparent counter-examples offered by Audi, Harman, and Bratman. In the course of this, I discuss connections between intending to V and hoping to V, and I argue that one can intend to do what one doesn't expect to do, and that one always intends what one attempts.
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References found in this work BETA
Monroe C. Beardsley (1978). Intending. In A. I. Goldman & I. Kim (eds.), Values and Morals. Boston: D. Reidel. 163--184.
Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Donald Davidson (1985). Adverbs of Action. In Bruce Vermazen & Merrill B. Hintikka (eds.), Essays on Davidson: Actions and Events. Oxford University Press. 230--241.

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Citations of this work BETA
Ryan Wasserman (2011). Intentional Action and the Unintentional Fallacy. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4):524-534.
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