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  1. Jesús H. Aguilar, Agency and Control.
    The main objective of this thesis is to defend an account of the control that agents possess over their actions from the perspective of the causal theory of action, that is, a theory that sees actions as events caused by internal states of their agents. The explanatory strategy that is employed for this purpose consists in addressing three interdependent and fundamental problems concerning the possibility of this type of control. The first problem arises from the possibility of controlling an action (...)
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  2. Wroe Alderson (1951). A Systematics for Problems of Action. Philosophy of Science 18 (1):16-25.
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  3. James Alexander (2012). Three Rival Views of Tradition (Arendt, Oakeshott and MacIntyre). Journal of the Philosophy of History 6 (1):20-43.
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  4. Derek Allan (1988). André Malraux: The Commitment to Action in 'La Condition Humaine'. In Harold Bloom (ed.), André Malraux's Man's Fate. Chelsea House.
    Discusses the function of action in Malraux's third and most famous novel.
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  5. M. Alvarez (2012). Action, Ethics, and Responsibility * Edited by Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke and Harry S. Silverstein * Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action * Edited by Jesus H. Aguilar and Andrei A. Buckareff. [REVIEW] Analysis 72 (1):190-193.
  6. Maria Alvarez (2010). Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action. Oxford University Press.
    Understanding human beings and their distinctive rational and volitional capacities is one of the central tasks of philosophy. The task requires a clear account of such things as reasons, desires, emotions and motives, and of how they combine to produce and explain human behaviour. In Kinds of Reasons, Maria Alvarez offers a fresh and incisive treatment of these issues, focusing in particular on reasons as they feature in contexts of agency. Her account builds on some important recent work in the (...)
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  7. Maria Alvarez (2005). Agents, Actions and Reasons. Philosophical Books 46 (1):45-58.
  8. Holly Andersen (2013). The Representation of Time in Agency. In Adrian Bardon & Heather Dyke (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Philosophy of Time. Wiley-Blackwell.
    This paper outlines some key issues that arise when agency and temporality are considered jointly, from the perspective of psychology, cognitive neuroscience, phenomenology, and action theory. I address the difference between time simpliciter and time as represented as it figures in phenomena like intentional binding, goal-oriented action plans, emulation systems, and ‘temporal agency’. An examination of Husserl’s account of time consciousness highlights difficulties in generalizing his account to include a substantive notion of agency, a weakness inherited by explanatory projects like (...)
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  9. David M. Armstrong (1962). Bodily Sensations. Routledge.
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  10. Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder (1999). Praise, Blame and the Whole Self. Philosophical Studies 93 (2):161-188.
    What is that makes an act subject to either praise or blame? The question has often been taken to depend entirely on the free will debate for an answer, since it is widely agreed that an agent’s act is subject to praise or blame only if it was freely willed, but moral theory, action theory, and moral psychology are at least equally relevant to it. In the last quarter-century, following the lead of Harry Frankfurt’s (1971) seminal article “Freedom of the (...)
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  11. Robert Audi, Sandra Bartky, Donald Davidson, Dorothy Grover & Vivian Weil (1988). Irving Thalberg, Jr. 1930-1987. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 61 (5):853 - 854.
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  12. Bruce Aune (1990). Action, Inference, Belief, and Intention. Philosophical Perspectives 4:247-271.
  13. R. J. B. (1969). Readings in the Theory of Action. Review of Metaphysics 22 (4):773-773.
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  14. R. J. B. (1965). Reason, Action and Morality. Review of Metaphysics 19 (1):154-154.
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  15. Lynne Rudder Baker (2008). “Tätigsein Und Die Erste-Person-Perspektive” (Agency and the First-Person Perspective). In Bruno Niederbacher & Edmund Runggaldier (eds.), Was Sind Menschliche Personen? Onto Verlag.
    It is no news that you and I are agents as well as persons. Agency and personhood are surely connected, but it is not obvious just how they are connected. I believe that being a person and being an agent are intimately linked by what I call a ‘first-person perspective’: All persons and all agents have first-person perspectives. Even so, the connection between personhood and agency is not altogether straightforward. There are different kinds of agents, and there are different kinds (...)
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  16. Zvie A. Bar-On (1974). Causes and Reasons. Philosophia 4 (4):559-560.
  17. John A. Bargh (1994). The Four Horsemen of Automaticity: Awareness, Intention, Efficiency, and Control in Social Cognition. In R. Wyer & T. Srull (eds.), Handbook of Social Cognition. Lawrence Erlbaum.
  18. John A. Barker & Fred Adams (2012). Conclusive Reasons, Knowledge, and Action. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):35-52.
  19. S. Bassford (1974). Enigmas of Agency: Studies in the Philosophy of Human Action. By Irving Thalberg. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.; New York: Humanities Press Inc., 1972. Pp. 229. $14.75. [REVIEW] Dialogue 13 (03):619-621.
  20. Martin A. Bertman (1990). God and Man: Action and Reference in Hobbes. Hobbes Studies 3 (1):18-34.
  21. Robert Williams Binkley, Richard N. Bronaugh & Ausonio Marras (eds.) (1971). Agent, Action, and Reason. [Toronto]University of Toronto Press.
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  22. Stefan Bird-Pollan (2011). Some Normative Implications of Korsgaard's Theory of the Intersubjectivity of Reason. Metaphilosophy 42 (4):376-380.
    Abstract: This article argues that Christine Korsgaard's conception of self-constitution can be historicized by considering the impact of actual humans on our reflective activity. Because Korsgaard bases her argument on a philosophy of action rather than of intention (as Kant does), and our actions must always be concrete, the article argues that the principles for action which we develop in reflection are likewise responses to concrete human demands. It further interprets the types of demands humans make on each other as (...)
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  23. Vincent Blok (2013). The Power of Speech Acts: Reflections on a Performative Concept of Ethical Oaths in Economics and Business. Review of Social Economy 71 (2):187-208.
    Ethical oaths for bankers, economists and managers are increasingly seen as successful instruments to ensure more responsible behaviour. In this article, we reflect on the nature of ethical oaths. Based on John Austin's speech act theory and the work of Emmanuel Levinas, we introduce a performative concept of ethical oaths that is characterised by (1) the existential self-performative of the one I want to be, which is (2) demanded by the public context. Because ethical oaths are (3) structurally threatened by (...)
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  24. Tomislav Bracanović (2012). From Integrative Bioethics to Pseudoscience. Developing World Bioethics 12 (3):148-156.
    Integrative bioethics is a brand of bioethics conceived and propagated by a group of Croatian philosophers and other scholars. This article discusses and shows that the approach encounters several serious difficulties. In criticizing certain standard views on bioethics and in presenting their own, the advocates of integrative bioethics fall into various conceptual confusions and inconsistencies. Although presented as a project that promises to deal with moral dilemmas created by modern science and technology, integrative bioethics does not contain the slightest normativity (...)
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  25. Michael E. Bratman (2004). Three Forms of Agential Commitment: Reply to Cullity and Gerrans. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3):327–335.
  26. Michael E. Bratman (2001). Two Problems About Human Agency. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):309–326.
    I consider two inter-related problems in the philosophy of action. One concerns the role of the agent in the determination of action, and I call it the problem of agential authority. The other concerns the relation between motivating desire and the agent's normative deliberation, and I call it the problem of subjective normative authority. In part by way of discussion of work of Harry Frankfurt and Christine Korsgaard, I argue that we make progress with these problems by appeal to certain (...)
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  27. F. D. C. (1977). Action, Knowledge and Reality. Review of Metaphysics 31 (1):112-113.
  28. H. G. Callaway (1995). Review of Joas, Die Kreativitat des Handelns. Philosophical Quarterly 45 (179):247-249.
    This is my English-language review of Hans Joas, Die Kreativitat des Handelns.
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  29. Maria A. Carrasco (2012). Adam Smith: Self-Command, Practical Reason and Deontological Insights. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (2):391-414.
    In this paper, I argue that, in his Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith conflates two different meanings of ?self-command?, which is particularly puzzling because of the central role of this virtue in his theory. The first is the matrix of rational action, the one described in Part III of the TMS and learned in ?the great school of self-command?. The second is the particular moral virtue of self-command. Distinguishing between these two meanings allows us, on the one hand, to (...)
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  30. Gerard Casey (1987). A Problem of Unity in St. Thomas’s Account of Human Action. New Scholasticism 61 (2):146-161.
    In his many and varied writings, St Thomas presents us with both a sophisticated account of human action and a complicated moral theory. In this article, I shall be considering the question of whether St Thomas’s theory of action and his moral theory are mutually consistent. My claim shall be that St Thomas can preserve the ontological unity of human action—but only at the cost of rendering it extremely difficult to evaluate in a manner consistent with his moral theory, or, (...)
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  31. Vere Chappell (2005). Self-Determination. In Christia Mercer (ed.), Early Modern Philosophy: Mind, Matter, and Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. 127--41.
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  32. Roderick M. Chisholm (1983). Two Dimensions of Rational Action. Social Theory and Practice 9 (2/3):223-229.
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  33. Randolph Clarke (2012). Absence of Action. Philosophical Studies 158 (2):361-376.
    Often when one omits to do a certain thing, there's no action that is one's omission; one's omission, it seems, is an absence of any action of some type. This paper advances the view that an absence of an action--and, in general, any absence--is nothing at all: there is nothing that is an absence. Nevertheless, it can result from prior events that one omits to do a certain thing, and there can be results of the fact that one omits to (...)
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  34. Randolph Clarke (2010). Because She Wanted To. Journal of Ethics 14 (1):27--35.
    Carl Ginet has advanced an account of action explanation on which actions can be entirely uncaused and action explanations need not cite causal factors. Several objections have been raised against this view, and Ginet has recently defended the account. Here it is argued that Ginet’s defense fails to come to grips with the chief problems faced by his view.
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  35. Randolph Clarke (2010). Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action, by E. J. Lowe. Mind 119 (475):820-823.
  36. Randolph Clarke (1995). Recent Work on Freedom and Determinism. Philosophical Books 36 (1):9-18.
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  37. Randolph Clarke, Joshua Shepherd, John Stigall, Robyn Repko Waller & Chris Zarpentine (forthcoming). Causation, Norms, and Omissions: A Study of Causal Judgments. Philosophical Psychology:1-15.
    Many philosophical theories of causation are egalitarian, rejecting a distinction between causes and mere causal conditions. We sought to determine the extent to which people's causal judgments discriminate, selecting as causes counternormal events—those that violate norms of some kind—while rejecting non-violators. We found significant selectivity of this sort. Moreover, priming that encouraged more egalitarian judgments had little effect on subjects. We also found that omissions are as likely as actions to be judged as causes, and that counternormative selectivity appears to (...)
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  38. Richard Cobb-Stevens (1990). Mind in Action. Review of Metaphysics 44 (2):431-433.
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  39. Arthur B. Cody (1998). The Onslaught of Mental States. Inquiry 41 (1):89 – 97.
    The causal theory of action had suffered from inattention or linguistically motivated rejection until it was revived in 1963 by Donald Davidson. Since then the causal theory has had a continuing acceptance without having had an inspection of its assumptions. There are reasons to suspect that the theory is as unfounded as it is undoubted. Those reasons are reviewed here which have to do with the definitive moment when states such as beliefs and desires must change character to become causal (...)
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  40. Arthur B. Cody (1971). Is 'Human Action' A Category? Inquiry 14 (1-4):386-419.
    It seems to have been taken for granted that we all know what a human action is. However in attempting to draw from what philosophers have said about actions the necessary clues as to their distinguishing features, one finds little to discourage the idea that there is no way of distinguishing one category of occurrences, human actions, from the complex of different sorts of things which happen. From this I am tempted to conclude that there is no category of human (...)
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  41. John M. Connolly (1991). Whither Action Theory. Journal of Philosophical Research 16:85-106.
    The problem of ‘wayward causal chains’ threatens any causal analysis of the concept of intentional human action. For such chains show that the mere causation of an action by the right sort of belief and/or desire does not make the action intentional, i.e. one done in order to attain the object of desire. Now if the ‘because’ in ‘wayward’ action-explanations is straightforwardly causal, that might be argued to indicate by contrast that the different ‘because’ of reasons-explanations (which both explain and (...)
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  42. Maeve Cooke & Timo Jütten (2013). The Theory of Communicative Action After Three Decades. Constellations 20 (4):516-517.
    This is the introduction to a special section on Habermas' Theory of Communicative Action, published in Constellations 20:4 (2013), and edited by Maeve Cooke and me.
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  43. Ursula Coope (2012). Why Does Aristotle Think That Ethical Virtue is Required for Practical Wisdom? Phronesis 57 (2):142-163.
    Abstract In this paper, I ask why Aristotle thinks that ethical virtue (rather than mere self-control) is required for practical wisdom. I argue that a satisfactory answer will need to explain why being prone to bad appetites implies a failing of the rational part of the soul. I go on to claim that the self-controlled person does suffer from such a rational failing: a failure to take a specifically rational kind of pleasure in fine action. However, this still leaves a (...)
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  44. Richard P. Cooper, Nicolas Ruh & Denis Mareschal (2014). The Goal Circuit Model: A Hierarchical Multi‐Route Model of the Acquisition and Control of Routine Sequential Action in Humans. Cognitive Science 38 (2):244-274.
    Human control of action in routine situations involves a flexible interplay between (a) task-dependent serial ordering constraints; (b) top-down, or intentional, control processes; and (c) bottom-up, or environmentally triggered, affordances. In addition, the interaction between these influences is modulated by learning mechanisms that, over time, appear to reduce the need for top-down control processes while still allowing those processes to intervene at any point if necessary or if desired. We present a model of the acquisition and control of goal-directed action (...)
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  45. Ryan Cox (2012). Book Note: 'New Waves in Philosophy of Action', Edited by Jes's H. Aguilar, Andrei A. Buckareff, and Keith Frankish. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):411-411.
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 0, Issue 0, Page 1, Ahead of Print.
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  46. Charles B. Cross (1986). 'Can' and the Logic of Ability. Philosophical Studies 50 (1):53-64.
    A selection function based semantics is offered for the 'can' of ability based on the idea that 'John can run a four minute mile' is true iff John would do so under the right conditions, meaning that he would do so under at least one appropriately chosen test condition. Completeness is proved for an axiom system and semantics based on this idea, and the logic turns out to be interestingly different from any standard system of modal logic.
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  47. Jonathan Dancy (2009). Action, Content, and Inference. In P. M. S. Hacker, Hans-Johann Glock & John Hyman (eds.), Wittgenstein and Analytic Philosophy: Essays for P.M.S. Hacker. Oxford University Press.
  48. Willem de Vries (1985). Hegel's Philosophy of Action. The Owl of Minerva 16 (2):212-215.
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  49. David DeMoss (2003). Connectionist Agency. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 10 (2):9-15.
    Any mind-brain theory eventually will have to deal with agency. I do not claim that no other theory could do this successfully. I do claim that connectionism is able to handle some key features of agency. First, I will offer a brief account of connectionism and the advantages of using it to account for human agency, comparing and contrasting connectionism with two other mind-brain accounts in cognitive science, symbolicism and dynamicism. Then, since a connectionist account of agency depends on a (...)
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  50. Vincent Descombes (1986). The Socialization of Human Action. Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 11 (1):131-142.
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