David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):633-646 (2003)
The present paper analyzes the regularities referred to via the concept 'self.' This is important, for cognitive science traditionally models the self as a cognitive mediator between perceptual inputs and behavioral outputs. This leads to the assertion that the self causes action. Recent findings in social psychology indicate this is not the case and, as a consequence, certain cognitive scientists model the self as being epiphenomenal. In contrast, the present paper proposes an alternative approach (i.e., the event-control approach) that is based on recently discovered regularities between perception and action. Specifically, these regularities indicate that perception and action planning utilize common neural resources. This leads to a coupling of perception, planning, and action in which the first two constitute aspects of a single system (i.e., the distal-event system) that is able to pre-specify and detect distal events. This distal-event system is then coupled with action (i.e., effector-control systems) in a constraining, as opposed to 'causal' manner. This model has implications for how we conceptualize the manner in which one infers the intentions of another, anticipates the intentions of another, and possibly even experiences another. In conclusion, it is argued that it may be possible to map the concept 'self' onto the regularities referred to in the event-control model, not in order to reify 'the self' as a causal mechanism, but to demonstrate its status as a useful concept that refers to regularities that are part of the natural order
|Keywords||*Cognitive Processes *Intention *Self Perception Causal Analysis|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Zsuzsa Káldy & Ilona Kovács (2004). Is There an Independent Planning System? Suggestions From a Developmental Perspective. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1):41-42.
Marek McGann & Hanne De Jaegher (2009). Self–Other Contingencies: Enacting Social Perception. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):417-437.
James G. Phillips, Thomas J. Triggs & James W. Meehan (2004). Planning and Control of Action as Solutions to an Independence of Visual Mechanisms. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1):46-47.
Michael J. Richardson & Claire F. Michaels (2001). The Event-Code: Not the Solution to a Problem, but a Problem to Be Solved. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):901-902.
David Hunter (2003). Is Thinking an Action? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (2):133-148.
L. Pisella, A. Kritikos & Y. Rossetti (2001). Perception, Action, and Motor Control: Interaction Does Not Necessarily Imply Common Structures. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):898-899.
Bernhard Hommel, Jochen Müsseler, Gisa Aschersleben & Wolfgang Prinz (2001). The Theory of Event Coding (TEC): A Framework for Perception and Action Planning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):849-878.
David A. Westwood & Melvyn A. Goodale (2001). Perception and Action Planning: Getting It Together. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):907-908.
J. Scott Jordan (2001). The Theory of Event Coding (TEC)'s Framework May Leave Perception Out of the Picture. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):890-890.
S. J. (2003). Emergence of Self and Other in Perception and Action: An Event-Control Approach. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):633-646.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads22 ( #76,903 of 1,099,048 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #175,277 of 1,099,048 )
How can I increase my downloads?